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the one they pick's the one you'll know .by 
I CAN'T UNDERSTAND HOW IT COULD HAVE BEEN, 
but when I first entered his classroom thirty years 
ago he was a good dozen years younger than the 
professor my students meet in my classroom. He 
seemed old to me then: perhaps it was because his 
graying flat-top that seemed to spike at the sides 
gave him a wizened, owl-like look. Perhaps at that 
time people in their late thirties really were much 
older than freshman college students. Or, perhaps 
he seemed old because-as I know now that he 
would have wished-in his classroom he became 
one with the ancient texts we were studying. 
Introduction to the Bible, my first class with 
him, met four days a week, at 8:00 am. And class 
began promptly at eight, when he closed and 
locked the door. We were permitted only three 
absences, so missing class could be costly. Early in 
the semester slightly tardy students would knock 
on the locked door, requesting entry. He would 
shout at us, "Go away! We began at eight!" We got 
the message. No exceptions were made to accom-
modate us. 
Class began with a daily quiz on the assigned 
reading-one question, often on what I then 
considered an obscure point in the text, perhaps a 
name no one should be expected to remember. His 
response: one either read carefully or one didn't. 
The quizzes were graded and returned the next 
morning and, on the same sheet of paper we wrote 
the next quiz answer, and the next, and the next. 
Mter the quiz he lectured, sometimes clarifying 
the secondary text, sometimes disagreeing with it; 
often introducing new material that illuminated the 
biblical texts with which we dealt; often intro-
ducing new material that had no bearing upon the 
biblical texts we were studying, so far as I could 
see. At these times I was impatient with him, some-
thing I think he knew, and knew better than to care 
much about. He was an archaeologist by training. 
He knew the biblical material we were studying 
and its social and historical context. He knew what 
was interesting and what was important. His class-
room was not the place to satisfy the demands of 
even his relatively bright students. Something more 
important than our wishes was going on in the 
classroom. Truth was at stake, and an excellence in 
the pursuit of that truth. 
When we studied the creation narratives, he 
was an ancient Israelite who understood how his 
God both resembled and differed from the other 
gods. He could be J, D, P, or E. He was a chroni-
cler of conquests, a psalmist who sang of God's 
closeness, and of God's abandonment of him. He 
was, most memorably, a prophet who raged against 
our materialism and, in the class before our 
Thanksgiving break, suggested to us that we 
deserved to "choke on the turkeys we would soon 
be gorging on" while others went hungry. 
He had a reputation for being a most 
demanding teacher, and that was my experience of 
him. His reading assignments were lengthy, and 
always followed in the morning by those wretched 
daily quizzes. His tests required knowledge of inti-
mate details as well as a grasp of the big picture and 
a concern for its relevance to our lives. He 
demanded from us research, providing tools that 
would · stretch us if we allowed. He recognized 
shoddy work for what it was, and graded it accord-
ingly. It is hard to recover from a well-deserved D 
on a major project; hard, as well, to live with 
having disappointed one's mentor. 
And he was my mentor for the two and a half 
years I studied at that college. He was probably 
teaching at least five courses a semester with few, if 
any, repeat courses in the second semester. If I 
came to his small office-stuffed with books and 
cluttered with papers stacked and strewn in a 
system even he could only occasionally grasp-
when he was busy, he would curtly tell me to come 
back later. I always came back later. And he always 
found the time for me, and found the time for 
whatever new request I placed upon him. Yes, of 
course, he would do that independent study with 
me, but I would have to do this and this and this. 
Yes, he would provide me with a reading list, but he 
couldn't do it before .... He loved his students as 
much as he loved his studies. We knew as much. 
Not long ago retired, W.H.F.K. died this year at 
the age of 69. Some of his recent retirement time-
even following a serious automobile accident-he 
had spent teaching Latin to nearby high school 
students. He could not stop teaching; the students 
and what they might learn mattered too much. He 
died having written little that appears on the book-
shelves of scholars but having produced and 
published much for his small church denomina-
tion. For his students, he produced more than he 
could have imagined. 
He was one of a kind. And yet, I suspect, there 
are many like him in the small colleges that dot our 
landscape. Scholars of the highest caliber who both 
demand and greet first-rate scholarship, though they 
recognize for themselves a different calling than 
scholarly publication. Teachers who would first of all 
honor the excellence of the research and writing of 
others, even as they themselves pursue excellence in 
the teaching of their disciplines, even as they initiate 
and care for students undertaking those studies. 
A middle-aged teacher, I know that it is no easy 
thing to inspire; it is far easier to take the sardonic 
stance that appeals to the cynical (and there will 
always be cynical eighteen to twenty-one year 
olds). But the hells of youth deserve more and 
better than an elder's mirror-hells; this, the 
memory of W.H.F.K. reminds me. Better for the 
young are the dreams inspired by a meeting with 
Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. As W.H.F.K. realized, 
we teach our subjects, but, inevitably, we also teach 
ourselves-fragile, shallow selves if not attended 
to, or selves that can be healed and made whole by 
our encounters with God. And selves that can for 
some happy, fleeting moments, loose themselves in 
a reality larger than themselves, thus conveying an 
education worthy of human nature. f 
TDK 
JONAH'S DREAM 
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He slept most of the time, 
swaddled in the black belly, 
sleep broken only when the walls 
squeezed in or when a gush 
of bile burned his flesh. 
While he slept, he dreamed-
always the same-a hand 
breaks through the murky 
darkness, burrows into his chest, 
clutches his heart. Unable 
to see, he is endlessly 
dragged by this hand in his heart. 
He wakes up face down 
in whale vomit glowing purple 
in the moonlight. As he washes 
his face in the endless sea, 
he wishes the hand would tear 
his heart out and leave 
him alone, lifeless, 
finally at rest. 
Travis Scholl 
liberal learning and the light of faith: 
an initiation into wholeness 
WHENEVER I SURVEY THE SCENE IN HIGHER 
education and consider the role that Christians are 
to play in it, I immediately turn to my intellectual 
heroes for wisdom. Let me call these people "sign-
posts in a strange land," borrowing the title of 
Patrick Samway's volume on Walker Percy. Among 
their number I would include such diverse thinkers 
as Wendell Berry, John Paul II, and Cardinal 
Newman. The signposts tell us that something is 
amiss. They alert us to the fact that, yes, we inhabit 
a strange land. But what makes the 
Jeanne Heffernan 
That matter is subject to the laws of physics is 
not the problem. Wendell Berry objects to the notion 
that everything tangible is reducible to and, as Wtlson 
argues, determined by, the laws of physics. Wilson's 
reductionism is thoroughgoing; there is no room 
here for a non-material explanation of anything in 
our experience. Even meaning itself succumbs to the 
cold clutches of scientific reductionism. As Wtlson 
reveals, "What we call meaning is the linkage among 
the neural networks created by the spreading excita-
tion that enlarges imagery and 
land-our land, the land of the I think that our land is engages emotion." Berry rightly 
points out that "[t]his idea is explic-
itly imperialistic, and it is implicitly 
tyrannical. Mr. Wilson is perfectly 
frank about his territorial ambi-
tions. He wishes to see all the disci-
plines linked or unified-but strictly 
on the basis of science." With 
meaning reduced to molecules, the 
profoundest insights of all the disci-
plines are imperiled. Contrasting 
the world of Shakespeare's King 
Lear with Wilson's laboratory, 
Berry notes that only in the former 
is there a genuine place for the 
academy, not to mention the larger 
culture-strange? I think that our 
land is strange because it is too flat; 
its surface has been reduced, 
leveled, so that what were once 
mountains are barely molehills. Or, 
better, what are mountains are 
now reckoned as molehills. Our 
topographical map is askew. 
strange because it is 
too flat-its surface 
How so? Well, if Wendell Berry 
is right, and I think he is, we've 
taken our map from the wrong 
surveyors. The academy's most 
illustrious mapmakers are reduc-
has been reduced, 
leveled, so that what 
were once mountains 
are barely molehills. 
Or, better, what are 
mountains are now 
reckoned as molehills. 
Our topographical 
map is askew. 
tionists; their equipment is suited to 
studying small bits of earth, but they presume to 
measure the whole world with it, to compass the 
horizon using a microscopic lens. For Wendell Berry, 
chief among misguided mapmakers is Harvard 
sociobiologist E. 0 . Wilson. Wtlson is a very clever 
scientist; this Berry grants. But he is a poor philoso-
pher, theologian, and political theorist. Does Wilson 
claim these areas of expertise? Not exactly. But he 
presumes to speak on all of them because his 
method is imperialistic: it conquers every territory 
of knowledge and becomes its master. In Wilson's 
own words, "all tangible phenomena, from the birth 
of stars to the workings of social institutions, are 
based on material processes that are ultimately 
reducible to ... the laws of physics." 
miraculous and mysterious. 
But then how has Wilson been able to concoct 
such a scheme? What has happened here? For 
Berry, the fact that Wilson can seriously propound 
the theory of consilience and the fact that he has 
been richly rewarded for it with accolades and a 
prestigious post in the academy testifies to the fact 
that the university is lost. It has no meaningful 
unity, but is fragmented, and split into different 
territories, each speaking hyper-specialized 
languages. As Berry argues in "The Loss of the 
University" in Life is a Miracle, there is no common 
tongue with which to communicate, no forum 
within which to discuss-and defend-one's ideas. 
Thus, safely distant from theologians and Christian 
literary scholars, an E. 0. Wilson can say that 
Milton's own testimony notwithstanding, Paradise 
Lost owes nothing to God's inspiration. Without 
challenge, Wilson is allowed to rest in what E. F. 
Schumacher called "a methodical aversion to the 
recognition of higher levels ... of significance." 
Now THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM IN THE NATURAL 
sciences alone; so many of our disciplines fall prey 
to a similar reductionism. This is the predicament 
of the modern university. But it was not always so; 
this radical fragmentation of knowledge is a rela-
tively recent thing. As H. ]. Massingham has 
observed, "Modern knowledge is departmental-
ized," whereas, he continues, "the essence of 
culture is initiation into wholeness, so that all the 
divisions of knowledge are considered as the 
branches of one tree, the Tree of Life whose roots 
go deep into the earth and whose top is in heaven." 
Here is an alternative, and I think recoverable, 
vision of learning. This vision is guided by what the 
medievals called adaequatio rei et intellectus: the 
principle that the understanding of the knower 
must be adequate to the thing to be known. To put 
it simply, there are different ways to know different 
things; and there are different ways to know the 
tively, the liberal arts in and of themselves can 
begin one's initiation into wholeness. 
Consider this scenario. A non-believing 
student with an empirical, pragmatic bent enrolls 
in a state university. He declares a chemistry 
major, loads up on natural science courses, and 
quickly refines his grasp and practice of the scien-
tific method; its precision profoundly shapes his 
habit of mind. Flush with his newfound knowl-
edge, he examines everything-even his girl-
friend-according to its chemical components. 
(This, of course, gets him in trouble!) But in the 
following semester, he begins to satisfy his general 
education requirements with courses on British 
literature, Western civilization, and art history. 
Suddenly, he's taken aback. The tools which had 
served him so well in the lab offer little assistance 
in interpreting George Herbert or understanding 
Augustine's Confessions or accounting for the 
paintings of Giotto. Herbert evokes in him a fasci-
nation with language-with the way in which 
finite forms gesture toward transcendence. 
Augustine prompts a new and strange self-exami-
nation. Giotto whets his appetite for beauty. All of 
this is mysterious to him, and he can't reduce it to 
the proportions of chemistry. He has experienced 
same things. Take a book. Let's say 
the Bible, a first edition King James 
at that. Now, a physicist can tell us 
a great deal about the atomic parti-
cles of its parchment; a chemist 
about the carbon remaining in its 
pages; a linguist about its distinc-
tive verbal forms; a religious histo-
rian about the social and political 
To put it positively, 
the liberal arts 
intimations of something beyond. 
And, like the unforgettable Binx 
Bolling in Walker Percy's The 
Moviegoer, he undertakes a search; 
he has thus begun the initiation 
into wholeness. 
in and of themselves 
can begin one's 
initiation into 
wholeness. 
What may deliver him into a 
fuller wholeness? The light of faith. 
context of its creation. Yet none of these has 
comprehended its meaning; each has added to our 
understanding, yes, but none is adequate to the full 
reality of the object; the proper bounds of the 
disciplines prevent this. 
This is why we have universities, ideally 
communities of learners who complement one 
another's work in an effort to understand the 
whole. The recovery of the liberal arts taking place 
in many of our colleges and universities is a step in 
the right direction. Baylor's Interdisciplinary Core, 
Pepperdine's Great Books Program, and 
Valparaiso's Christ College curriculum come to 
mind in this connection. Even in secular universi-
ties, the study of the liberal arts promises some 
protection against reductionism. To put it posi-
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It is the leaven his liberal arts 
studies need in order to rise to new heights, for a 
Christian perspective markedly changes learning. 
What might it mean to view education, and specif-
ically higher education, from a Christian perspec-
tive? I think it entails at least two things: a certain 
orientation toward learning and a sense of the 
proper breadth of education. 
Christian orientation toward learning 
A Christian orientation toward learning, as I 
see it, is an openness to the truth that is marked by 
wonder and gratitude. James Taylor in his remark-
able Poetic Knowledge: The Recovery of Education 
describes wonder as "an emotion of fear, a fear 
produced by the consciousness of ignorance, 
which, because it is man's natural desire (good) to 
know ... is perceived as a kind of evil." Ignorance 
is a kind of deprivation, the awareness of which 
produces fear. Think of walking into a great study 
filled from floor to ceiling with beautiful books and 
at once feeling surges of anxiety as well as excite-
ment and desire. We are aware that we don't know 
the riches the books contain; we're daunted by this 
fact, and yet we're drawn to the books just the 
same; we want to know. As Taylor reckons, this is 
what Plato and Aristotle understood as wonder, the 
existential starting point of philosophy. 
R TO AND ARBTOUE ILWMJNATED MUCH ABOJJf 
the experience of wonder and the birth of philos-
ophy in the soul; they were great teachers. But it 
seems to me that what we learn from revelation 
adds immeasurably to our orientation toward 
learning, because we know from God's self-disclo-
sure to the Jews and, even more, in his Incarnation 
in Christ that the unmoved mover of the ancients 
is actually a personal God-so personal that we call 
him Father-who created the world out of 
generosity, who considered his creation very good, 
and who so loved the world even after it rebelled 
that he sent his only Son to die for its salvation. 
This prepares us, it seems to me, to approach the 
learning process not only with wonder, but also 
with profound gratitude. Everything about our 
Christian story should encourage this, for we see 
from start to finish that self-giving love is the very 
ground of existence; it is the deepest truth about 
the world. It is out of this love that we have been 
given everything-from the creation of the world 
to its salvation-as a gift. And the proper way to 
receive a gift is in gratitude. Thus, the Christian 
can affirm what Socrates expressed so well about 
education in the Republic, namely, "the object of 
education is to teach us to love what is beautiful," 
to which she will add, "and to be grateful to her 
heavenly Father for it." 
Christian revelation also informs us that the 
context within which all learning takes place is a 
great drama. Think about these biblical themes: the 
way of life versus the way of death; truth in contest 
with falsehood; the forces of light arrayed against 
the powers of darkness; heaven and hell. Human 
life is charged with supernatural meaning, meaning 
that transcends the bounds of time and history. As 
Pope John Paul II explains in his encyclical The 
Gospel of Life: 
Man is called to a fullness of life which far 
exceeds the dimensions of his earthly exis-
tence, because it consists in sharing the very 
life of God. The loftiness of this supernatural 
vocation reveals the greatness and the ines-
timable value of human life even in its 
temporal phase. Life in time, in fact, is the 
fundamental condition, the initial stage and 
an integral part of the entire unified process 
of human existence. It is a process which, 
unexpectedly and undeservedly, is enlight-
ened by the promise and renewed by the gift 
of divine life, which will reach its full realiza-
tion in eternity (cf. 1 John 3:1-2). At the 
same time, it is precisely this supernatural 
calling which highlights the relative char-
acter of each individual's earthly life. After 
all, life on earth is not an "ultimate" but a 
"penultimate" reality; even so, it remains a 
sacred reality entrusted to us, to be preserved 
with a sense of responsibility and brought to 
perfection in love and in the gift of ourselves 
to God and to our brothers and sisters. 
If we understand life as a sacred reality, entrusted 
to us, we will insist that education remain faithful 
to the supernatural dimensions and destiny of the 
human person. Our thoughts about education will 
begin, as Jacques Maritain's did, with a considera-
tion of the essence of man. "Man," in Maritain's 
words, "is a person, who holds himself in hand by 
his intelligence and his will. He does not merely 
exist as a physical being. There is in him a richer 
and nobler existence; he has spiritual superexis-
tence through knowledge and love." Thus, contra 
E. 0. Wilson, Maritain insists that man "is in some 
way, a whole, not merely a part; he is a universe 
unto himself, a microcosm in which the great 
universe in its entirety can be encompassed 
through knowledge. And through love he can give 
himself freely to beings who are to him, as it were, 
other selves; and for this relationship no equivalent 
can be found in the physical world." 
a sense of the breadth of education 
Man is in some way a whole, a universe unto 
himself, and education should be commensurate to 
his stature; this is the second insight a Christian 
perspective offers. Education must reflect the 
height, depth, and breadth of human experience, 
attending to the body, soul, and spirit, to time and 
eternity. It must, in short, guard against reduc-
tionism. It should not attempt to understand the 
human experience according to the epistemolog-
ical constraints of any one discipline, nor should it 
focus on a narrow and limited goal, such as "career 
preparation." 
Instead, as Wendell Berry has passionately 
argued, education should be about the making of a 
good, that is to say, a fully developed, human 
being. And it does so by engaging the student in 
broad, basic studies that enable us to understand 
the whole, the cosmos. A curriculum should be 
faithful to the many-faceted nature of reality, from 
sub-atomic particles to the heights of religious 
mysticism. From a Christian perspective, this 
makes sense, since God reveals his wisdom and 
love through the Book of Revelation and the Book 
of Nature; faith and human reason both yield 
truths that originate with the Author of Truth. As 
Ambrose of Milan affirmed, ''Anything true, by no 
matter whom said, is from the Holy Spirit." The 
briefly sketch how such a person might apply in a 
practical way what she has learned. Having spent 
the last year in Washington, I am sensitive to how 
pressing the need for Christian wholeness is in the 
world of policymaking, a world often marked by 
ideologically drawn categories and a frightening 
reductionism. By contrast, instead of working 
within the comfortable but hopelessly inadequate 
categories of liberal and conservative, a Christian 
humanism prompts us to an independent analysis 
of political proposals, judging them in light of a 
biblical anthropology. 
This kind of perspective, it seems to me, can 
helpfully inform our approach to two policy areas 
that are especially susceptible to the reductionism 
a Christian should resist: environmental regulation 
and stem cell research. It is a mark of our impov-
erished politics that one would not expect the 
same person to be concerned about both things, 
but this is exactly the kind of dichotomy Christian 
teaching defies. 
unity of truth lends dignity to the 
investigation of all of reality-sacred 
and mundane-as all reality bears the 
stamp of God's creative love. In the 
words of John Henry Newman, "All 
that is good, all that is true, all that is 
beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it 
great or small, be it perfect or frag-
mentary, natural as well as supernat-




story prepares us 
to approach the 
learning process 
not only with 




mental policy, Christians are singu-
larly able to resist the impulse to 
regard natural resources as simply 
material to be used at will for our 
comfort and security. Such an attitude 
has implicitly informed much of our 
land-use. In the words of Aldo 
Leopold, founder of the Wilderness 
Society, we have too often used the 
natural world according to a 
simplistic formula of economic utility, Hence, there should be a 
Christian impulse to offer an expansive, unified 
curriculum, grounded in the conviction that 
approaching life and learning through a dedication 
to the liberal arts illumined by faith provides the 
surest initiation into human wholeness. Cultivating 
this kind of wholeness, which is to my mind the 
work of Christian humanism, runs against the 
reductive impulses so pervasive in our culture-in 
the academy, politics, medicine, and economics. A 
Christian humanism consciously resists this reduc-
tionism and insists on seeing things whole. 
Christian life and learning: an application 
A student trained in the ways of Christian 
humanism would emerge from the university a 
more whole, integrated person. She would be 
equipped to engage the world in a distinctive way, 
reflective of her deep Christian education. Let me 
sl9 The Cresset Trinity 12004 
which "defines no right or wrong, assigns no obli-
gations, calls for no sacrifice, [and] implies no 
change in the current philosophy of values." 
Hence Leopold's plea for a more comprehensive 
"land ethic" informed by what he calls an "ecolog-
ical conscience." Christian theology yields vital-
indeed, indispensable-resources for the develop-
ment of such a comprehensive ethic and the 
formation of such a conscience. Drawing upon the 
Catholic tradition, in particular, I think that the 
Church's understanding of the sacramentality of 
creation, the requirements of a just social order, 
and the resources of the spiritual life are critical 
elements in the theoretical and practical enterprise 
of conservation. 
For the Christian humanist, the natural world 
is a material resource ordained for human use, but 
it is more than that. A reflection of God's creativity, 
it has the sublime power to inspire contemplation 
and praise. Even in its mundane use, however, it is 
to be treated in a particular way. Pope John Paul II 
calls for a "ministerial dominion" that is respectful 
of earth's integrity and rhythms and mindful of the 
fact that man does not own, but simply stewards 
creation. The practice of stewardship, moreover, 
entails a consideration of justice to our fellows; our 
use of the world's resources must be defined in 
light of the needs of others. This is why the pope 
calls the ecological crisis a moral crisis: the 
wasteful habits of some have harmed many. In 
order to enact environmental policies that both 
accord due respect to the natural world and 
redound to the global common good, we need to 
bring a larger, richer vision to environmental poli-
cymaking; we need, in short, a biblical vision of 
creation to guide our decisions. 
Likewise, a Christian vision is necessary in the 
area of biotechnology, a field often governed by a 
similarly reductionist impulse. When this is applied 
to embryonic stem cell research we see an even 
more grievous example of instrumenta1ization than 
we find in environmental policy, and so the expan-
sive vision of Christian humanism is especially 
needful here. Unlike many policymakers on 
Capito] Hill, Christians recognize human life as a 
Prayer 
sacred reality, and they refuse to render it raw 
material for our use-even for the sake of the 
noblest causes. As I see it, a Christian conscience 
allows the poetic profundity of the psalms to shape 
its vision of the tiniest member of our species, 
seeing in the fragile embryo not a reserve of DNA 
to be harvested at will, but a human being mysteri-
ously participating in the supernatural destiny of 
God's children. 
In each of these cases-the one concerning the 
environment, the other the embryo-the disposi-
tion of the Christian humanist is marked by 
humility before that which she did not make and 
should not aim to master. Inspired by the richness 
of the biblical vision, she attempts to see things 
whole and to see them sub specie aeternitatis-
under the aspect of eternity. Possessed of such a 
perspective, she resists the reductive impulse of our 
time and the despair to which it inevitably leads. 
Instead, as Berry suggests, she insists that meaning 
suffuses the cosmos, and so she exclaims with love 
for the world what Edgar so tenderly spoke to 
Gloucester, "Thy life's a miracle"! f 
Jeanne Heffernan teaches Political Science at 
Pepperdine University and directs the university,s 
Washington, D. C. Internship Program. 
Let me hang in the space 
you invent. 
By my feet, if need be. 
Like the bat 
in her surplice of leather, 
folded 
in expectation. 
Suspend me from whimsical rafters 
of your grace, 
permit me to sound out 
the intricate 
shapes of your orchard. 
Feed me 
with your deft fruit. 
Linda Mills Woolsey 
what we have loved: 
memory and the heart of learning 
I. OUR GOAL IS TO "REVISIT THE CONNECTION" 
between Christianity and liberal learning, then 
there can be few better places from which to begin 
our journey than the nineteenth century. There we 
find Christianity facing bracing challenges of direct 
relevance to our own spiritual lives and theological 
concerns, and it is also in the final decades of that 
century that we witness the emergence of liberal 
learning as we now define, practice, and defend it. 
What makes this century so vital to our task of 
revisiting the connection is the fact that this chal-
lenge and this emergence are not coincidental or 
unrelated, but intimately tied to one another. In the 
form that we know them, liberal learning and the 
modern ideal of the humanities were cultivated at 
that century's close as a kind of healing balm to 
repair the wounds inflicted upon Christian belief 
over the course of that century. 
In focusing upon questions of history here, I 
am in a way going against type. When we gather as 
Christian educators to reflect upon the connections 
between the Lord to whom we bear witness and 
the educational vision we profess, we customarily 
speak of themes and ideals rather than of narratives 
of the past. Now to be sure, our contemplations 
and visions are central to our work as Christian 
educators. They set us at a distance from our daily 
labors and afford us a refreshing perspective on our 
sometimes wearying activities. They are to us what 
the climbing of trees is to the "swinger ~ birches" 
in Robert Frost's remarkable poem. The speaker in 
"Birches" tells us that as a boy he liked to climb 
those branches "Toward heaven." And so, he says: 
I dream of going back to be. 
It's when I'm weary of considerations, 
And life is too much like a pathless wood 
Where your face burns and tickles with the cobwebs 
Broken across it, and one eye is weeping 
From a twig's having lashed across it open. 
I'd like to get away from earth awhile 
And then come back to it and begin over. 
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The speaker in Frost's poem has his trees to 
climb to gain his fresh vantage point, while we have 
our Lilly-funded flights to take, rooms to occupy, 
and vistas to enjoy so that we may renew our vision 
for the work before us. Yet as the speaker of Frost's 
poem reminds us, he-and we-must return from 
the treetops and make our way back from Malibu. 
"May no fate willfully misunderstand me," he 
pleads: 
And half grant what I wish and snatch me away 
Not to return. Earth's the right place for love: 
I don't know where it's likely to go better. 
Love and memory are my themes today. If earth is 
indeed the right place for love, I can think of no 
better way of returning to it for our thinking about 
"Christianity and liberal learning" than through 
the offices of memory and the work of history. In 
the account I am about to offer, I am indebted in 
particular to James Turner, whose work on the rise 
of unbelief and the growth of the humanities in the 
nineteenth century provides a framework for my 
argument. At the heart of this history, however, 
will be nineteenth-century poets, novelists, and 
essayists. Each wrote profoundly on memory as 
well as love, and each speaks to the matters on our 
minds and in our hearts. 
memory and modernity 
We begin with Wordsworth, who has provided 
our title. The passage comes at the end of The 
Prelude. Mter having documented everything from 
the French Revolution to the development of his 
own "poetic mind," Wordsworth links memory, 
love, and learning with the poet's calling: "what we 
have loved,/ Others will love, and we will teach 
them how." 
As it stands, this seems a remarkably concise 
representation of a Christian understanding of the 
art of teaching and the heart of learning. These are 
enterprises of cultural memory and transmission. 
The present perfect tense-"what we have loved" 
-speaks of the passing nature of all expenence 
and implies our need to pass it on. 
We will teach them, Wordsworth appears to say, 
about the objects of our affection, with the goal of 
having them share the love we hold. It is not a tech-
nique for having affections, however, that we will 
impart; rather, we will teach them to love the proper 
persons, things, and beings. "He lives in justice and 
sanctity who is an unprejudiced assessor of the 
intrinsic value of things," writes St. Augustine. "He 
is a man who has an ordinate love: he neither loves 
what should not be loved nor fails to love what 
should be loved." Sinners are not to be loved for 
their own sake, and all women and men are to be 
"loved for the sake of God, and God should be 
loved for His own sake." While Wordsworth 
grounds teaching in the act of transmitting the past, 
Logos philosophy of the Greeks, the incarnational 
theology of John's gospel, and medieval 
Catholicism's Aristotelian theology of nature. It 
entails the conviction that the universe is saturated 
with a worded significance. Ideas and values are 
located in the world and not exclusively in human 
consciousness; they inhere in the nature of things 
and are not merely ascribed to objects by subjects. 
In Charles Taylor's words, in this view of reality 
"the order of things embodies an ontic logos," and 
"correct human knowledge and valuation comes 
from our connecting ourselves rightly to the signif-
icance things already have." 
To support his argument, Taylor refers briefly to 
the work of Walter Ong, the brilliant Catholic 
literary critic whose book on Peter Ramus examines 
the linguistic evidence for the transformation of 
he also speaks confidently of 
what is to come in the future: 
"what we have loved,/ Others 
will love." He delivers this as 
an assertion that takes on the 
character of a promise, having 
connected in two lines of 
poetry past, present, and future 
in a narrative of memory and 
anticipation. 
''He is a man who has an 
ordinate love: he neither loves 
what should not be loved nor 
fails to love what should be 
loved., Sinners are not to be 
loved for their own sake~ and 
all women and men are to be 
modern conceptions of self, 
God, and world. As an example 
of these changes, Ong cites the 
history of the words honor and 
praise, which we think of as 
qualities applied to objects by 
persons, but to Ramus and his 
classical and Christian prede-
cessors, "object[s] somehow 
emanate honor and praise, in 
this way performing a kind of 
personal role." When we praise 
God, we respond m a 
This sounds good, but if 
we step back and scan the 
longer passage in which these 
lines are couched, a somewhat 
"loved for the sake of God~ 
and God should be loved for 
His own sake., 
different picture emerges. Wordsworth 1magmes 
his age and nation sinking to "servitude, ignominy, 
and shame." Still he hopes we may yet be 
"labourers in a work. .. of redemption." (Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge is the other person forming the 
"we" in these passages.) We will stand as "Prophets 
of Nature," Wordsworth asserts, and "speak/ A 
lasting inspiration." Then follows the "what we 
have loved" passage, after which The Prelude 
moves quickly to its conclusion: We will "Instruct 
them how the mind of man becomes/ A thousand 
times more beautiful than the earth/ On which it 
dwells." The mind dwells above the world, for it is 
"Of substance and of fabric more divine." 
Written at the dawn of the nineteenth century, 
The Prelude marks a point at which the arcs of two 
radically different intellectual trajectories cross. 
The descending line traces the path of a conception 
of the cosmos deeply etched in western conscious-
ness. This view has many sources, including the 
secondary fashion to the praise 
that flowed from its primary source in God; ours is 
not a work of creative attribution but one of 
dependent participation. Ong refers to the Merchant 
of Venice-"How many things by season season'd 
are/ To their right praise and true perfection" [V,v, 
108-9]-and other works to illustrate his conclusion: 
"For the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century mind, 
the value in the object and the praise elicited by the 
object tend to be viewed as one whole." 
This train of thought is on a descending trajec-
tory by the time Wordsworth writes The Prelude. In 
his lifetime, from 1770-185 0-the era of the English 
Romantic poets and German philosophical ideal-
ists-it intersects with a rising belief in the primacy 
of the mind, consciousness, or imagination. 
Wordsworth intended The Prelude to be truly a 
prelude to a longer epic he never finished. He did, 
however, complete a "Prospectus" to this work. It 
has a haunting beauty and makes audacious claims 
on behalf of this mind, which is ''A thousand times 
more beautiful than the earth. The "Prospectus" 
piles image upon image to affirm that nothing-
not "Jehovah-with his thunder," nor his "choir of 
shouting angels," nor the pits of hell itself can 
"breed such fear and awe/ As fall upon us often 
when we look! Into our Minds." 
The brief prospectus then turns into a wedding 
verse celebrating the union of "the intellect of 
Man" and "this goodly universe." In "love and holy 
passion" this "great consummation" shall make 
nothing less than Paradise "A simple produce of the 
common day": 
my voice proclaims 
How exquisitely the individual Mind 
... to the external World 
Is fitted:-and how exquisitely, too, ... 
The external world is fitted to the Mind; 
And the creation .. . 
which they with blended might 
Accomplish:-this is our high argument. 
And this was indeed to be the "high argument" of 
many of the greatest English-language writers of the 
first half of the nineteenth century-including Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, William Blake, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau, among others. 
We might make the distinction between this 
position and the preceding pattern described by 
Ong and Taylor in the following manner. Then, the 
"value in the object and the praise elicited by" it 
were both, in a fashion, dependents of God; 
subject and object were equal children of the 
divine, not identical twins yet nonetheless bearers 
of the same familial DNA. Now, at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century the human person as subject is 
one thing, the natural world as object, another; 
they are exquisitely fitted, like husband and wife, 
to each other, and it is their offspring that will 
become the restored paradise, the longed-for 
kingdom that God has yet failed to bring into 
being. As Wordsworth's fellow poet, Robert 
Southey wrote of their era, "Old things seemed 
passing away, and nothing was dreamt of but the 
regeneration of the human race." 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, 
many looked for the end of history as we had known 
it since we began wandering east of Eden. The vision 
of the new order sprang from the mind of human 
beings whose task it was, in Emerson's words, to 
effect "the transformation of genius into practical 
power." In The Prelude, Wordsworth confesses that 
at the height of the French revolution, the earth had 
appeared to him as an "inheritance, new-fallen" 
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appears to one who comes to make his home in it. He 
"moulds it and remoulds,/ And is half pleased with 
things that are amiss,/ 'Twill be such joy to see them 
disappear." The joy of liberation here is palpable, as 
Jehovah, his choir of angels, and the sordid history 
over which they have ruled appear about to vanish. 
But if Wordsworth's "Mind of Man" was to 
triumph, if consciousness was to play ascendant 
husband to nature's submissive wife, memory had to 
be subdued and chastened. Emerson is a key figure 
here. In the 1830s, having traded his Unitarian pulpit 
for a lyceum lectern and the sermon for the lecture, 
he traced the contours of a cultural life to be estab-
lished beyond the Christian creeds, the scriptures, 
and the Triune God. In a series of dazzling essays, he 
sought to obliterate the distinction between God and 
human consciousness, for "God incarnates himself in 
man, and evermore goes forth anew to take posses-
sion of the world." The incarnation is an exercise in 
self-development and self-expansion, and God 
assumes his new and only residence within: "That 
which shows God in me, fortifies me. That which 
shows God out of me, makes me a wart and a wen." 
For Emerson, no force has a greater power to 
"show God out of me" than memory. It makes us 
foolishly concerned about the consistency of our 
acts and the continuity of our identity; it trains our 
minds on the dead letter of the past rather than the 
quick spirit of the present; and it imposes on life's 
freely flowing forces a pattern our experience 
neither seeks nor requires. Emerson's disdain for 
memory is visceral and relentless. The problem with 
preaching is that it is rooted in tradition and "comes 
out of the memory, not out of the soul"; "when we 
have new perception," he writes, we are able at last 
to discard the "old rubbish" of "memory"; we are 
burdened not by our sins but by the "monstrous 
corpse of memory" under whose weight we stagger; 
and God protects us from our past by drawing 
behind us a "screen of purest sky." "You will not 
remember," he seems to say, "and you will not 
expect .... All good ... action[s] come from a spon-
taneity which forgets .... Life has no memory." 
love, memory, and the rise of liberal learning 
Not surprisingly, this assault on memory 1s 
accompanied by a sharp critique of the art of 
teaching and the work of the American college. As 
records of past experiences, Emerson writes, books 
"are for nothing but to inspire." They are for the 
"scholar's idle times," because when he or she can 
"read God directly, the hour is too precious to be 
wasted in other men's transcripts of their read-
ings." The truth, he told the Harvard Divinity 
School students in 1838, "cannot be received at 
second hand," for "truly speaking, it is not instruc-
tion, but provocation, that I can receive from 
another soul." The person thus provoked is "the 
word made flesh, born to shed healing to the 
nations," and he or she is ready to begin "tossing 
the laws, the books, idolatries, and customs out of 
the window." Having been a lackluster student at 
Harvard, Emerson saw little of value in the clois-
tered life of higher education. After all, "life is our 
dictionary," he declared. "Colleges and books only 
copy the language which the field and the work-
yard made." 
In the seventh decade of the nineteenth 
century, that language of the American field and 
workyard acquired a bloody coloring and took on 
violent resonances. It is here that our story turns, 
for as Andrew Delbanco has written, "the Civil 
War was the great divide between a culture of faith 
and a culture of doubt. . . . Before the war, 
Americans spoke of providence. After it, they 
spoke of luck." For many in the war's aftermath, 
both the long-standing orthodoxies of Christianity 
and the more recently minted pieties of the 
Romantic and Transcendental faiths seemed brittle 
and hollow. Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, 
survived his wounds from the bloody battle of the 
Wilderness in the spring of 1864 but never recov-
ered from the spiritual shocks of those dreadful 
years. He went on to a distinguished career as a 
Supreme Court justice, but "he never forgot what 
he lost. "He told me," [Albert] Einstein reported, 
"that 'after the Civil War the world never seemed 
quite right again."' 
Ruled by a God of Battles so ruthless, efficient, 
and indifferent that he had no name but that of 
"force," the Civil War particularly confirmed what 
some writers and thinkers of the day were already 
beginning to fear generally. For these poets, novel-
ists, and philosophers, the early nineteenth century 
joys of liberation were being transformed into the 
terrors of abandonment. This is the point of the 
dreadful yet gleeful passage on the death of God in 
Friedrich Nietzsche's The Gay Science-"We have 
killed him-you and I. All of us are his 
murderers" -as it is, I believe, one of the reasons 
for the fascination of the nineteenth-century 
American and English novel with the figure of the 
orphan. Take the orphans out of the novels of 
Dickens, the Bronte sisters, and George Eliot, and 
what do you have left? What would Great 
Expectations be if Pip had parents? What is The 
Scarlet Letter but the story of a daughter's search 
to find the father who has abandoned her? Who is 
Huckleberry Finn if not another orphan drifting 
down the lazy river of aimless American time? 
As the nineteenth century moved into its final 
decades, then, mind and nature appeared to be in 
the final stages of a divorce brought on by irrecon-
cilable differences, and their abandoned children 
were the orphans of a brave new world, a strangely 
different age. In Moby-Dick, written a decade 
before the Civil War, Herman Melville's Captain 
Ahab asks about this abandonment: "Where lies 
the final harbor, whence we unmoor no more? ... 
Where is the foundling's father hidden? Our souls 
are like those orphans whose unwedded mothers 
die in bearing them: the secret of our paternity lies 
in their grave, and we must there to learn it." Or as 
Emily Dickinson was to write in 1882-the same 
year Nietzsche's The Gay Science was published: 
Those-dying then, 
Knew where they went-
They went to God's Right Hand-
That Hand it amputated now 
And God cannot be found-
The abdication of Belief 
Makes the Behavior small-
Better an ignis fatuus 
Than no illume at all-
For Melville and Dickinson, the awareness of loss 
and the terror of abandonment came with a corre-
sponding quest to revivify memory. It was to them 
no longer a corpse threatening to crush the fresh 
identity of a people freed from the clutches of 
history. Instead, memory became the resonant 
core, the vital body of that identity. Melville's 
wrenching account of slavery, race, and the ironies 
of identity, Benito Cereno, concludes with the 
forward-looking American Amasa Delano admon-
ishing the broken-hearted Cereno: "But the past is 
passed; why moralize upon it? Forget it." The sun 
has forgotten it, "and the blue sea, and the blue 
sky; these have turned over new leaves." They have 
done so, Benito Cereno "dejectedly replied," 
"because they have no memory; because they are 
not human." 
Thus, as the Wordsworthian and Emersonian 
faith in the transforming force of consciousness 
waned, the passion for memory as a resurrection 
power waxed more strongly. "I cannot tell how 
Eternity seems. It sweeps around me like a sea," 
Emily Dickinson wrote to her cousins only days 
after her mother had died in late 1882. Yet "thank 
you for remembering me. Remembrance-mighty 
word. 'Thou gavest it to me from the foundation of 
the world."' Several weeks later, she wrote, again in 
reference to her mother's death: "Memory is a 
strange Bell-Jubilee, and Knell." It was "Jubilee" 
because it brought the dead to life and lodged them 
securely in the mansion of the mind. "My Hazel 
Eye/ Has periods of shutting-/ But no lid has 
Memory," Dickinson claimed, for "Memory like 
Melodyj Is pink eternally-." Yet at the same time, 
memory also sounds the death "Knell," tolling the 
loss of ones she had loved. "Remorse-is 
Memory-awake," and the mind that raises the 
dead must also acknowledge that "The Grave-was 
finished-but the Spade/ Remained in Memory-." 
For Dickinson, memory's power was without equal 
as a human capacity, and life 
In that half-century, a new congeries of subjects, 
known as the humanities, came into being and 
quickly displaced the Greek and Latin centered 
curriculum that had governed the liberal arts for 
centuries. 
This "rise of the humanities was intimately 
linked to embarrassments consequent upon secu-
larization," Turner claims. Those embarrassments 
had to do with the weakening of what the late 
nineteenth-century Princeton physicist Joseph 
Henry spoke of as that belief which should 
animate all research and teaching in the modern 
university: "all the phenomena of the external 
universe, and perhaps all those of the spiritual, 
[may be] reduced to the operation of a single and 
simple law of the Divine will." According to 
Turner, this assumption was undermined by the 
passing of the moral philosophy that had unified 
college curricula from the Revolution to the Civil 
War; by the increasingly specialized work of 
researchers who had neither the need nor the 
without memory was unthink-
able. "Dear friend," she wrote 
to a neighbor in 1879, "I think 
Heaven will not be as good as 
earth, unless it bring with that 
sweet power to remember, 
which is the Staple of Heaven-
here. How can we thank each 
other, when omnipotent?" 
It is hardly a coincidence 
that in the same decades during 
which Melville and Dickinson 
The doctrine of the Trinity, 
by contrast, reminds us that 
persons are essentially in 
relation. Our relations aren't 
an "add on," they're at the 
core of who we are. To the 
extent that this isn't true for 
human persons, it's a sign of 
our failure to be persons in 
desire "to invoke the creator of 
any larger matrix of knowl-
edge"; by the influence of grad-
uate training in Germany where 
ties between Christianity and 
higher learning "had frayed if 
not snapped"; by the small, 
growing cadre of agnostics who 
appeared in universities after 
the Civil War; and, finally, by 
the methodological conse-
the fullest sense, after the 
model of the divine persons. 
quences of Darwin and his 
system's "shaking of episterna-
were meditating on memory 
and the loss of God-from the 1850s through the 
1880s-the modern ideal of liberal learning was 
taking form and then taking hold of American 
higher education. In a series of compelling books, 
James Turner has written extensively about this 
subject for the past twenty years-first in his path 
breaking Without God, Without Creed: The Origins 
of Unbelief in America, then in his biography of 
Charles Eliot Norton, and most recently in The 
Sacred and the Secular University, jointly-authored 
with Jon Roberts. 
"Development may be forecast; revolution 
cannot," Turner writes in the opening sentence of 
his section of this latter book. No one could have 
predicted in 1850 the dramatic new "shapes into 
which academic knowledge would shift by 1900." 
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logical certainty." 
With a few exceptions, late nineteenth-century 
American universities and colleges moved with 
what Turner terms "a buoyant zeal to bring 
Christian learning up to date" and subdue "the 
threat of disciplinary specialization and of intellec-
tual secularization more broadly." As they fought 
this good fight, educators of that era deployed the 
humanities as the main weapon in their arsenal, 
hoping through the offices of liberal arts education 
to restore coherence to an increasingly fragmented 
array of disciplines and to sustain the religious 
character of learning, even as their schools and 
curricula shed their allegiances to any particular 
Christian confession, authority, or creed. This indif-
ference to historic Christianity should not surprise 
us, for the most vocal proponents of the humanities 
and the ideal of liberal learning-such as Charles 
Eliot Norton on this side of the Atlantic, and 
Matthew Arnold across the sea-were Protestants 
who were not necessarily Christians. And within a 
matter of years their vision was to make the 
American and British university a safe haven for 
what George Marsden has memorably phrased 
"liberal Protestantism without Protestantism." 
At mid-century, however, others had set out 
not just to recover the ethos of a remembered past 
but to recuperate the living faith that had once 
animated its long history. For some, like John 
Henry Newman and Orestes Brownson, this meant 
a return to the Catholic church from which their 
ancestors had separated centuries before. Others 
like John W. Nevin and Charles Hodge, were, as 
Mark Noll felicitously puts it, "far less convinced 
that the deliverances of consciousness did as much 
for theological formation as their American coun-
terparts claimed." Members of this group sought to 
counter the vapidities of liberalism through a 
renewal of creedal Protestantism. 
Yet in the main, the scholars and leaders who 
shaped the American revival of liberal learning in 
the late nineteenth century had little desire to 
resist the shift in knowledge that Walter Ong and 
Charles Taylor have outlined for us. To most of 
these hesitantly Christian humanists, the world 
was a domain of objects without qualities faced by 
an array of human subjects who invented and 
ascribed to these objects what values they could. 
In most cases, those educators, whom Taylor calls 
"our Victorian contemporaries," longed to 
believe that an increasingly nebulous and inef-
fable mind of God held these objects and subjects 
together within a single purpose, a single law, a 
single destiny. 
Nevertheless, as Taylor points out, the 
Victorian humanists also found it ever more diffi-
cult to hold together the "split-screen vision of 
nature" they bequeathed to us. On one side of the 
screen we view the vast universe of modern science, 
"huge and in some ways baffling . . . indifferent to 
us and strangely other, though full of unexpected 
beauty and inspiring awe." On the other side we 
scan what Taylor calls our "inexhaustible inner 
domain"; from it flows the values that give our life 
meaning and the visions that drive us to goals 
beyond the needs of the moment. How the inner 
world is to relate to the outer one is, in Taylor's 
words, "deeply problematical." This makes our 
"cultural predicament utterly different from what 
existed before the eighteenth century, where the 
scientific explanation of the natural order was [still] 
closely aligned with its moral meaning .... For us, 
the two have drifted apart, and it is not clear how 
we can hope to relate them." 
re-membering love: the mysteries of the Incarnation 
How the Catholic and Protestant institutions 
that make up the Lilly Fellows network have gone 
about the task of "relating" these disparate pictures 
for the past century is another story, and in general 
it is a narrative with clearer visions and brighter 
prospects than Charles Taylor may have considered 
possible. But it is by any standard a story with 
many diverse and distinctive strands. No single 
Christian tradition, let alone a solitary Christian 
observer, could possibly comprehend the whole on 
this question. We are Baptists and Catholics, 
Lutherans and Mennonites, Methodists and 
Christian Reformed, members of the Churches of 
Christ and adherents to the free church and inde-
pendent church traditions. If Tertullian puzzled 
over what Athens had to do with Jerusalem, it 
perhaps should not surprise us that we struggle at 
times to determine precisely what Dordt has to do 
with Trinityn Mennonite, or Wheaton with 
Wittenberg, for that matter. 
So, rather than attempt a quick synthesis of the 
best elements of our many different traditions of 
higher education, I want to round off these 
remarks with a brief meditation on something we 
all share, in which memory, love, and learning 
come together in extraordinary ways. I refer to the 
sacrament that has many names-the Lord's 
Supper, the Eucharist, or Holy Communion-but 
one object, one subject, and one Lord. 
And here I will call again on the poets. Near 
the end of his life, W. H. Auden wrote of what he 
called "the significance of the Mass." ''As biological 
organisms," he observed, "we must all, irrespective 
of sex, age, intelligence, character, creed, assimilate 
other lives in order to live." And in his words, "as 
conscious beings, the same holds true [for us] on 
the intellectual level: all learning is assimilation." 
Because we are children of God who are made in 
God's image, Auden concludes, "we are required in 
turn voluntarily to surrender ourselves to being 
assimilated by our neighbors according to their 
needs. The slogan of Hell: Eat or be eaten. The 
slogan of Heaven: Eat and be eaten." 
This idea of "surrendering ourselves to being 
assimilated by our neighbors according to their 
needs" has always struck me as a wise and deft defi-
nition of teaching. We give ourselves up in the 
service of the texts, formulas, theories, scores, and 
narratives that have nourished us, and, in turn, we 
surrender ourselves to our students so that they 
may make use of us according to their needs. Yet at 
the same time, is it not often the case that we as 
teachers assimilate some remarkable things from 
our students? This was the case for me in my first 
year of college teaching. We had gotten to 
Dickinson, and as I worked my way through the 
material somewhat stiffly, we came to a poem that 
had me stumped. It begins: 
A Clover's simple Fame 
Remembered of the Cow 
Is sweeter than enameled Realms 
of notoriety-
! uttered something unmemorable about the idea of 
memory, but what one student said I have never 
forgotten. He brought us back to the imagery of 
the poem and implored us to think simply of how 
a cow turns clover into milk. He urged us to think 
of "remembered" not just in the sense of "being 
brought back to mind," but of something being "re-
membered" in the sense of its having been broken, 
its having died, and its having been transformed. 
It was the brokenness of Jesus the Son that 
drew Dickinson to him, even as she shunned the 
sovereign serenity of God the Father. Late in life 
she wrote to a neighbor that "when Jesus tells 
about his Father, we distrust him," just as "when he 
shows us his Home, we turn away, but when he 
confides to us that he is 'acquainted with Grief,' we 
listen, for that also is an Acquaintance of our own." 
As one of her several powerful and moving poems 
about Christ phrases it, his "acquaintance" with 
death "justifies Him" and makes him that "Tender 
Pioneer" who leads and guides us every step of the 
often difficult human way. Here in the life and 
death of this one "acquainted with Grief," 
Dickinson the subject found an object whose qual-
ities she could praise, honor, love, and grasp. As 
she wrote to a friend as they both grieved the death 
of a man they honored and loved, "the crucifix 
requires no glove." 
In writing about the tensions marking moder-
nity, between love and knowledge, between 
memory and hope, Charles Taylor notes, 
''Augustine holds that in relation to God, love has 
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to precede knowledge. With the right direction of 
love, things become evident which are hidden 
otherwise." As we consider the connections 
between Christianity and liberal learning, are we 
not asking how our love of God and God's world 
might guide both our pursuit of knowledge and our 
teaching and thereby make evident so many things 
otherwise hidden? 
As Christian scholars and teachers, we most 
effectively uncover and disclose those truths by 
remembering in our thoughts as Christian scholars 
and re-membering through our deeds as 
worshipers in the body of Christ that "the Word 
became flesh and lived among us." In the incarna-
tion, mind and body, God and man, subject and 
object come together as one through the sacrificial 
freedom of a creative, long-suffering God. In the 
light shed by the incarnation, we can see new ways 
of looking at ourselves as subjects, as well as fresh 
ways of perceiving the loveliness of objects, even 
those objects we once found most unlovely. 
Only a month after her mother died, Emily 
Dickinson confessed to a friend, "we were never 
intimate Mother and Children while she was our 
Mother-but Mines in the same Ground meet by 
tunneling and when she became our Child, the 
Affection came." As we strive to teach others to 
love what we have loved, we do well to remember 
that the connections between Christ and the life of 
the mind may be more readily discovered in Emily 
Dickinson's tunnels than glimpsed from Robert 
Frost's treetops. As he dreamed of heaven and 
thought of his own art at his life's close, William 
Butler Yeats concluded, "I must lie down where all 
the ladders start/ In the foul rag and bone shop of 
the heart." Or as one of his own earlier poems had 
asserted, "Love has pitched his mansion in/ The 
place of excrement;/ For nothing can be sole or 
whole/ That has not been rent." We begin where 
our own affection, our own love came-with our 
memory of that child who became a man and 
whose body was rent, broken out of love, first, so 
that it might be re-membered by us and, then, so 
that we might live with the hope of that day when 
God will re-member us wholly, body, mind, and 
soul, for eternity. That is a love worth teaching. 
That is a truth worth remembering. f 
Roger Lundin is Blanchard Professor of English at 
Wheaton College, Illinois, and author most recently 
of Emily Dickinson and the Art of Belief. 
dancing with death: 
reclaiming martyrdom in an era of suicide bombers 
MARTYRDOM ~ ONE OF THOSE WORDS THAT 
we use to define ourselves, to set ourselves apart 
from what we are not. We don't particularly like 
martyrs among us, and when someone denies them-
selves the pleasure of the last remaining brownie 
our response often is: Oh, don't be such a martyr. 
Of course, the implication is that we are not 
martyrs. Given half a chance, we'd grab that 
brownie and run with it. Carpe diem! Seize the 
profits, seize the five-figure bonus, seize the oil 
under the Iraqi desert. We are not martyrs, we are 
fighters. And it is instructive to note that we have 
never described as martyrs the emergency response 
teams in New York City who gave up their lives. 
Nor, so far as I know, were the 45 passengers on 
United Airlines flight 93 ever described as martyrs, 
because that's just too suspect of a word. They were 
heroes. Martyrdom, then, is a psychological state, 
perhaps even a neurosis like co-dependence. 
Such martyrs as we remember in Christianity 
seem to have lived in the distant past. They were 
brave souls who gave up their lives in the face of 
persecution. We might think of Christians in 
ancient Rome, their nobility enhanced by the figure 
of Russell Crowe cutting across the movie screen in 
Gladiator. Or, we might think back to the early 
apostles-Stephen, Peter, Paul, and others who 
died for their faith. We might even remember that 
the religious freedom we enjoy in this country is in 
part due to the Pilgrims, the Shakers, and the 
Quakers, all of whom fled persecution in Europe. 
In this case, martyrdom is a response to religious or 
political persecution, and in our modern societies, 
it is utterly a thing of the past. 
There is, however, a third kind of martyrdom, 
one that is far more contested, and one that 
certainly does not describe us. In fact, it is a curious 
thing that we simultaneously call them terrorists, 
murderers, and suicide bombers while also recog-
nizing that they term themselves martyrs. And so, 
with gruesome fascination at the twistedness of the 
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human mind, we read about their prayers to their 
God, their promises of paradise, and their seven 
layers of underwear to protect their genitals from 
the blast so that later in heaven they can enjoy the 
seventy-seven eternal virgins. We think this third 
kind of martyrdom is a fraud, an example of how 
religion brainwashes adherents into doing most 
anything with promises of eternal renown and licit 
sexual pleasure. 
Whatever good name martyrdom once might 
have had, it seems it cannot have it anymore. In our 
pragmatic and multi-cultural world, this seems to 
be an aspect of religion we are better off without. 
But certain aspects of martyrdom are worth our 
while to reclaim. We should not dismiss it as an 
outdated or dangerous mode of thinking, but 
should find the good in it. In so doing, we might 
find a useful mode of Christian action to help fix 
our broken world. More importantly, we make 
significant progress in learning to love our enemies, 
especially those who attack us and our friends. 
If you are reading carefully, you will note that I 
just made a shift, and no small one. I am suggesting 
a connection between knowledge and action, a 
necessary connection between what we know and 
what we choose to do about it. This may seem 
rather strange given the fact that scholars are 
supposed to sit in dusty libraries and publish books 
of great meaning that no one can quite understand. 
As someone who specializes in Arabic manuscripts 
written by ninth-century scholars of Islamic law in 
the nascent Maliki tradition, I am certainly in love 
with the arcane worlds of the past. But I learned as 
a student at Valparaiso University that Christian 
higher learning is necessarily bound to social action, 
and is anything but dispassionate. 
Perhaps the single most influential course I took 
at Valpo was on Jewish-Christian dialogue, looking 
at the first five books of the Bible from the perspec-
tive of these two religious traditions. I still have 
some of the books from that course and remember 
some of the content. But what remains most clearly 
in my mind was the dynamic between the two 
professors of the course. The first, Rabbi Joseph 
Edelheit, was a powerful, opinionated figure who 
took it as his mission to shake students out of their 
complacency and change the way we looked at the 
world. I had presumed Judaism to be a relic, a reli-
gion that was superseded by Christianity. Of course, 
I had a vague notion that there were Jews in Israel 
and in New York City, but I was frankly surprised to 
find out that there were Jews in Northern Indiana. 
In contrast to Rabbi Edelheit was the quiet but 
no less formidable presence of Walter Rast. I knew 
that Walt Rast was a famous archeologist, and I 
thought his work on Bronze-age sites on the 
Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea was terribly 
romantic. He threw around Greek and Hebrew 
terms as if they were English, and Edelheit treated 
him and his knowledge of the texts with the 
utmost respect. 
The whole course seemed sort of transgressive. 
Edelheit said things I had never heard before, for 
example, that Christians had completely misinter-
preted the Genesis story, that it was not about the 
"fall" and original sin but about the intimate rela-
tionship God established with his people. For his 
part, Rast would not contradict Edelheit. He 
acknowledged Edelheit's claims and proceeded to 
explain how Christians see the workings of the 
Messiah in the Genesis story. Only very slowly did 
I come to realize that Rast's ability to listen, 
consider, and respond creatively arose from the 
great strength of his convictions. Edelheit, as well, 
responded not with defensiveness but with 
curiosity, asking questions about the Messianic 
tradition in Christianity that allowed Rast to 
explain, in great detail, points of convergence and 
difference in the two religions. 
Their example taught me that religious 
dialogue is not about which side has the truth but 
about working together on common goals. In that 
class we took apart the two Genesis narratives, 
learned about the four strands of authorship in the 
Torah, and learned how the Rabbis played with the 
multiple meanings of the Hebrew words. 
According to Edelheit and Rast, good will and 
common interests were not sufficient. For them, 
religious dialogue is founded on a common future; 
conversion is utterly dismissed as a goal. The point 
must be to make the other a better Christian, a 
better Jew. 
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This is a radical claim, and I am still working 
out its implications. In part, it is a rejection of the 
sort of scholarship one sees in the first translations 
of the Qur'an into English. Such a translation 
appeared in 1649 with the following note "to the 
Christian reader": 
There being so many Sects and Heresies banded 
together against the Truth, finding that of 
Mahomet wanting to the Muster, I thought good 
to bring it to their Colours, that so viewing thine 
enemies in their full body, thou maist the better 
prepare to encounter, and I hope overcome them. 
... though [the Qur'an] hath been a poyson, that 
hath infected a very great, but most unsound part 
of the Universe, it may prove an Antidote, to 
confirm thee in the health of Christianity. 
In the seventeenth century, scholars studied 
other religions to find their weaknesses and logical 
inconsistencies to prepare missionaries for their 
work. That this should no longer be the goal of our 
inquiry is quite reasonable, and it fits the comfort-
able notion of scholarship as an objective, impartial 
activity, one quite removed from the politics of the 
everyday world. At the same time, the goal of 
developing a greater appreciation for the things 
that make our religion unique is laudable, so too an 
awareness of the extensive heritage common to the 
three great monotheisms. 
But the claim that inter-religious dialogue is 
about faithfulness suggests that the goal of dialogue 
is not disengagement, but engagement, not merely 
recognition of a common heritage, but of a 
common future. Edelheit and Rast were suggesting 
that people of faith must question the doctrines 
found in every universal religious tradition that 
envision a world where other religions have disap-
peared. That these beliefs ever existed in 
Christianity was hard for me to imagine, emotion-
ally even more than intellectually. I am still stirred 
by certain biblical passages: 
Therefore God exalted him to the highest place 
and gave him the name that is above every 
name, that at the name of Jesus every knee 
should bow, in heaven and on earth and under 
the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus 
Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. 
(Philippians 2:9-11) 
When I think of the end of days, I imagine 
everyone bowing voluntarily, out of some inner 
revelation. I never thought that such bowing would 
be done under compulsion. But others in Christian 
history have thought just that, and we have perpe-
trated more than our share of forced conversions 
and pogroms. Doctrines of universal superiority 
get in the way of honest dialogue; from the start 
they make it impossible to see the dialogue 
partner-Jew, Muslim, or Buddhist-as fully equal. 
Learning about other religious traditions, then, is a 
necessary prerequisite to any dialogue. The more 
one learns, the more study becomes an act of 
reconciliation-atoning for the crusades, the inqui-
sitions, and the holocausts of past ages-by 
genuinely valuing the other. 
~N, IT WAS NOT SO MUCH THE CONTENT OF 
that one course but the simple example of the 
teachers that reinforced this lesson for me. The 
tremendous respect that each accorded the other, 
the time they took to clarify and respond to our 
naive questions, the fact that both men could 
undertake this sort of inquiry and remain 
unmoved in their own faith commitments-all this 
represented an ideal of the academic study of reli-
gion. I don't know that they would recognize 
themselves in this, but over the course of the years 
I have developed rules of interpretation based in 
part on their example. 
The first requirement is natural for Christians: 
a sense of humility. We are limited creatures and 
cannot possibly know anything except in partial 
and incomplete ways. Second, we should be as 
clear as possible about our political and religious 
commitments, because these will affect what we see 
and how we interpret it. Third, and perhaps most 
important, we must engage others with the same 
seriousness and respect that we would expect from 
them. Finally, we must be prepared to change our 
opinions. 
Each of these rules is controversial in its own 
way, and not everyone will want to accede to all of 
them. But I believe some version of each is essen-
tial for effective dialogue. The first claim presumes 
that we alone cannot determine what we can know. 
For example, I might be convinced that I know my 
name in a full and complete way, yet that claim 
holds only insofar as my name is mine. In fact, it 
does not belong to me alone; it is given to me and 
invoked by countless others, my parents, son, 
students, and colleagues, to name a few. Each of 
these persons has a claim on my name, and their 
definitions of my name exist alongside and in 
conversation with mine. No one possesses 
complete knowledge of my name, save perhaps 
God alone. Similarly, as a Christian I do not possess 
the sole meaning of the Genesis story-others also 
have a claim to the truth of that tale. This rule does 
not describe nihilism or cultural relativism, but 
something much more productive: I cannot under-
stand the meaning of my name or of my interpre-
tation of Genesis until I place my comprehension 
within the context of others. 
The second and third rules follow from the 
first and probably seem reasonable to most. But the 
fourth rule needs elaboration-after all, just how 
far should one be prepared to change? My answer: 
a great deal. But by change I mean allowing our 
own opinions to develop and adjust to the claims 
of others, not rejecting or renouncing our own 
convictions. Despite my study of other religions, I 
remain a Christian. But over the years my faith has 
become both simpler and more complex. Simpler 
in that I realize just how little I am in control of my 
faith, and more complex in continually engaging 
with Christian diversity in past and present. 
Taking these rules into the realm of Jewish-
Christian dialogue is one thing. Can they also be 
applied to the study of Islam? After all, we have 
incorporated Judaism into American culture in 
numerous ways: Menorahs are now a common 
sight and even Wisconsin has a Jewish senator. We 
regularly speak of our Judeo-Christian heritage, and 
in 1998 the ELCA developed explicit guidelines for 
demonstrating "love and respect for the Jewish 
people." But when I was an undergraduate, the 
Munich Olympics of 1972 and the Iranian revolu-
tion of 1978-1979 made Islam another story until I 
met some Muslim students on campus looking for a 
place to pray. I had some long discussions with the 
Dean of the Chapel about why the Chapel of the 
Resurrection should, or should not, be used for this 
activity. Engaging Muslims in their religious convic-
tions-and not only their political agendas-
brought back lessons from the comparative reli-
gions course. When I entered graduate school three 
years later, I decided to focus on Islam, not Judaism. 
BUT IF TH~ EXPLAINS MY INffiAL JNfRJGUE WITH 
Islam, it does not explain my pursuits through long 
years of graduate study, nor my continued commit-
ment to the scholarly study of Islam. Islam is 
harder for Christians to engage than Judaism. 
There is not only the current political situation, but 
also a structural contrast that is problematic. As 
Christians, we are dependent upon Judaism; we 
share many of the great narratives that define our 
traditions. Jesus, Peter, Paul, and all the other disci-
ples were Jews. But Christians have no category for 
Muhammad, except, perhaps, that of false prophet. 
We need no knowledge of his story for our faith to 
be complete, yet he and his followers claim the 
same heritage, prophets, and stories that we claim. 
Christian engagement with Islam is the reverse of 
Chritian engagement with Judaism. Islam has 
appropriated our story in the same way that we 
have appropriated the Hebrew Bible. Politically, we 
no longer feel threatened by Judaism. But we do 
feel that Islam threatens us, especially with the 
specter of the martyr we might meet on any plane, 
at any bus stop. 
martyrdom in Islam 
Despite the Hollywood caricature of the 
crazed Muslim terrorist ready to kill himself for 
God, martyrdom does not have a lengthy history in 
Islam. Martyrdom cannot exist without persecu-
tion, and for the vast majority of its existence, 
Islam has been the dominant tradition in its world. 
One exception to that dominance was the earliest 
parts of Muhammad's career. Islam began as a 
small group, committed to a more just society 
based on the worship of the One God. During the 
Prophet's lifetime, the early Muslim community 
was attacked by surrounding tribes, especially the 
Quraysh, and many Muslims lost their lives. 
Sumayya bint Kubbat is the first martyr in Islam; 
her master tried to force the convert to leave her 
new faith and she died when he stabbed her with a 
spear. Others were tortured or killed for their 
convictions, and even the life of the Prophet was 
threatened. One of the earliest sources gives us the 
following account: 
The Quraysh (tribe] showed their enmity to all 
those who followed the apostle; every clan. . . 
attacked them, imprisoning them, and beating 
them, allowing them no food or drink, and 
exposing them to the burning heat of Mecca, so as 
to seduce them from their religion. Some gave way 
under pressure of persecution, and others resisted 
them, being protected by God. Bilal. . .was a 
faithful Muslim, pure of heart ... (His master] used 
to bring him out at the hottest part of the day, 
throw him on his back in the open valley and have 
a great rock put on his chest; then he would say to 
him, 'You will stay here till you die or deny 
Muhammad and worship Al-Lat and al-'Uzza (two 
of the Meccan goddesses] .' [Bilal] used to say while 
he was enduring this, 'One, one!' 
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By saying "One!" of course, Bilal was declaring his 
commitment to the monotheistic creed. Eventually, 
the early community was able to defend itself in a 
series of skirmishes in which dozens of men and 
women-died in battle. The Muslims emerged 
victorious, and the tradition counts these individ-
uals among its greatest martyrs. 
Because of their acts of self-sacrifice, martyrs 
in Islam are understood to have direct access to 
heaven, to be among God's elect. Stories abound of 
early Muslims throwing themselves into battle with 
the hope of dying "in God's path." The Prophet is 
said to have wished for three lives so he could lose 
each of them fighting for the faith. Another story 
from these early battles concerns a soldier taking a 
break in the midst of fighting and suddenly 
throwing down his dates, saying: ·~ I so eager for 
the good things of this world that I should sit here 
and finish these morsels in my hand?" He then 
grabbed his sword and raced back to the front, 
eventually losing his life. 
With these words, the soldier was repeating a 
familiar refrain in the Qur'an: the good to be 
found in this world is mere chance compared to the 
good things which God has prepared in the world 
to come. The Arabic word for martyr, shahid 
means one who witnesses an event. These early 
martyrs bore witness to the truth of the new reli-
gion, risking their own death in the process. Two 
cases from the classical literature demonstrate just 
how fine the line is between seeking God's reward 
as a martyr in battle and seeking death. In the first, 
~ir b. Sinan accidentally slays himself while 
beating an enemy with the broad side of his sword. 
The story says that the people of Medina began to 
lament, because they assumed ~ir's actions 
would be considered suicide: 
The people said: "his good deeds have gone to 
waste : he killed himself!" But I said : "0 Prophet 
of God, they claim that 'Amir's good deeds have 
gone to waste" and he responded: "The one who 
says this lies; 'Amir will receive two rewards, 
since he died a martyr." 
Though ~ir actively caused his own death, he did 
so unintentionally. His purpose was only to engage 
an enemy soldier. In the second case, a Muslim also 
actively causes his own death with his sword, but 
different intentions lead to different consequences. 
Both men in these examples died by their own 
hand, and both fought in jihad, or religiously sanc-
tioned war. Both appeared to intend the taking of 
their own lives, but in the first case, the Prophet, 
due to his knowledge of the unseen, discovered 
'Amir's real intent. So the distinction between these 
examples remains one of inscrutable intentions. 
Intentions are vital for any tradition wanting to 
distinguish between martyrdom and suicide. Like 
Christianity and Judaism, Islam strongly forbids 
suicide, seeing it as an encroachment on God's role as 
author of life and death. Committing suicide, even in 
the face of impending death, is the antithesis of faith, 
since it cuts off the possibility that God will bring 
about a miracle. Both the martyr and the suicide may 
die in the end, but the martyr does not need to die in 
order to be effective. Consider, for example, Daniel in 
the Lion's den-the point of entering this deadly situ-
ation was to glorify God, not to die. 
Just as most Sunday school children can tell the 
story of Daniel, the Islamic tradition remembers its 
martyrs in great detail. By the second Islamic 
seek to undertake the hardships of the pilgrimage 
to Mecca at the end of their lives in hopes of dying 
in a state of grace. Such "martyrs of love" are said 
also to gain direct entrance into paradise. By the 
ninth century even legal scholars were being 
described as warriors. 
L. TRADITION TRANSFORMED A POWERFUL 
concept that had lost its original utility. Elements 
considered essential it kept-the interests of the 
community over the individual, the beauty of para-
dise over the "chance goods" of this world. Other 
elements were discarded, even categories like 
mortal peril that we might consider essential to 
martyrdom. Thus, martyrdom continued to play an 
important role in Islam even when persecution 
disappeared. Like the martyr, the Sufi rejects the 
century (around 700 C.E.), tales of 
the early battles of the Prophet had 
already become an expected part of 
any cultural event, whether in the 
street or in front of the sultan. After 
the Islamic empire's rapid spread 
across the continents of Mrica and 
Europe, persecution diminished, 
and with it the chances for 
martyrdom. The classic jihad, the 
Like Christianity and 
Judaism, Islam 
strongly forbids 
suicide, seeing it as an 
encroachment on 
God, s role as author 
of life and death. 
material value of life, risking not a 
real death, but a social death in 
the process of pursuing the path 
of God's love. This newer form of 
martyrdom became quite popular 
in the medieval period, and even 
today scholars and Sufis are 
thought to gain a heavenly reward 
for their efforts. In times of 
particular crisis-the Crusades, 
defensive struggle of a small Muslim minority 
against overwhelming odds, no longer occurred, 
and traditions spread to change the nature of both 
jihad and martyrdom. 
A large, stable empire had little need for heroic 
sacrifices, and about this time it was conveniently 
remembered that jihad's meanings addressed more 
than warfare. In fact, the root meaning of jihad is 
struggle, and a distinction between "lesser 
struggle" and "greater struggle" was thought to go 
back to the Prophet himself. Here, warfare is 
defined as the "lesser jihad" and the "greater jihad" 
was the struggle against one's own evil inclinations. 
This notion was so preval.ent that the greater jihad 
had greater martyrs, like the Sufis and ascetics who 
gave away all that they had, devoting their lives to 
seeking God. A famous example of a "martyr of 
love" is the Muslim mystic al-Hallaj. He was perse-
cuted for his beliefs but was so strong in his convic-
tion that he would be admitted into God's presence 
that he is reported to have been singing "kill me, 0 
my friends, for in my death is my life!" as he was 
taken off to the gallows. Similarly, Muslims still 
the Mongol invasion, European colonization-the 
old concept of martyrdom was still available. It is 
latent in the tradition, ready to be exploited by 
political leaders. Hasan al-Banna', the modern 
idealogue of the Muslim brotherhood, called on his 
fellow Egyptians to fight the neo-colonialist regime 
in the 1950s. In the following quotation, he seems 
to blur the line between martyrdom and suicide, 
between aiming for heavenly reward and aiming 
for death: 
Brothers! God gives the umma that is skilled in the 
practice of death and that knows how to die a 
noble death, an exalted life in this world and 
eternal felicity in the next. What is the fantasy that 
has reduced us to loving this world and hating 
death? If you gird yourselves for a lofty deed and 
yearn for death, life shall be given to you. Know, 
then, that death is inevitable, and that it can only 
happen once. If you suffer it in the way of God, it 
will profit you in this world and bring you reward 
in the next. (Five tracts of Hasan Al-Banna') 
Al-Banna's distinction between the good of this 
world and the good of the world to come is a 
familiar part of martyrdom literature. But his 
exhortation to "yearn for death" pushes the 
boundaries of intention mentioned above. If you 
yearn for death, is your intent really to glorify 
God? By playing with this boundary, al-Banna' 
opens up the possibility for suicide missions to be 
considered acts of martyrdom. 
In 1978, just before the revolution in Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini also invoked the imagery of 
martyrdom to call for similar acts of self-sacrifice by 
the Iranian people. In the following passage, 
Khomeini refers to the Prophet's own grandson, 
Husayn, who is known as the Lord of the Martyrs 
in the Shi'i tradition. Muharram, the month in 
which Husayn was killed, is still marked throughout 
the Shi'i world with processions of mourning. 
With the approach of Muharram, we are about to 
begin the month of epic heroism and self-sacri-
fice-the month in which blood triumphed over 
the sword, the month in which truth condemned 
falsehood for all eternity and branded the mark of 
disgrace upon the forehead of all oppressors and 
satanic governments; the month that has taught 
successive generations throughout history the 
path of victory over the bayonet; the month that 
proves the superpowers may be defeated by the 
word of truth; the month in which the leader of 
the Muslims taught us how to struggle against all 
the tyrants of history, showed us how the clenched 
fists of those who seek freedom, desire independ-
ence, and proclaim the truth may triumph over 
tanks, machine guns, and the armies of Satan, how 
the word of truth may obliterate falsehood. 
Khomeini's language may be chilling to those 
of us who recall that his "armies of Satan" are in 
fact our own; the Shah of Iran was, after Israel, our 
greatest ally in the region. We must also recognize 
that some of the responsibility for the suffering of 
the Iranian people prior to 1978 was due to our 
support for an unjust and oppressive regime for 
strategic reasons. But also notice how the old 
conception of martyrdom in Islam still remains 
viable and is used by these radical leaders to affect 
social change in the face of persecution. 
dancing with death 
It is, perhaps, enough to find a context for 
modern acts of martyrdom in Islam, to distinguish 
the greater jihad from the lesser and to see martyrs 
of warfare in the context of martyrs of love. We are 
still too close to the horror of September 11, 2001, 
to do much more than read the letter left behind by 
Muhammad Atta and perceive him as a radical 
extremist. Indeed, if we can read that letter and 
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still see Muslims as good, faithful people, then we 
have done much to imagine a common future of 
peaceful relations between Muslim and Christian. 
But some forty years ago, in his book, Islam 
Observed, Clifford Geertz wisely wrote that the 
comparative study of religion "can be looked at as 
but a circuitous, even devious, approach to a 
rational analysis of our own situation, an evalua-
tion of our own religious traditions while seeming 
to evaluate only those of exotic others." 
In other words, our reflections on martyrdom 
and on Islam must necessarily lead to reflections on 
our own faith commitments. If I reject out of hand 
all Islamic martyrdom, I run the risk of rejecting all 
similar acts of faith that respond to persecution and 
injustice. If I accept the 9/11 hijackers as martyrs, I 
do greater damage to my own faith. The attacks on 
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center confirm 
in some people their impressions that religious 
belief is a relic in the modern world, that in its 
public form, religion is dangerous and irrespon-
sible. These scholarly distinctions between aiming 
for death and aiming to glorify God are, therefore, 
more than just a scholarly exercise. Such distinc-
tions preserve the possibility for Christian action in 
the modern world. The attackers of 9/11 did 
enough damage; we should not also give them the 
power to erase forever the great good that can 
come from the religious imagination. So I reject 
Muhammad Atta and his ilk as martyrs, and in so 
doing reject any description of martyrdom that 
yearns for death; such actions do not follow the 
will of a life-giving God. In turn, I reclaim a 
martyrdom that puts the desire to affirm and 
preserve God's creation above individual desire. 
MANY THINGS WILL CONTINUE TO DMDE 
Muslims and Christians, particularly in areas of 
doctrine and faith. At the same time, our own 
struggles to understand God's inscrutable actions 
in this world are intimately connected with theirs. 
We share a great deal with Muslims, and in many 
ways, this rather arcane issue of martyrdom can 
provide an excellent starting point for discussions 
between members of both faiths, since our atti-
tudes toward the meaning of death and dying are, 
in fact, remarkably similar. There is no better 
reflection on the Christian meaning of death than 
an odd bridge in Luzern, Switzerland, called the 
Totentanzbriicke. A wooden bridge built in the late 
middle ages, along its length is a series of panels 
depicting the dance with death that we all perform 
daily. Its medieval message was to remind passersby 
that they are always engaged in a dance with death, 
and they had better reform their evil ways and be 
prepared to meet their Maker. 
For me, that message of fear is always defeated 
by the word "dance." Dance is one of those unique 
human behaviors that can take everyday actions 
and transform them into works of art. Similarly, 
the fear of death can be transformed into a Dance 
of Life, a dance for joy, when we realize the free-
doms embedded in the very limit of death. As 
Christians, we live our lives not for our own, 
limited purposes, but for the larger purpose of 
serving God. Perhaps this is what the Muslim 
martyrs of love, the Sufis, are getting at in their 
claims that dance can lead to a union with God. 
What I know for certain is that Muslims and 
Christians must transform histories of war into a 
future of peaceful inter-dependence through crit-
ical, serious engagement with one another. We 
must go beyond talking. By learning to dance and 
work together, Muslims and Christians can help 
one another move from violence to justice, from 
seeking death to seeking life. f 
Jonathan E. Brockopp is associate professor of 
Religious Studies and History at the Pennsylvania 
State University. This essay was first presented as 
the Warren Rubel lecture in Christ College. 
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A TESTIMONY 
Dostoyevsky stared 
into the dark holes 
of the soldiers' guns 
till even the firing squad 
was eclipsed in darkness 
and knew with the conviction 
of madness that he would never 
again face an empty universe 
and when the guns did not explode 
in his heart (the Czar's laugh 
filling the frigid air of Petrograd, 
a splendidly rehearsed spoof 
on the young socialists 
who worshipped words) 
he wilfully embraced God 
and in his prison in Omsk 
wrestled with devils 
and read the gospels 
in stolen moments 
of unspeakable peace 
and pleaded jealous love 




patterns of confusion and blunder: 
Vietnam and Iraq 
LIKE MOST AMERICAN MEN MY AGE, I SPENT 
several years of my early adulthood dealing with 
Vietnam. My father was a committed supporter of 
the Civil Rights Movement and followed his hero 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. into opposition to our 
nation's involvement in Vietnam's civil war. 
Following my dad's intellectual example as always, 
I went off to college an opponent of a war I 
presumed would be long over by the time I gradu-
ated. But it was still there to greet me as I 
approached commencement ceremonies in the 
Kent State/Cambodia spring of 1970. 
Along with the other young men of my gener-
ation, I participated in the first Vietnam draft 
lottery in the fall of 1969. The lottery was devised 
as a strategy by the Nixon administration to stanch 
the relentless waves of antiwar protests that had 
swept the nation since 1967 and succeeded in 
driving Lyndon Johnson from the White House 
even though he was eligible for another term as 
president. The Nixonians figured that by staging a 
lottery they could let some air out of the antiwar 
movement's expanding balloon. Some of the 
anxious young men whose opposition to the war 
was more personal than philosophical would be 
protected by high draft numbers, thereby dimin-
ishing their zeal for opposing the war. The tactic 
might have worked better had projections not indi-
cated that eighty-five percent of the draft numbers 
would be called. 
Since my number was seven, the lottery 
offered me no hope whatsover of escape. I was 
ordered to a pre-induction mental and physical 
examination two months before my graduation 
date. With my student deferment expiring, my 
college diploma seemed little more than a one-way 
ticket to Vietnam. Throughout my last three years 
in college, I marched in antiwar rallies. In 1968, 
not yet old enough to vote but old enough to be 
drafted if I dropped out of school, I worked in the 
Fredrick Barton 
campaign of antiwar presidential candidate Eugene 
McCarthy and in the equally unsuccessful 
campaign of an antiwar congressional candidate. I 
was part of a student group that secured a meeting 
with Indiana Senator Birch Bayh to urge him into a 
more critical stance of our policies in Vietnam. 
People today forget how compromised congres-
sional Democrats were by Johnson's prosecution of 
the war and Democratic presidential candidate 
Hubert Humphrey's Hamlet-like refusal to 
denounce it. They sometimes forget that Nixon ran 
as a "peace" candidate. 
But all these formal and informal political 
activities did nothing to protect me from being 
drafted into a war I found morally offensive. As 
graduation loomed, I was all alone in my struggle 
with the draft. Or at least I was alone in my 
personal resistance. I was never represented by legal 
counsel. I had no connections with anyone of influ-
ence who might have been able to pull strings on 
my behalf. On the other hand, I had plenty of intel-
lectual and spiritual allies in the fight writ large. 
Draft counseling centers sprang up in every major 
city to supply draft resisters with advice about 
options and with copies of selective service legisla-
tion and regulations. And like thousands of others 
conducting their own struggle against the draft, like 
other young men preponderantly from my class and 
race, I became an expert on the system's procedures 
and on my rights within the system. 
I HAVE ELSEWHERE DESCRIIlED THE FUNDAMENTAL 
strategy of the draft resistance movement as akin to 
the delay game basketball coaches sometimes 
employed against superior opponents in the days 
before the shot clock. The object was not to score 
but to keep the ball so that the other team couldn't 
beat you. Like others, I learned when and how to 
file appeals that would buy maximum periods of 
time even though I knew the appeals were sure to 
be turned down. I learned how to petition for 
changes of venue. I knew that taking certain kinds 
of jobs allowed one to request deferments even 
though those deferments were no longer being 
granted. For three years after college, I played this 
delay game relentlessly. I had jobs to pay the rent, 
but I lived to fight the draft. 
And I am proud of it. 
And, like thousands of others who were 
equally determined and equally resourceful in 
turning the system on itself, I was eventually 
successful. Nixon sustained the war far longer than 
was conscionable, but over time the nation's polit-
ical nausea with the War in Vietnam meant that not 
even Nixon could sustain it. He pulled the troops 
out, and those of us who fought the draft with 
adequate stubbornness and guile were spared 
having to participate in something we abhorred. 
never have won. Men fought and survived physi-
cally but carry emotional scars to this day. Those 
who served, like Kerry, did so because they thought 
they ought to or did so because they couldn't figure 
out how not to. Those who marched in demonstra-
tions and resisted the draft were centrally respon-
sible for changing the nation's attitude about an 
unjustifiable war. 
These musings about the Vietnam War are 
sadly pertinent to the contemporary American 
political landscape, to the current presidential 
campaign because of Republican insinuations 
about the exact nature of Kerry's Navy service 
record and subsequent antiwar stance and because 
of Democratic complaints about the murkiness 
surrounding President Bush's service in the 
National Guard. They are also relevant because, 
with every passing day, analogies to Vietnam are 
impossible to avoid as we contemplate America's 
I I had jobs to pay the N THE LONG YEARS SINCE THE rent, but I lived tO 
involvement in Iraq. For enlighten-
ment on war in general, we should 
look at Errol Morris's Oscar-
end of the War in Vietnam, a kind 
of fog has settled over the actions 
of the war resisters. As a presiden-
tial candidate, Bill Clinton tried to 
fudge his own resistance activities 
with regard to the draft. Al Gore 
largely dodged the tssue by 
pointing to his fleeting service as a 
military journalist. Now John 
fight the draft. And I 
am proud of it. And, 
like thousands of 
others who were 
equally determined 
winning 2003 documentary, The 
Fog of War. 
The Fog of War is a feature-length 
interview with Robert S. 
McNamara, illustrated as 
McNamara talks with images from 
the events he describes and analyzes. 
Best known as Secretary of Defense 
from 1961 to 1967, McNamara was 
widely vilified as the architect of 
America's Vietnam disaster. Early in 
the film, he claims to remember, at 
Kerry has made his military 
heroism a central element in his 
campaign. Thirty years on, and we 
and equally 
resourceful in turning 
the systeff.Z on itselt 
I was eventually 
successful. 
haven't put Vietnam behind us. Nor should we. But 
like Clinton and Gore before him, Kerry gets dodgy 
when talk turns to his antiwar activities, despite the 
fact that his leadership role in the Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War first brought him to the national 
stage. George W. Bush doesn't want to admit that 
he benefited from family connections to seek sanc-
tuary from Vietnam in the National Guard. And 
Kerry equivocates about his disgust with the war 
having been great enough that he was ashamed of 
the honors he won for bravery on the battlefield. 
He ought not be ashamed. But to truly understand 
America's role in Vietnam, one has to understand 
that a brave man like Kerry was ashamed. 
The men of the Vietnam generation have much 
to be proud of, and they ought to embrace it. Too 
many men gave their lives for a war they could 
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age two in 1918, Armistice Day, the end of World 
War I' s "war to end all wars." As MeN amara talks, 
Morris overlays footage of Woodrow Wilson 
addressing cheering throngs, many wearing masks 
to protect themselves from that year's virulent flu 
epidemic. Morris told me in a conversation we had 
about his film that he sees the masks "as a chilling 
harbinger of all the wars to come," all the wars 
WWI did not end after all, particularly the wars in 
which Robert McNamara would play such a 
central part. From McNamara's life, Morris' film 
draws sundry pointed lessons applicable to our 
current military policy in the Middle East. 
Though The Fog of War covers McNamara's 
life from childhood, through his youthful appoint-
ment as a business professor, to his 
resignation/firing (he reached the decision that he 
should resign simultaneously with Johnson's deci-
sion to replace him) as Defense Secretary at age 51, 
most of the film focuses on three events: 
McNamara's WWII service as an aide to air force 
General Curtis LeMay, McNamara's involvement 
in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his role as advisor 
to presidents Kennedy and Johnson at pivotal 
moments early in the Vietnam War. 
MCNAMARA WAS A KEY MEMllER OF THE 
LeMay staff during the deadly fire-bombing raids 
over Japan in 1945. Data-cruncher that he was, 
McNamara assisted LeMay in determining how to 
do the maximum damage per sortie. And they did 
damage that some of us never knew' and few of us 
can comfortably face. One night in March of 1945 
American bombers burned to death 100,000 civil-
ians in Tokyo. And though that was the worst of it, 
that night was hardly the end of it. The fire-
bombing eventually killed more than 50 percent of 
the residents (and in some places up to 90 percent) 
in 67 Japanese cities, cities the size of New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles and Cleveland included. The 
firebombing was so effectively devastating that 
LeMay thought the dropping of nuclear bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary. LeMay 
also told McNamara that were they to lose the war, 
he and his staff would be tried as war criminals. 
From this experience McNamara had deduced the 
principle "proportionality should be a guideline in 
war." How many civilians is it acceptable to kill in 
order to win a war? 
McNamara was perpetually at John Kennedy's 
side during the Cuban Missile Crisis. With the 
world facing imminent atomic war, Kennedy 
received two messages from Nikita Khrushchev, 
one saying that the Soviets would pull its nuclear 
arms out of Cuba if JFK would promise not to 
invade Cuba, the other listing other more extensive 
demands. A former diplomat to Russia advised 
Kennedy to agree to the first offer and ignore the 
demands of the second. That's not exactly what 
Kennedy did, though McNamara says it is. 
Nonetheless, there is obvious merit in the principle 
he extracts from this experience: "empathize with 
your enemy." This is a lesson the American military 
has been slow to learn. In Vietnam our leaders 
stated for public consumption that Asians valued 
human life less than we did. As I write, we are 
learning the horror of American soldiers sexually 
humiliating Iraqis (and photographing themselves 
doing it) in prisons once run by Saddam Hussein. 
The white-hot fires of outrage throughout the 
Muslim world are the price of our appalling failure 
to see our enemy as human beings. 
McNamara relates alarming facts about our 
faulty intelligence during the missile crisis. 
Kennedy and his advisors thought the missiles in 
Cuba had yet to be fitted with warheads. Thus, at 
LeMay's urging, they seriously contemplated a 
massive air, sea, and land assault to destroy the 
missiles before they could be armed. But they were 
wrong. The missiles were fully operational and 
capable of killing ninety million Americans. There 
was a rational argument for decisive military 
action, but had we attacked, human civilization 
might have been destroyed. "We lucked out," 
McNamara argues and announces his principle 
"rationality will not save us." Testimony from 
inside the Bush White House calls into question 
whether the president and his cabinet ever really 
believed in the existence of Saddam's purported 
"weapons of mass destruction," but our subsequent 
failure to find them should give us grave pause 
before we make war next time. In Iraq what wasn't 
there couldn't hurt us. In Cuba, what wasn't 
supposed to be there could have precipitated 
Armageddon. What if Kennedy had surrendered to 
LeMay's bellicosity? Saddam certainly didn't hesi-
tate to launch Scuds into Israel in the first Gulf 
War. What if Saddam had actually developed 
armed nuclear missiles? Might invasion of Iraq 
have resulted in the destruction of Tel Aviv? 
A POPULAR NOTION IN THE 1960, WAS THAT 
McNamara was the cabinet hawk who urged first 
Kennedy and then Johnson ever deeper into the 
quagmire of Vietnam. "McNamara's War" the 
press sometimes called Vietnam. But McNamara 
claims that he saw the problems with military 
action in Vietnam from the very first stages of the 
war, advised Kennedy to begin withdrawing troops 
in 1963, and developed a plan that Kennedy 
approved to remove all American soldiers by 1965. 
When Morris asks point blank, then, who was 
responsible for Vietnam, McNamara finally 
concedes with obvious anguish that it was Johnson. 
McNamara's version of his role in Vietnam is hotly 
disputed by some who have seen this movie. And 
this despite the fact that Morris has discovered and 
includes a taped conversation in the Oval Office 
between McNamara and JFK on October 2, 1963, 
and another between McNamara and LBJ on 
February 25, 1964, that definitively seem to 
substantiate McNamara's account. 
Asked about those who think he lets 
McNamara off too easy on this point-that 
McNamara was an enabler at best and an active 
collaborator or even instigator at worst-Morris 
says that he has listened to all the tapes that are 
available and believes they show that McNamara is 
telling the truth. "People have also claimed 
McNamara exaggerated his World War II record," 
Morris told me, "but the documents I examined 
bear him out." 
Some viewers of this film have objected to 
what they see as a sympathetic portrayal of a man 
who was involved in decisions that killed millions 
of people. Nearly three and a half million 
Vietnamese died in a war McNamara supervised 
and now states without a single qualification that 
we never had a chance of winning. Over 58,000 
American soldiers were killed, countless others 
maimed for life. Yet McNamara did not resign to 
protest Johnson's decisions and never spoke 
against the war after he left office, not even when 
Richard Nixon reneged on his campaign promise 
of peace, rained more bombs on North Vietnam 
than were dropped in World War II and expanded 
the war across the border into Cambodia. One 
wonders if thirty years from now Secretary of State 
Colin Powell will be as candid in his assessments of 
Iraq as McNamara is now about Vietnam. 
Errol Morris and I were born exactly three 
weeks apart. Like me, he protested against the war 
in the 1960s and, like me, he says he hasn't changed 
his attitude about Vietnam "one whit. I thought it 
was appalling then; it remains appalling to me 
now." So why the sympathetic portrait of 
McNamara? "I don't at all think that McNamara 
was blameless," Morris says. "But I am moved by 
his struggle. He is unusual among political figures 
in his willingness to look back over his life and 
examine his actions. Though perhaps not loudly 
enough or without qualification, he is willing to 
admit having been wrong. Some will say his books 
and his appearance in my film are a strategy to 
whitewash his responsibility. And I think there is an 
element of that. What human being wouldn't want 
to construe his life in the best possible way? But 
McNamara dares to wonder if the world has to be 
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the way it is. He dares wonder if we could ever 
learn to live without war." 
It is in Errol Morris' nature to look for the best 
in people even as he endeavors to tell the truth 
about them. His devastating portrait of Holocaust 
denier Fred A. Leuchter in this film is nonetheless 
relentlessly humane. He encourages us not to hate 
Leuchter, but to feel sorry for his stupidity. Morris 
has far more sympathy for McNamara and obvi-
ously sees him as a man in search of redemption. 
But the film does not suggest that McNamara's 
journey is done. Morris gives McNamara the 
opportunity to express sorrow and admit guilt, and 
he won't do it. McNamara may be making progress 
in his soul-searching, but the picture makes clear 
that, to a sad extent, he is still lost in the fog of war. 
And so it is with many who have sat where 
McNamara once sat. 
Now WE ARE LOST IN ANOTHER FOG OF OUR 
own making. And this time the situation is both 
worse and less excusable. The legal beginnings of 
the hostilities in Vietnam and those in Iraq are 
nettlesomely similar. Lyndon Johnson extracted 
congressional permission to pursue military action 
in Vietnam through the infamous Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, a war act based on an incident Morris 
shows never happened. An American ship was 
supposedly attacked by the North Vietnamese but, 
in fact, it wasn't. George W. Bush elicited war 
powers from congress and built a "coalition of the 
willing" based on "weapons of mass destruction" 
that don't exist. President Bush asserted that 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were 
terrorist allies, but no evidence has emerged to 
substantiate such a charge and much evidence 
exists to disprove it. 
Vietnam faced a spiraling decline in public 
support. Iraq is becoming a matter of public 
concern at a much faster rate. Though John Kerry 
now tries to soft-peddle his public condemnation 
of them in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Vietnam 
produced My Lai and other human rights attroci-
ties. Gulf War II has already splashed the front 
pages of world newspapers and lead stories of 
evening newscasts with the foulness of events in 
Abu Ghraib prison. Vietnam protesters were 
taunted to "go back to Russia" while war 
supporters insisted "my country: right or wrong." 
Iraq has yet to generate the kind of mass protest 
that Vietnam did, but if the war lasts long enough, 
and the cost in American lives continues to rise, it 
will. Vietnam became a quagmire because, having 
gotten us in, neither Johnson nor Nixon could 
determine how to get us out, a dilemma Robert 
McNamara reflects on at length. The Bush admin-
istration plows forward with its plan to "hand over 
sovereignty" to the Iraqis by the end of June 2004. 
But whatever ceremonies are performed, no one 
believes that American troops will be, or at this 
point even ought to be, withdrawn anytime soon. 
Still, there are telling differences. McNamara 
proves convincing in his interviews with Morris 
that the tragic blunder of Vietnam can only be 
understood in the context of the Cold War. The 
Clarke maintains that the president and his closest 
advisers were making plans to invade Iraq during 
their first days in office. The terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington gave them the excuse to 
do so. 
A OF THffi ffi WHY I FAVOR THE DRAFf EVEN 
though I spent three years of my young life fighting 
it. Average Americans ought to have a personal 
stake in policies that lead to and sustain war. In the 
aftermath of victory over tyranny in World War II 
and the astonishing generosity of the Marshall 
Plan, America was a beacon of hope to the devel-
oping world in the 1950s. But we squandered a 
Soviet colossus was a genuine threat to Western- great portion of our standing and moral authority 
style democracy and to world peace. After the by trying to impose our will on a tiny Asian nation 
Cuban Missile Crisis, John Kennedy ----------- that we never understood and for too 
believed that Soviet influence did not All of this is why I long didn't grasp that we couldn't 
have to be contested in every corner 
of the earth. That's why he was able 
to devise an exit plan from Vietnam. 
Lyndon Johnson, in tragic contrast, 
bought the tortured wisdom of the 
"domino theory" which held that 
failing to fight communism in 
Vietnam meant having eventually to 
fight it in Australia. The collapse of 
the Soviet bloc a decade and half ago 
proved that notion entirely wrong, 
but at least it was forged amid a 
quarter-century of extremely tense 
favor the draft cow. Now we are making the same 
even though I mistake again. President Bush prom-
spent three years of ised that we would be greeted as 
my young life liberators. A year after the collapse of 
Saddam's army we are suffering 
fighting it. Average greater casualties during the occupa-
Americans ought tion than during the war. We have 
to have a personal failed to learn every lesson Robert 
stake in policies McNamara declares essential to 
that lead to and deciding to wage war. 
Bring back the draft, and we'll see 
how long the nation's young men and sustain war. 
relations and genuine provocations. The Bush 
administration began to beat the drums of war in 
Iraq in the context of a post-September-eleven 
world frenetic with fear of Islamic terrorists. 
Indeed, the American public accepted the determi-
nation to invade Iraq and fumed over the refusal of 
NATO partners Germany and France to fight by 
our side precisely because Americans bought the 
notion that deposing Saddam would make us safer. 
What segment of the American populace now 
believes that the Iraq war has increased rather than 
diminished our national security? And if former 
Bush administration official Richard A. Clarke is 
right in his book Against All Enemies: Inside 
America's War on Terrorism, September 11, 2001 
provided not a context for the Iraqi war but rather 
a pretext. That's a very grave difference indeed. 
women and their fathers and mothers 
will tolerate a foreign policy so arrogant that it 
sneers even at the need for allies. One of the things 
I cherish most about my own struggle with the draft 
is something my friend Will Campbell once told me. 
"We won a war," he said of his generation that 
served in World War II. "That was a good thing. But 
your generation stopped a war. And that was an 
even better thing. "f 
Fredrick Barton is professor of English at the 
University of New Orleans where he currently 
serves as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs 
and Provost. His fourth novel, A House Divided, 
won the William Faulkner Prize in fiction. His 
award-winning first novel, The El Cholo Feeling 
Passes, has just been re-released in a new trade 
paperback edition. 
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student is the father 
THE SnJDENT ffi THE FATHER TO THIS MUSICOWGJST, 
and I have been thinking recently about my student 
days and the changes that I, and my homeland, 
South Africa, have undergone in the last decade. As 
I think back upon my struggles as a student nearly 
three decades ago, it is not surprising that musi-
cians-a dance fiddler and a brass band director-
have shaped me. But three figures loom the largest 
in my student days-two icons of the twentieth 
century, Paul Robeson and Nelson Mandela, and 
an earlier man of conscience, Martin Luther. 
In our educational system, the year-end exam-
inations determined the results of the entire year's 
work. With only pen in hand, we entered the 
Spartan surroundings of Jameson Hall, the dome-
shaped auditorium in dark wood paneling, in ritu-
alized silence. Three hundred tables stood in regi-
mented rank and file in that cavernous echo 
chamber. You entered the large hall to take your 
stand in a three-way battle of the exam question, 
your mind, and the clock. The questions were ruth-
less. The clock remained unforgiving. 
An inanimate object, the clock had its army of 
mercenaries: men and women of a certain age (and 
race) who enforced the rules of combat. Proctors, 
as these officers of the clock were known, enforced 
the punctual start and finish to the examination 
session. The rustling of paper, an occasional cough, 
and the simultaneous shuffle of chairs punctuated 
the beginning and end of the three-hour battle. 
The anxiety caused by the oversight of proc-
tors was, of course, nothing new. In a police state 
where classmates and people in authority thrived 
on being informants for the apartheid state, every 
part of one's daily interaction was a potential field 
of contest. One had to be battle ready. A middle-
class child of color from an Afrikaans-speaking 
rural hometown, I was accustomed to the gratu-
itous insults of white public servants or shop assis-
tants. Defensive verbal blows would usually 
] ohann S. Buis 
suffice; the skirmish would come to a quick and 
decisive end simply by my retorting in English 
rather than Afrikaans, placing the offender on the 
defense. Such childish delights became the proving 
ground for an internalized combat of pen, paper, 
and clock, the perfect non-violent struggle. 
Perhaps the greatest motivation for me was 
that this battle was honorable. I was acutely aware 
that my non-university-trained relatives held great 
aspirations for me. As the eldest of seven siblings, 
the obligation to succeed took on even more 
importance. The rural town in which I grew up 
deprived me of the local library, the municipal 
auditorium, and town parks. However, I benefited 
enormously from the rural setting, being far away 
from the distractions of the city and having parents 
with enormous drive. I was prepared for the exam-
ination battle. 
"To stand" implies place, somewhere to act. So 
it was that I would stand on the majestic steps 
leading to Jameson Hall, towering high upon the 
slopes of Table Mountain, like the steps leading to 
Parnassus, daunting and forbidding. To my left, 
facing the unfolding panorama of the Cape Flats 
and False Bay, was the Student Union, a place of 
recreation and community action. To my right was 
Jagger Library, a place of obligation and reward. 
Standing upon those steps, I would remember the 
place of my father and his ancestors several 
hundred miles beyond the mountains that bordered 
my line of vision from Jameson Hall steps. 
Alongside a massive canyon on the Gouritz 
river in the Southern Cape lay the only black-
owned farm in the region, home to two communi-
ties, one Lutheran and one Episcopal. A Lutheran 
missionary, sent out from Germany by the Rheinish 
Mission arrived on horseback sometime during the 
nineteenth century and converted my great-grand-
father, Paul Buis, to Christianity. Following his 
conversion, this renowned dance fiddler took his 
fiddle and tossed it into the fire in the presence of 
his wife and twelve children. To the African mind, 
an object used for one purpose cannot be "undedi-
cated" and consecrated to a new purpose; the 
instrument's voice and spirit had to be silenced. 
Though not a fetish, the violin had the potential to 
take on such properties, and that instrument's 
unstated role had to be exorcised, preferably by fire. 
Two generations later, another German 
missionary offered to pay for the high school and 
teacher training education for the youngest two 
children of one of Paul's sons. The youngest and 
only son of this man was my father. He made the 
transition from peasantry to professionalism, as 
elementary school principal, brass band director, 
mathematics teacher, and community leader. From 
him I learned the unwavering determination of 
standing firm on matters of conscience. 
I also owed a great debt to that hero of enor-
mous musical ability, academic gift, and activism, 
Paul Robeson. The man with the sonorous, deep 
bass voice could stare the Committee on On-
American Activities in the face and claim his 
rightful place in the land in which his father was a 
slave; my government-issued racial permit to study 
music at a white university was small in compar-
ison. If Paul Robeson could stand tall, his voice 
ringing the truth of the dignity of all persons, 
perhaps I too could sing. 
To the far left of the unfolding Jameson Hall 
steps panorama, one could see the distant Robben 
Island where Nelson Mandela was serving his life 
sentence. At that time neither his face nor his 
words could be seen in print. "I have fought for a 
non-racial South Africa," he said at his trial. Then 
he continued, "This is an ideal for which, if needs 
be, I am prepared to die." When I thought of the 
struggles of Mandela, I had no choice but to 
perform at my best. 
Those steps on the slopes of Table Mountain 
yielded their stunning view on many bright 
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sunshiny days, reminding me that I would have to 
give an account of myself, and tempting me with 
the view of the student union on one side. People 
of color like me studied at whites-only universities 
at the apartheid government's pleasure; I could not 
afford to fail. A constant sword of Damocles over 
my head provided the incentive to equal or better 
the work of academically better-prepared students. 
So I fled to the books. Daily, I faced reminders 
of the hopes that I represented to others. There 
were the laborers who picked me up in their panel 
van almost every day, making no secret that they 
took pride in their "varsity boy." There were the 
black gardeners who tended the wooded grounds I 
walked on my way to and from lectures at the 
upper campus. During one rainstorm, I sought 
shelter in the shed with them. When the rain 
stopped, one of them took off his hat, put it on my 
head, and sent me off to class. The daily prayers 
and dreams of an extended clan of relatives were to 
see their first university graduate. 
The accounting would come soon enough in 
the examination hall. That place became my 
personal crossroads of hope or despair. I would 
love to stand on those steps today, nearly thirty 
years later. I will return to those steps and remind 
myself of a place where a young man stood long 
ago. And I will remember the songs of my country, 
of Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, and 
Ladysmith Black Mambazo. And I will remember 
the music of my family, and the courageous voices 
of Robeson, Mandela, and Luther. I will offer my 
paean of praise to the Almighty for seeing me 
through a period that seemed impossible to me. I 
will return to the place and know it for the first 
time again. There is where I'll stand. f 
Johann S. Buis is Associate Professor of Music in the 
Conservatory of Music at Wheaton College, Illinois. 
Richard Wightman Fox. Jesus in 
America: Personal Savior, Cultural 
Hero, National Obsession. New 
York: HarperCollins, 2004. 
Stephen Prothero. American Jesus: 
How the Son of God Became a 
National Icon. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2003. 
The other day on the bus to 
O'Hare, I heard an African-
American man discussing Mel 
Gibson's The Passion of the Christ: 
"It was like Rodney King got a 
whuppin' with a ruler," he said, 
admiring the graphic reality with 
which Gibson portrayed the 
sadistic abuse of Jesus in the hands 
of vicious Roman soldiers. The 
observation reminded me how 
deeply our perceptions of sacred 
matters are shaped by the medium 
in which we perceive them. A 
video sequence of the brutal treat-
ment of a man by police officers 
became the register in which this 
man viewed the cinematic violation 
of Jesus, or rather, 'the Christ,' the 
Messiah, as Gibson prefers. The 
degree to which the very medium 
in each case threw the factuality of 
the presented event into question 
did not seem to matter to the 
speaker. Perhaps that is because, 
like many viewers, he took the 
representation to be accurate. No 
less likely, he took the violations of 
Jesus and Rodney King to be 
comparable, though not equal, in 
severity. The two instances of 
abuse might even serve to corrobo-
rate one another as media events. 
Belief is always belief also in a 
medium. Seeing is believing only 
when belief is first belief in a 
particular medium of seeing. 
Watching Rodney King get beaten 
or Jesus whipped to a pulp seems 
truthful in part because modern 
viewers are inclined to accept 
video and film for faithful means 
of representation. Our impulse is 
to want to believe, to treat the 
medium of film as transparent, as a 
window through which we 
glimpse the real. When this view 
of a medium is joined to a disposi-
tion of commitment (that some 
police harbor racist rage or that 
Jesus was God's instrument for 
substitutionary atonement), seeing 
is believing, indeed. 
The diversity of views of Jesus 
is narrated very nicely in two new 
books on the history of Jesus in 
America from the Puritans to the 
present. Authors Stephen Prothero 
and Richard Fox demonstrate that 
portrayals of Jesus in art, litera-
ture, song, theology, and social 
practice vary because of the 
cultural diversity of Americans and 
because of their competition with 
one another in wave after wave of 
immigration that began with the 
first landing of Europeans. 
Prothero, religious historian 
and chair of the department of reli-
gion at Boston University, is more 
interested in the breadth of 
American Jesuses. The first half of 
his deftly written volume sketches 
the career of Jesus from Jefferson's 
evening redactions (when he 
clipped from the Bible only those 
verses of the Gospels that met with 
his notion of representational 
veracity: little more than the moral 
teachings of Jesus in the Sermon 
on the Mount) to the present. 
Along the way, Prothero portrays 
the gentle fellow of a sentimental-
ized Victorian Jesus, the toughened 
man of Muscular Christianity, and 
Teddy Roosevelt's gospel of the 
Strenuous Life, and ends with the 
hip and celebrity Jesuses of the 
second half of the twentieth 
century. After that, Prothero turns 
to what he smartly calls the "rein-
carnations" of Jesus in American 
culture, by which he means the 
non-Christian versions of the 
person and mythos: Mormon, 
Black Moses, Rabbi, and Asian 
guru and mystic. He shows that 
Jesus is more than the Christian 
savior; he is a widely revered 
figure whose cache of wisdom and 
profound moral capital make him 
appealing to many American 
newcomers as well as to religious 
syntheses taking place on the 
swirling edges of religious cultures 
in the never stable mix of 
American belief. 
Richard Fox, a historian at the 
University of Southern California, 
has focused his effort on the purely 
Christian history of Jesus, and 
largely on the Protestant interpre-
tations and evocations of Christ. 
Fox's book is a longer, more 
detailed, more nuanced study. It is 
also conducted within the 
thoughtful frame of the author's 
Catholic faith, or at least his 
youthful formation as a Catholic. 
He opens with memories of his 
own upbringing, of his faithful 
father's efforts at catechesis and 
devotion, and ends with a moving 
account of a friend who became a 
priest and died of AIDS. The two 
men, father and friend, embody 
Christ for Fox, bringing the overar-
ching and transcendent figure into 
a personal and material form that is 
clearly endearing to an author who 
has undertaken something of the 
same formation and transmission 
with his own children. 
Cultural historians of Fox's 
caliber-and he is among the 
finest-usually don't indulge in 
such personal details when 
studying their subjects. But there is 
something about Jesus that invites 
this personal violation of scholarly 
norms. To be sure, the reader 
forgets the author's engagement 
with faith for most of the book. 
Fox plunges into the rich and 
varied history of Jesus among 
Hispanics, Native Americans, 
Europeans, Anglos, and African 
Americans from sixteenth century 
to present. Yet Fox's account 
begins and ends with memories of 
father, friend, and his own chil-
dren. These personal relationships 
are the broadest medium through 
which the author views Jesus 
because they were in place before 
he was a scholar. 
The warmth of these memories 
has everything to do with the 
American Jesus. Devotion to the 
person of Jesus is characteristically 
modern and familiarly American. 
This is the Jesus of a faith that 
thrives on comfort and safety, on 
the therapeutic values of personal 
affirmation and positive self-
esteem in light of one's 'personal 
relationship' with Jesus. Of course, 
in contrast to Fox the historian, 
most American Christians do not 
regard Jesus as the object of histor-
ical reflection but only as an inti-
mate presence in their lives. Fox's 
book serves as a substantial work 
of historical memory. Americans 
may think they know who their 
Jesus is. As Fox and Prothero 
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show, the truth is that he has been 
all things to all people. Fox 
patiently and even-handedly leads 
readers through the meandering 
and fascinating story of American 
Christianity's many ways of expe-
riencing Jesus. 
Prothero moves more quickly 
over the course of American 
cultural history, painting m 
broader strokes. The result is a 
quicker, easier read than Fox's 
book. That economy comes at 
some expense, however. For 
instance, advocates of the eigh-
teenth century will object to the 
general claim that Prothero makes 
about the nineteenth century: that 
it turned the corner on earlier 
Americans may think 
they know who their 
] esus is. The truth is 
that he has been all 
things to all people. 
periods by becoming the evangel-
ical century, focusing on Jesus, the 
second person of the trinity, in 
contrast to the prominence of the 
Father throughout the colonial 
American era. This ignores the 
christocentrism of Anglicans, the 
importance of Christ for Quakers 
and Shakers, Moravians, 
Lutherans, and Pietists, not to 
mention the Catholics in North 
America. Yet by focusing on the 
Calvinist theocentrism of the 
Puritan tradition, Prothero is able 
to underscore the revolutionary 
shift toward Jesus piety in the nine-
teenth century. In many ways, that 
is the revolution widely inaugu-
rated by the Second Great 
Awakening, which continued in the 
long series of subsequent revivals 
from Dwight Moody to Billy 
Sunday and Billy Graham in the 
twentieth century. The stress laid 
by conservatives and liberals alike 
on the person of Jesus invited new 
visual measures for cultivating the 
all-important "personal relation-
ship" with him. In the second half 
of the nineteenth century through 
the middle of the twentieth, devo-
tional portraits of Christ became 
important among American 
Protestants of many kinds. It is 
impossible to understand the even-
tual triumph of Warner Sallman's 
ubiquitous Head of Christ without 
the rise of Jesus piety. 
Fox notes that Protestants and 
Catholics in America have grown 
closer in many ways (371) and 
Prothero rightly wonders if the 
next age of American Christianity 
will shift from the second person 
of the Trinity to the third (303). 
Each observation underscores the 
degree of change that marks the 
career of the American Jesus. The 
way that Protestants and Catholics 
have flocked to see Gibson's film 
suggests that Fox is right; and the 
rise of Pentecostalism since the 
early twentieth century in the 
United States and throughout the 
world supports Prothero's intu-
ition. In either case, as immigra-
tion and transnationalism continue 
to shape the religious landscape of 
the United States, the American 
Jesus will surely move in greater 
step with the global rhythms of his 
shifting identity. By some esti-
mates, as many as ninety percent of 
the congregations of the Lutheran 
Church in Ethiopia today are 
Charismatic. African missionaries 
are traveling to Europe and the 
United States to undertake the 
slow work of evangelism. The old 
will be made new and the 
American Jesus will acquire a face 
and an accent to match. 
David Morgan 
John T. McGreevy. Catholicism 
and American Freedom: A History. 
New York and London: W.W. 
Norton, 2003. 
Jesuits John Ford and Gerald Kelly 
were two of the most important 
Catholic intellectuals in mid-twen-
tieth century America. This pair of 
moral theologians declared the 
position of the church on a multi-
tude of practical concerns: eating 
meat on Fridays, fasting before 
communion, and perhaps most 
controversially, using contracep-
tives. Their teaching was incorpo-
rated into sermons and into the 
confessional, extending their influ-
ence in the everyday lives of the 
faithful. In spite of their national 
and international prominence, 
Ford and Kelly are virtually 
strangers to the pages of main-
stream American histories. 
These two moral theologians 
are, in this respect, representative 
of many figures in John T. 
McGreevy's impressive Cathol-
icism and American Freedom. 
McGreevy offers fresh interpreta-
tions of American religious history 
by the very fact of addressing the 
material. Of course, Catholics are 
not exactly invisible in other narra-
tives. There are histories of 
Catholics in the United States, and 
their presence is figured into 
social, political, and labor histo-
ries. But Catholics often appear in 
the roles cast for them by other 
forces or others' ideas: as victims 
of nativist prejudice, as the rank-
and-file in the nineteenth-century 
Democratic party, as immigrants 
filling out tenement blocks or 
factory rolls in industrial cities. In 
contrast, McGreevy's is predomi-
nantly an intellectual history which 
aims to integrate the thought and 
experience of Catholics within the 
broader American story. 
It is not doctrinal differences 
that divide Catholics and 
Protestants here but two different 
understandings of liberty. 
McGreevy argues that Catholics, 
rather than simply signing on to 
the American way or-as they 
were sometimes accused--casting 
up balky old-world intransigence 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, maintained a nuanced, 
critical engagement with American 
values. Catholics agreed with 
American ideals when they 
comported with their own reli-
gious worldview, and offered in 
addition a separate notion of 
liberty. But where Americans 
emphasized independence and 
autonomy, Catholics situated 
liberty in family and community, 
praising not the freedom to do 
whatever one wished but 
"freedom only from wrong." 
Nineteenth-century debates 
about liberty here are three-way 
conversations among American 
Protestants and two groups of 
Catholics: the ultramontane 
conservatives and the more liberal 
ones. Catholics in the United States 
gave varied responses to questions 
about slavery, the growth of the 
state, and policies toward the poor. 
While some of the liberal Catholics 
featured here come off as distin-
guished and articulate, ultramon-
tane priests more often had the ear 
of their congregations. This is 
particularly evident in McGreevy's 
discussion of slavery and the Civil 
War. The rare Catholic leaders 
who voiced antislavery sentiments 
were treated with suspicion, as in 
the case of Orestes Brownson, the 
brilliant Catholic convert. 
Brownson's foil in the book is 
James McMaster, colorful editor of 
the New York Freeman's journal, 
whose criticism of Lincoln's war 
effort landed him in jail. 
McGreevy's employment of 
European sources to elaborate the 
story of American Catholicism is 
among the richest elements of the 
book. His familiarity with these 
sources allows him to follow the 
intellectual exchange both ways 
across the Atlantic. One of the 
first currents of European thought 
to be transplanted to the United 
States came in reaction to the 
European revolutions of the 
1840s. These upheavals were a 
turning point for many Catholics 
who emigrated to America, 
making them leery of the destruc-
tion and chaos that could attend 
apparently progressive policies. 
Prominent Catholics in the United 
States kept up contact with some 
of their counterparts in Europe, 
discussing developments in poli-
tics and the church. Brownson, 
for instance, established contact 
with John Henry Newman and 
Lord Acton, the German historian 
Ignaz von Dollinger, and French 
leaders Charles de Montalembert 
and Bishop Felix Dupanloup. 
Later, Europeans and Americans 
debated Rerum Novarum and 
single-tax proposals; in the twen-
tieth century, Jacques Maritain 
and John Courtney Murray trav-
eled between both continents, 
advocating religious liberty and 
human rights. 
American Catholics and 
Protestants squared off over 
important issues: the proper 
spheres of church and state, 
slavery, labor and welfare, contra-
ception, abortion, and-perenni-
ally-education. The process and 
goals of teaching children crystal-
lized some of the starkest disagree-
ments between the different ideas 
of freedom. Should church or state 
be responsible for schooling? 
Should children of different back-
grounds have a common 
curriculum, or should curricula be 
tailored to families' beliefs? Is reli-
gious education a religious obliga-
tion? And, crucially, who should 
pay for this project? Catholics 
insisted that education could not 
be divorced from its moral basis, 
so that nonsectarian schools were 
fundamentally misguided-and 
could also be downright inhos-
pitable to their Catholic pupils. 
Protestant rhetoric against 
Catholic education not infre-
quently verged on the hysterical, 
warmng that these religious 
schools threatened the very foun-
dations of the republic. 
The battle over education 
opens with the book's dramatic 
first pages, in the Eliot School 
Rebellion of 1859. In this Boston 
school a ten-year-old Catholic boy, 
Thomas Whall, refused to recite 
the Ten Commandments according 
to their formulation in the King 
James Bible. Whall was backed by 
Father Bernardine Wiget, a Swiss 
Jesuit who had fled persecution in 
the revolutionary 1840s. The Eliot 
School rebellion brought the 
Catholic revival of the mid-nine-
teenth century into conflict with 
the common school movement. 
Whall won this particular round, 
and confrontations like these 
helped spark the development of 
independent, Catholic schools. 
The school question flared 
again and again. In the 1870s 
Catholics and Protestants quar-
reled over government aid to 
parochial schools. Locales tried 
different remedies. Cincinnati 
attempted the consolidation of 
public and parochial schools. 
Poughkeepsie funded schools that 
promised to hire Catholic teachers 
but forbade the teaching of reli-
gion during regular class hours. 
Some Protestants proved more 
willing to remove religion from 
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school altogether than to risk 
having their funds be used to 
support Catholicism. For their 
part, some priests warned parish-
ioners about the dangers of state 
education and wanted to refuse 
the sacraments to parents who 
failed to send their children to 
parochial schools. 
Catholics can count their 
schools as among their most 
impressive achievements, building 
what McGreevy calls "the world's 
largest private school system." But 
in other areas, Catholic resistance 
to some American principles and 
practices is based on an unchari-
table reading of the American 
project. Certain figures in the 
book seem determined to view 
American culture and politics in 
the least favorable light. Perhaps 
my sense of this was colored by 
reading Catholicism and American 
Freedom by night working through 
the pages of Little House on the 
Prairie with my five-year-old 
daughter by day. The familiar 
protagonists of that classic, the 
Ingalls family, could be an example 
of what concerned Catholics: 
parents struggling to subdue the 
land, children socialized in town 
schools, all full of an independent, 
pioneering spirit. But self-reliance 
is not all there is to a story in 
which moral education and family 
take center stage. Ma and Pa 
Ingalls were supported by their 
community-by their German and 
Scandinavian neighbors, by fellow 
homesteaders who shared labor 
and tools, and by the church they 
walked miles each Sunday to 
attend. From the colonial period, 
American liberty was sustained by 
more than individual rights and 
autonomy. Those principles devel-
oped with a regard for the kind of 
ordered liberty that Catholics also 
championed. 
Some Catholics in the book 
praise these aspects of American 
liberty, but only after these things 
seem to have passed away. Making 
their case against mid-twentieth-
century liberals, several priests 
hearken back to the American 
founding, insisting that they, with 
their respect for natural law, were 
honoring Jefferson and Madison, 
whom contemporary liberals had 
left behind. Francis J. Lucey, S.J. 
found it painfully ironic that John 
Dewey, "who most radically 
applied the ax to the principles 
upon which this democratic 
government. . .is erected," was 
"hailed as the philosopher of 
democracy." Another priest even 
discerned that "there is vastly more 
in common between the modern 
Catholic and the colonial 
Protestant than between the old 
colonial Protestant and the modern 
secularized product of public 
education." This rather startling 
concession to the Puritans suggests 
recognition of what had long been 
the case: American liberty rested 
on morality as well as autonomy. In 
fact, the Catholic view of "freedom 
only from wrong" uncannily 
echoes John Winthrop's insistence 
that liberty means doing that which 
is good, just, and honest. 
New sympathy for older ideas 
of political liberty did not neces-
sarily bring Catholics any closer to 
their contemporaries. At times, 
American and Catholic ideas of 
freedom appear so far apart that 
one wonders how they could ever 
be brought together. Several devel-
opments, however, served to 
bridge them. First, Rome's efforts 
to address the "social question" of 
labor in industrial societies-artic-
ulated m encyclicals Rerum 
Novarum and Quadragesimo 
Anna-drew favorable response 
from some American liberals. 
Democratic politics of the 1930s 
represent the high point of the 
"liberal-Catholic alliance." The 
next advance owed much to the 
work of Jacques Maritain and 
John Courtney Murray, who urged 
Rome toward increased care for 
democracy, human rights, and reli-
gious liberty. In the United States, 
Catholics also gave timely support 
to the civil rights movement. 
Economic and political issues 
drew Catholics and American 
liberals closer, but cultural differ-
ences drove them back apart. 
Chapters titled "Life I" and "Life 
II" chart Catholic positions on 
contraception and abortion, posi-
tions staked out in a culture rapidly 
moving to opinions contrary to the 
church's teaching. Here the debate 
about contraception is centered in 
the church, where it bitterly 
divided those who wanted to 
change the traditional ban from 
those who upheld it. McGreevy 
suggests that the battle over birth 
control compromised the fight 
against abortion, weakening a 
united front against legalized abor-
tion and allowing non-Catholics to 
see this as another attempt by the 
church to impose its morality on 
others. The abortion battle 
certainly undermined the 
rapprochement of Catholics and 
American liberals, especially as the 
latter argued their pro-choice case 
by emphasizing autonomy and 
personal privacy, thus drawing on 
the definition of freedom Catholics 
had always found suspect. While 
McGreevy praises the achievement 
of some Catholic leaders in 
opposing abortion, he gives too 
much credit to historiography that 
likens abortion rights to civil 
rights, a comparison McGreevy 
calls "not wrong, just incomplete." 
The book's final chapter takes 
on another highly charged issue, 
broaching the church's 2002 sexual 
abuse scandal. The scandal 
certainly merits attention, and the 
timing of the book made it almost 
impossible not to mention it. But 
this section feels tacked on to the 
rest of the work, not least because 
the way it is introduced-'~d 
then none of this mattered"-
undercuts the fascinating material 
that precedes it. The book's close 
might have returned instead to the 
issue that generated such contro-
versy in previous chapters: educa-
tion. Now, when Catholics still 
maintain their substantial school 
systems, the United States Supreme 
Court finally seems willing to 
permit government funds for those 
institutions while some Protestants 
express their own doubts about 
secularized state schools. 
McGreevy does provide a brief 
update on schools, but further 
comment would have been 
welcome given education's impor-
tance throughout his narrative. 
Catholic and American ideas of 
freedom have benefited from their 
interaction with each other. And 
readers will benefit from 
McGreevy's thoughtful look at 
their interaction. The United 
States harbors both laudable and 
regrettable expressions of liberty, 
and we might well consider 
Jacques Maritain's assessment: 
Maritain confessed "how deeply 
we love America and have been 
intoxicated by her soul and her 
hopes, that great human dream 
which is permeated with the 
Gospel infinitely more than the 
Americans themselves believe." 
Agnes Howard 
Tom Christenson. The Gift and 
Task of Lutheran Higher Education. 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004. 
I suspect one defining character-
istic of reflective Lutheran educa-
tors is their persistent, invigorated 
search for understanding what it is 
to be engaged in Lutheran higher 
education. Whereas Catholics rely 
on their long tradition of univer-
sity education and sacralization of 
cultural institutions, the Reformed 
tradition educates from the 
perspective of a Christian world-
view whose central teaching is that 
all truth is God's truth. Since the 
respective disciplines can be taught 
in ways that reflect diverse world-
views, the integration of faith and 
learning constitutes a critical task 
for the educational institution, its 
faculty, and its students. Christian 
convictions form not only some of 
the presuppositions, but also the 
consistent thread that holds 
Christian education together. 
Lutherans operate within their 
own (one might suggest) world-
view. One consistent affirmation 
running through all Lutheran 
discussions is that Lutherans bring 
to the table a rich theological 
heritage, as is clear in Ernest 
Simmons' Lutheran Higher 
Education, (though, of course, an 
emphasis upon theology is not 
unique to Lutheran reflection on 
higher education). Well aware of 
this, Tom Christenson commences 
his discussion of Lutheran higher 
education by delineating a 
Lutheran theological and anthro-
pological perspective. His chapter 
on Lutheran theology identifies 
eight fundamental themes: God as 
creator (we are loved by God and 
are to be earthly stewards of the 
earth), sin, grace, freedom, voca-
tion, sacraments, theology of the 
cross, and faith. Accompanying 
- I 
these more traditional theological 
themes are emphases on human 
finitude and divine sovereignty in 
whose face we must confess 
humility, a dialogic point of view, 
and the role of paradox. 
What Christenson contributes 
to the discussion of Lutheran 
higher education is an emphasis on 
what might seem to be an 
oxymoron: Lutheran episte-
mology. Christenson quickly points 
out that a Lutheran epistemology is 
authentic, but not necessarily 
unique or exclusive (114). Founded 
on Lutheran theological principles, 
his epistemology describes human 
knowing as (a) characterized by 
fallibility arising not only from 
finitude but also from sin, (b) 
furthered in faithful criticisms of 
human institutions and ways of 
knowing, (c) founded on the 
Gospel, and (d) fraught with "tense 
conjunctions" (paradoxes). 
This model is a reaction to 
both Cartesian and Reformed 
views of knowing. It draws on a 
mix of insights from various 
authors. From Mark Schwehn and 
Parker Palmer, Christenson affirms 
that knowledge should grow out 
of love for the subject matter and 
the relations found in learning. 
From feminism he takes knowing 
as an embodied experience, where 
from a position of accountability 
we preference the disenfranchised. 
Suspiciousness of all absolute 
claims, self-suspiciousness, ambi-
guity, and doubt are central episte-
mological motifs. 
Christenson's Lutheran episte-
mology is not a systematic philo-
sophical epistemology delineating 
how to obtain knowledge or to 
justify and assess claims. Rather, 
he proffers what might be termed 
a principled or practical episte-
mology, a way to look at the world 
(a worldview?). This hints at the 
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larger issue of a significant differ-
ence between the Reformed (and 
Catholic) and Lutheran perspec-
tives. While Reformed educators 
are willing to address paradigms 
and advocate a unified worldview, 
Lutherans like Christenson are 
wary of such. They consistently 
reject such troublesome terms as 
"Christian biology," "Christian 
chemistry," "Christian political 
science," or "Christian business," 
and for some, even "Christian 
college or university." Such privi-
leging of Christianity allegedly 
would squelch the openness of 
inquiry (97). At the same time, 
however, Christenson notes that 
this rejection does not mean "we 
should pursue these inquiries by 
following their secular paradigms, 
because our argument is that 
following those paradigms has not 
resulted m pursumg those 
inqumes as well as they can be 
pursued" (134). But if secular para-
digms exist for the respective 
academic disciplines, and if the 
Gospel is in some sense founda-
tional, then are there not at least 
elements of a Christian paradigm 
that should play a role in the value 
laden teaching, application, schol-
arship, and critique of the respec-
tive disciplines? If I read 
Christenson rightly, this is 
precisely what he advocates when 
he suggests that we teach from 
perspectives of sustainable devel-
opment, attending to matters of 
justice and the disadvantaged, 
moral responsibility in develop-
ment of technology, and human 
wholeness. 
Christenson promotes eight 
epistemic "principles": wonder, 
openness, realization of connect-
edness, freedom, faithfulness while 
still being critical of claims to 
personal or institutional ultimacy, 
suspiciousness about motives and 
claims, vocation in a life of service 
to others, arid an affirmation of 
the importance of the search for 
meaning and hope. His principles 
form a helpful way of thinking 
about pedagogy, constructing a 
curriculum that includes both a 
disciplinary emphasis as well as a 
coherent general education 
program, and forming a commu-
nity. I leave it for readers to 
discover the delightful and 
thoughtful ways Christenson 
applies his epistemic principles. 
The book's strengths lie in the 
freshness with which Christenson 
puts forth his principled episte-
mology and teases out its practical 
import. Its weakness, from my 
perspective, lies in Christenson's 
implementation of this epistemic 
vision in the academic curriculum 
and community. Christenson 
insightfully helps us see that the 
Lutheran college or university 
cannot be what he terms a first-
order focal community, where 
admission is based only on agree-
ment on positions taken. It cannot 
even be a second-order focal 
community where one agrees on 
positions while being willing to 
diverge on the justifications of the 
core positions. He believes that a 
"higher-order focal community is 
what we wish to pursue" (171). 
Rightly so, but when Christenson 
spells this out in terms of nine 
meta-principles, we get something 
indistinguishable from an enlight-
ened humanist perspective (even 
the principle that mentions God 
can be understood this way). For 
him, the "good Lutheran candi-
date" is one who is wonder-awake, 
has a love for subject and teaching, 
is a continual learner, will advance 
the kind of conversation we are 
having, and has a sense of calling 
(175). The hiring criterion of 
willing participation in the conver-
sation is central, but it presupposes 
that the institution already is 
engaged in a conversation informed 
by a theologically grounded episte-
mology. And having a sense of 
calling, though rooted in the 
central Lutheran concept of voca-
tion, does not mean that a theolog-
ical understanding of vocation 
informs the candidate's concept of 
vocation. "The truth is, the 
successful integration of faith and 
learning demands a certain level of 
theological literacy and expertise," 
not just an endowed chair in the 
religion department (188). 
Although early on Christenson 
affirms that "we are Lutheran 
institutions by virtue of being 
informed by a theologically shaped 
anthropology and epistemology; 
this shapes our approaches to 
knowing, to teaching, to being a 
community of learners" (29), the 
implementation of this leaves 
unclear whether Christenson 
would also share Gilbert 
Meilaender's vision that "without 
a distinctive commitment to trans-
mitting a tradition, Christian 
colleges have no particular reason 
for existence." A Lutheran college 
should not only have a theologi-
cally informed Lutheran episte-
mology, it should also facilitate 
passing on what Mark Schwehn 
refers to as a Lutheran or Christian 
DNA, which can occur only by "a 
critical mass of faculty members 
who, in addition to being excellent 
teacher-scholars, carry in and 
among themselves the DNA of the 
school, care for the perpetuation 
of its mission as a Christian 
community of inquiry, and under-
stand their own callings as impor-
tantly bound up with the well 
being of the immediate commu-
nity." Without this transmission, 
the "kind of conversation" we are 
having will gradually change and 
so will the ethos and epistemology 
of the institution. 
Christenson is not completely 
opposed to a critical mass, 
although he fears it means quotas. 
In fact, Christenson captures an 
essential feature of critical mass 
when he contends that it is not 
merely or even primarily a matter 
of numbers, but also of position of 
influence and quality: "If a 
minority gets too small it becomes 
token. I think the same could be 
argued for Lutherans on the 
faculty .... Having the right people 
is important, but having them in 
the right positions is also impor-
tant. Even if a quarter of the 
faculty in a university were 
Lutheran, but no deans or 
provosts or vice presidents or pres-
idents were, it might be hard to 
feel well-supported" (188-189). 
This ultimately brings me back 
to Christenson's Lutheran episte-
mology. Though the themes of sin, 
faithful criticism, and paradox that 
he notes in Luther clearly inform 
his presentation, strangely the 
theme of the Gospel as the founda-
tion drops out from his discussion. 
Notably, it is absent in the curric-
ular suggestions, where the words 
Gospel, theology, Lutheran, or 
Christian do not appear. Likewise, 
consideration of the Gospel does 
not appear in his general education 
scheme. The absence of the 
Gospel, the DNA as it were, either 
from the epistemic principles or 
their application to curriculum and 
community, needs to be overtly 
attended to when implementing 
Christenson's epistemology in the 
academic community. This is not to 
say that this DNA is not present in 
Christenson's subtext, but as he 
noted earlier in the book, the 
Lutheran epistemology is not 
distinctively Lutheran, so that 
faculty and staff not informed by 
this DNA could very well agree to 
his pedagogical and community 
recommendations without theo-
logical knowledge of, being rooted 
in, or having a sense of continuity 
with the tradition. 
Community implementation of 
Lutheran theology and episte-
mology, one might suggest, is part 
of the Lutheran paradox; in being 
an institution of the kingdom on 
the left, it is possible to forget, 
ignore, or even disenfranchise the 
influence of the kingdom on the 
right. So I would want to make 
more explicit the role of the 
Gospel as overtly informing the 
institutional implementation of 
Christenson's fertile Lutheran 
epistemology. As Paul J. Griffiths 
has put it, "[O]ne is a Christian 
scholar [and here one might think 
of being a Christian educator and a 
Christian academic institution] if 
one understands one's work to be 
based upon and framed by and 
always in the service of one's iden-
tity as a Christian." 
Bruce Reichenbach 
Stephanie Paulsell. Honoring the 
Body-Meditations on a Christian 
Practice. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 2002. 
Stephanie Paulsell's book is the 
third in the Practices of Faith 
Series edited by Dorothy Bass 
since 1997. This series grew out of 
a Lilly-sponsored seminar on 
'Practicing our Faith' in the mid-
nineties. While deeply rooted 
within the Christian tradition, the 
series aims at a readership beyond 
the Christian fold, a general audi-
ence concerned with human flour-
ishing. Thus, the style of this book 
is inviting, non-judgmental, and 
non-technical, and the choices of 
topics are of a general and very 
basic existential nature. 
The first volume of the series, 
Practicing our Faith, carried a 
contribution by Paulsell under the 
same title as this book and she 
raises there many of the same 
themes of this monograph. But 
shifts and changes are noticeable 
here, indicating the author's 
growing and broadening under-
standing of the subject. Paulsell 
does not discuss her topic in a 
theoretical manner, trying to prove 
a hypothesis or to disprove others, 
though she draws frequently on 
the relevant literature. Instead, she 
provides her readers with 
'Meditations on a Christian 
Practice.' Her associational 
method and very personal style 
(one third of the book consists of 
autobiographical material!) are 
quite appropriate. They indicate 
personal authenticity, as does the 
style, which now and then 
becomes markedly passionate. 
The nine chapters of the book 
broadly follow the line of life from 
birth to death. Interspersed is a 
principal chapter on 'Pondering the 
Mystery of the Body,' followed by 
chapters on bathing, clothing, nour-
ishing (with extended reflections on 
'Blessing our Table Life'), exerting 
and resting. A chapter on 'Honoring 
the Sexual Body' and one on 
'Honoring the suffering Body' 
conclude Paulsell's meditations. 
The opening chapter deals with 
the 'Awakening to Sacred 
Vulnerability,' which m the 
author's case coincided with the 
birth of her daughter. "My desire 
for a practice of honoring the body 
was awakened the day I crossed 
the threshold of the hospital to the 
world outside after the birth of my 
daughter." Suddenly realizing how 
vulnerable life is, the author took 
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recourse in the Christian and 
Jewish religious traditions "for 
wisdom about the body," knowing 
well that in the course of history 
these traditions have often been 
compromised. Perceiving the 
human body as 'sacred' appears to 
Paulsell especially helpful, for this 
not only enables one to be mindful 
of one's own body; it provides for 
the qualitatively different attitude 
toward others that the early 
church displayed in her ministry of 
charity. "These Christians knew 
that what is suffered by one can be 
suffered by all, and that every 
body [!] is a fragile temple of 
God's Spirit and worthy of care." 
The tensions "between being a 
body and having a body," as often 
experienced in times of disease, or 
"between integrity and relation-
ality. . .freedom and constraint, 
and between sacredness and 
vulnerability" become pointers to 
the body's own mystery. The 
author resolves none of these 
tensions. Instead, she encourages 
her readers to accept them because 
they help us "see the body as both 
fragile and deeply blessed." 
When meditating about 
bathing, clothing, nourishing, 
exerting and resting the body, 
Paulsell's writing becomes notice-
ably more vivid. She often becomes 
a passionate critic of the state of 
affairs in today's society in order to 
advocate significant changes 
informed by religious traditions. 
The chapter on bathing has a 
section on baptism. The chapter on 
clothing refers to the need for 
clothing others found in Matthew 
25:31-46, and, not surprisingly, the 
chapters on nourishing cite the 
Manna story and the Lord's 
Supper. Finally, in the meditation 
on 'Exerting and Resting the Body' 
Paulsell presents the body as 
created by God. It therefore bears 
the image of God and is not to be 
spoiled by overdoing exertion and 
rest. God's rest on the seventh day 
of creation and Jacob's sleep and 
dream (Gen 28:10-17), like other 
references, serve as critical markers 
and call for the development of 
practices that give honor to the 
body alternative to practices 
commonly accepted by our society, 
such as fast food, shift-labor, 
athletics, and lifestyle. 
Paulsell's approach to sexuality 
is remarkable. This chapter most 
probably reflects her pastoral expe-
rience as a minister in the Christian 
Church (Disciples of Christ) and as 
director of ministry studies at 
Chicago. Beginning with a personal 
experience, she dwells on topics of 
freedom and desire, ecstasy, the 
evolving sexual self, consolation, 
and covenant, employing scriptural 
texts like 'Song of Songs,' Matthew 
19:6, and others. "The sexual body 
does not exist apart from the body 
that eats and drinks, bathes and 
dresses, rests and exercises and 
works. Sexual desire does not exist 
in isolation from other desires. It is 
only through learning to honor the 
body in every aspect of our 
embodied life that we will be able 
to honor our bodies' sexual feelings 
and desires." What a perspective 
for the development of well-
grounded sexual ethics! 
Suffering and dying are medi-
tated upon in the final chapter. 
After briefly dealing with pain and 
suffering, the author ponders 
touch. Touch becomes a sign of 
acceptance by others of the frail 
and aching body. On the other 
hand it reminds those willing to 
care for the sick of their own 
fragility and vulnerability. In linking 
this argument to the word of the 
risen Christ: "Touch me and see 
me!" (Luke 24:39), Paulsell ends her 
book with a pointed note on the 
resurrection of the body (Rev 21:4), 
which Christians anticipate in hope 
and which finally informs all their 
practices of honoring the body. 
The book is stimulating and 
liberating. It will serve ably the 
purpose for which it was written, 
providing ample material for 
discussion, experimentation, and 
pious reflection. The critical reader, 
however, may notice a certain 
dilemma, which the author too is 
aware of but which she does not 
really overcome. The dilemma is 
caused by the wording of the 
book's title: Honoring the body. 
While the author tries her best to 
avoid the implicit mate-rialism and 
dualism by speaking of the "body's 
own mystery" the body still 
remains an object throughout. It is 
seen as an instrument and tool to be 
manipulated for the good, of 
course as defined by religious tradi-
tion. But is that really the way it is? 
'Bodies' are not just matter created. 
Speaking of 'bodies' means always 
speaking of 'lived bodies,' meaning 
living human individuals with a 
biography of their own. This 
insight has a tremendous bearing 
not only on the perception of the 
self or the other-which today is 
being reflected upon in disciplines 
like philosophy, sociology, anthro-
pology, medicine, psychology, and 
biology. It also profoundly changes 
perceptions of faith and faith tradi-
tions. Faith is never extra-corpo-
real. It is accessible only through 
lived tradition (see Rom 10:14-17). 
This calls for a complete revision of 
theology and its articulations of 
faith, which Paulsell's book does 
not initiate. But it may be that 
sometime in the future she will 
come up with a contribution to this 
effect. The potential to do so is 
clearly there. 
Christoffer H. Grundmann 
Fritz Oehlschlaeger. Love and Good 
Reasons: Postliberal Approaches to 
Christian Ethics and Literature. 
Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003. 
For readers interested in the mutual 
relations of literature and ethics, 
the last two decades have given rise 
to both hope and despair. On the 
one hand, books and articles 
abound, unleashed in part by the 
gradual yet ineluctable ascendance 
of vanous politically-oriented 
forms of literary scholarship (e.g. 
feminist, marxist, postcolonial) and 
especially their critique of the nine-
teenth-century notion of litera-
ture's 'disinterestedness.' While 
this critique has rendered excellent 
service to American intellectual life 
in general and to the field of 
literary criticism in particular, the 
positive fruit borne of these move-
ments has been decidedly mixed. 
Ideological forms of theory tend to 
produce accounts of literature that 
are relentlessly reductivist (e.g. 
literature is nothing but the excres-
cence of manipulative knowledge-
power regimes), while ideological 
criticism routinely effaces the 
particular literary text in its efforts 
to grasp and describe the social-
historical world which lies behind 
the text. Moreover, while these 
literary-critical movements do 
differ on a number of points, they 
are remarkably similar with respect 
to their undergirding ethico-polit-
ical commitments. Each assumes 
and advocates some rather clearly 
conceived and doggedly pursued 
form of liberalism in which 
freedom from oppression is the 
highest, and perhaps only, social 
good and the social order is, gener-
ally, the passive or active opponent 
of authentic individuation. Even 
those few recent practitioners of 
ethical criticism who do not fall 
prey to the reductivist temptation 
(e.g. Martha Nussbaum, Wayne 
Booth) would gladly be called 
liberals in this sense. 
Thus the subtitle of Fritz 
Oehlschlaeger's most recent book, 
Love and Good Reasons: 
Postliberal Approaches to Christian 
Ethics and Literature, says more at 
first than it might appear to. On 
the one hand, Oehlschlaeger 
announces, through the term 
'postliberal', his indebtedness to 
Alasdair Macintyre, Stanley 
Hauerwas, and, more generally, 
the Yale school of theology for his 
understanding of Christian ethics; 
at the same time, he is also 
announcing his intention to blaze a 
new trail in the discussion of liter-
ature's relations to ethics by 
departing from the broad and 
well-worn path of literary critics 
who espouse some form of ethical 
or political liberalism. Chapter 1 
begins with a survey of the land-
scape of recent efforts to reunite 
ethical language with broadly 
intellectual and narrowly literary 
endeavors, and proceeds from an 
appreciative critique of Mark 
Schwehn's Exiles from Eden (in 
which Oehlschlaeger argues that 
Schwehn's position is both more 
and less liberal than it purports to 
be) to Booth's consideration of 
texts as Aristotelian friends 
(though Booth's liberalism keeps 
him from appreciating the radical 
communality of Aristotle's vision) 
to J. Hillis Miller's deconstructive 
ethics of reading (in which 'post-
modern' appears to mean 'partici-
pating in the death throes of 
liberal modernity') to Nussbaum's 
neo-Aristotelian emphases on 
moral vision and moral luck 
(which emerge comparatively 
unscathed). This chapter then goes 
on to elaborate a distinctly 
Christian vision of ethics from 
which his reflections proceed; this 
vision is formed primarily by such 
postliberal figures as Hauerwas 
and Macintyre, but also draws 
substantially upon the work of 
John Milbank, Simone Weil, Blaise 
Pascal, and others. (Oehlschlaeger 
even goes so far as to defend, 
though not with out revision, this 
position against the critiques of 
Jeffrey Stout and Richard Rorty in 
the book's afterword.) 
Chapter 2 forms a transitional 
chapter between the theoretical 
first chapter and the literary-crit-
ical essays that follow. Here 
Oehlschlaeger provides a close 
reading of Melville's "Bartleby the 
Scrivener" that reads Bartleby as a 
figure for the moral bankruptcy of 
intellectual life under the ideolog-
ical tyranny of liberalism and 
simultaneously demonstrates the 
resistance a literary text can mount 
to the ideological tyranny of liberal 
critics. The most interesting feature 
of this chapter to non-specialists 
will be his argument for prudence 
as a core virtue (second only to 
charity) of postliberal Christian 
intellectual life. Moving beyond 
(and behind) the modern meaning 
of 'prudence' as calculating reason, 
Oehlschlaeger rehabilitates 
Aquinas' account of the central 
moral virtue, helping us to see 
prudence as a perceptive openness 
to others, to things, to situations in 
all the fullness of their particularity. 
Chapters 3 through 6 are close 
readings of the works of four 
canonical authors Gane Austen, 
Anthony Trollope, Henry James, 
and Stephen Crane). Each of these 
chapters has its own shining as well 
as puzzling moments. Although 
appearing unconnected, a common 
structure is shared by the argu-
ments of these four chapters. While 
each chapter can and does stand on 
its own, all offer a critique of 
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abstract rationalism, especially 
rationalism's efforts to domesticate 
the embarrassing superfluity of 
particulars which rich literary 
narratives seek to celebrate. 
Chapter 3 argues, through an 
insightful and fair reading of 
Emma, that Austen is "more 
Protestant, feminist, and individual-
istic than Macintyre allows" (120). 
Chapter 4 starts with Hauerwas' 
provocative and perplexing claim 
that "Karl Barth's main problem is 
that he did not read enough 
Trollope" (126), specifically that 
Barth's account of honor in his 
Doctrine of Creation traffics in 
abstractions that are of little use to 
concrete moral reflection. Through 
a careful reading of Trollope's pres-
entation of honor in The Warden 
and He Knew He Was Right in light 
of Barth's theological account of 
that virtue, Oehlschlaeger demon-
strates how the concrete details of 
narrative and the abstractions of 
philosophical or theological 
discourse need one another to 
remediate their own unavoidable 
blind spots. Chapter 5 takes as its 
starting point the austere theology 
of Henry James Sr. and reads his 
son's Portrait of a Lady as a narra-
tive critique and counterstatement; 
in so doing, Oehlschlaeger chal-
lenges Nussbaum's famous reading 
of Osmond. Chapter 6, unlike the 
others, does not begin with the 
statement of an abstract thinker 
whose claims subsequently come 
under the scrutiny of narrative, but 
his reading of Stephen Crane's 
"The Blue Hotel" and "The 
Monster" sets up an antagonism 
between Crane's narratives, seen in 
light of their allusive affinity with 
the Gospel of John and Immanuel 
Kant. Needless to say, Stephen and 
John emerge victorious. 
The inevitability of this last 
match-up leads me to my only 
significant criticism of an other-
wise fine book. Immanuel Kant is 
either explicitly or implicitly 
present on nearly every page as the 
whipping boy for postliberal 
ethics. Now, truth be told, I too 
have taken more than my fair share 
of potshots at this venerable 
philosopher. However, the implied 
narrative m Oehlschlaeger's 
account of modern ethics makes 
Kant responsible for nearly every 
problem in modern ethical and 
political life: abstract rationalism; 
disparagement of the body, history, 
and community ("modern 
Gnosticism" as he calls it repeat-
edly); bureaucratic disregard for 
personhood; and the list goes on. 
Clearly he has inherited this preju-
dice from both Macintyre and 
Hauerwas, but Oehlschlaeger 
seems less than charitable in 
repeating ad nauseum the postlib-
eral line without engaging in any 
direct conversation, as it were, 
with Kant. Oehlschlaeger is suffi-
ciently charitable to refrain from 
nasty polemics or ad hominem 
arguments, and he does have the 
capacity to disagree with 
Hauerwas (chapter 4} and 
Macintyre (Afterword) when 
necessary, but his argument would 
have been much better served by a 
more direct encounter with Kant 
than with the repeated evocation 
of Kant's lurking, sinister presence. 
The strengths of Love and 
Good Reasons are many: It is well-
written (and, thanks to Duke, well-
edited). Its analyses of literary texts 
are careful, prudent (in Aquinas' 
sense) and illuminating; in several 
cases they offer a significant break-
through in the critical literature. Its 
summaries of Hauerwas in partic-
ular and postliberal theology in 
general should be accessible to the 
non-specialist and are, for the most 
part, quite reliable. (One small 
quibble here: In a few places 
Oehlschlaeger seems to assume his 
readers know more of Macintyre 
than most of them will.) The most 
significant accomplishment of this 
volume, however, is its implicit 
refutation of the charge, leveled by 
Stout and others, that postliberal 
Christian ethics must necessarily be 
tribal, sectarian, or balkanizing. 
Oehlschlaeger's project both 
argues for and demonstrates how 
robustly Christian scholarship 
might serve not only the ekklesia 
but also the polis without losing its 
soul. Anyone interested in the 
fields of literature and ethics, liter-
ature and theology, theology of 
culture, or modern literary criti-
cism would do well to spend time 
with this well-written, insightful, 
and provocative volume. 
Scott Huelin 
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by the waters of Mars: a bio-friendly universe? 
LAST SUMMER, NASA lAUNCHED TWO ROBOTIC 
rovers toward the Red Planet. Sporting the upbeat 
names Spirit and Opportunity, these Martian rovers 
were sent primarily to study the rock formations of 
our neighbor in space, with the hope of discovering 
whether or not there is evidence of Martian seas 
and flowing water. Last January, Spirit landed on 
the Gusev crater, while Opportunity landed in the 
Meridiani plain. After a rough landing, surrounded 
by balloons, both rovers began to move out and 
explore the planet. There is now conclusive 
evidence that, yes, there once was liquid water on 
the dry and barren plains of Mars. Opportunity, in 
particular, has now found evidence of salt water 
pools at least two inches deep, and NASA's Mars 
exploration rover mission is not yet finished. No 
doubt more evidence will turn up. What is more, 
President Bush has announced a long range, $170-
billion proposal to send human prospectors to 
Mars, looking for more ripply rocks. 
Why all this excitement? What makes a little 
salt in ripple patterns on a few rocks so profound a 
discovery? The answer has to do with assumptions, 
new assumptions the scientific community now 
makes about life on other planets. We are 
witnessing a paradigm sift in astrobiology. 
At one time, scientifically minded philosophers 
like Bertand Russell concluded that the physical 
sciences have revealed a huge, empty universe filled 
with darkness and devoid of life. Life on our planet 
was an accident, a kind of cosmic hiccup. It is 
almost ironic that we are endowed with intelligence 
by a capricious nature, so this line of thought went, 
for intelligence makes us capable of reflecting upon 
the meaninglessness of our lives in comparison with 
the gigantic span of the galaxies. It is impossible not 
to recall the glorious rhetoric of Russell's most 
cited essay, "A Free Man's Worship" (1903): 
That Man is the product of causes which had 
no prevision of the end they were achieving; 
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and 
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fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the 
outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; 
that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of 
thought and feeling, can preserve an indi-
vidual life beyond the grave; that all the 
labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the 
inspiration, all the noonday brightness of 
human genius, are destined to extinction in 
the vast death of the solar system, and that 
the whole temple of Man's achievement 
must inevitably be buried beneath the debris 
of a universe in ruins-all these things, if not 
quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly 
certain, that no philosophy which rejects 
them can hope to stand. 
All that glorious angst in one sentence! 
Russell's view has been continued by science 
writers like Jacques Monod and Steven Weinberg. 
Weinberg wrote in his book on the Big Bang that 
"the more the universe seems comprehensible, the 
more it seems pointless," since our tiny planet is 
"one small part of an overwhelmingly hostile 
universe." 
We are now witnessing a sea change in the basic 
assumptions about just how accidental and point-
less life may be in our cosmos. Scientists working 
on the Mars probe believe that wherever there is 
liquid water and enough energy, there will be life. 
The best scientific evidence for this new paradigm 
in astrobiology comes not from space, but from the 
wine-dark sea. Strange forms of life have been 
found miles below the ocean's surface, where 
cracks in the earth's crust shoot forth hot steaming 
water ("dark smokers"). Various animals have 
found a way to survive far beneath the sun's 
enlivening rays, at the uttermost depths of the sea. 
If life can evolve and survive there, then it may exist 
in many different forms throughout our cosmos. 
The universe may not be so dead and lifeless after 
all. Life may not be an accident. In fact, many scien-
tists today hold that the universe is "bio-friendly." 
NASA agrees. Where there is liquid water, and some 
energy, life has a good chance of getting started. 
One of the scientists at the forefront of this 
paradigm-shift in astrobiology is the Belgian biolo-
gist Christian De Duve, winner of the Nobel Prize 
in Medicine in 1974 for his work with cellular life. 
Born in England in 1917, De Duve was professor of 
molecular biology for many years at Rockefeller 
University in Manhattan. In his so-called retire-
ment, his books and lectures (such as Vital Dust or 
Life Evolving) make the case for the evolution of 
life being a natural occurrence: neither a supernat-
ural miracle, nor an accident, but a normal 
outworking of the laws of nature and the initial 
conditions of the young earth. De Duve is part of a 
growing cadre of scientists who believe all kinds 
and types of life may well exist already, spread 
throughout the vastness of space like salt in soup, 
yeast in bread, or lamp stands in a room which 
would otherwise be dark. 
Of course, we are not yet talking about intelli-
gent life. But if we do discover some evidence of 
even microbial life on Mars, that will increase 
greatly the odds that somewhere in our wonderful 
universe, filled with light and life, there are bound 
to be other creatures who are-like us-given the 
gift of reason by the Creator of all. That life is an 
accident, and the universe is pointless, uncaring, 
and hostile-these assumptions are now seen for 
the philosophy they always were. Russell and 
Weinberg may think they are giving us "just the 
facts, Ma'am," in setting forth a philosophy of 
Stoic courage in the face a pointless existence. 
Instead they are confusing their science and their 
worldview, an error which usually leads to bad 
philosophy and bad science. In fact, both 
astronomy and biology are telling us that the 
universe appears to welcome and encourage life, 
which may already be blossoming around countless 
stars just like ours. f 
Alan G. Padgett teaches theology and science at 
Luther Seminary. He lives in a remote part of the 
galaxy known as "Minnesota, " where he reports 
there is lots of intelligent life. 
THE SONS 
Fog hides the heads of streets 
and the sons who have fallen. 
A strange vertigo makes them 
think they are standing. 
The gray muffles our calls; 
they think us a species of bird 
interpreting omens. 
Tell it not in the valley 
lest daughters of wantons rejoice. 
0 daughters of God, now weep-
cry for the beautiful sons, 
the fallen ones, sons 
of Eli, of Saul. 
Anne Turner 
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front-page news 
RCENTLY I READ AN ARTICLE ASKING, "WHAT 
must the church do to get on the front page of the 
newspaper?" Typically, churches do not make 
headlines, and when we do it is because of scandals. 
Earlier this year my church got some front-page 
coverage in The Oshkosh Northwestern, so I know 
the answer to the question about front-page news is 
"Bury the locally notorious schizophrenic man." 
It is, as they say, a long story. 
Martin Lloyd was found dead on Wednesday 
11 February. A friend of his had left some groceries 
for him outside his door and after they had sat there 
a few days, she feared the worst. When the police 
entered his apartment they called the coroner. 
Martin was a peculiar man. When I arrived in 
Oshkosh five years ago I assumed he was homeless. 
He looked like Bo Diddley, and acted and smelled 
like the homeless people I had served while volun-
teering at a shelter in Chicago. It turned out, 
though, that he had an apartment and frequented 
my church. The outgoing interim pastor told me 
that Martin knew more scripture than anyone else 
in the congregation and it was true; he had many 
verses memorized. Often during Adult Sunday 
School and during less formal worship services he 
would recite scripture-mostly psalms and epistle 
passages-when he heard a word or phrase that 
spurred his memory. 
When I first spotted Martin at church I 
assumed that he came just for the food we served 
at coffee hour. Then I noticed he never once went 
through the line himself. He would sit off to the 
side and people would serve him. 
"Martin, there are Oreos and chocolate chips 
today, which would you prefer?" 
"Fine, fine. 
He also took his coffee "fine, fine." 
Martin began to appear at our Wednesday 
after-school program. He sat on a pew at the edge 
of the room, just watching. At 5:30, when we make 
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a circle holding hands and sing "Johnny 
Appleseed," he would stay there, waiting. After a 
few weeks, we moved the circle to surround 
Martin, so he would have hands to hold during 
grace. After a few more weeks the kids were vying 
for the privileges of holding his hand and filling a 
plate for him. 
It seemed that everyone in town had somehow 
touched-and been touched by-Martin Lloyd. 
When I heard of his death I sprang into action. I let 
the coroner know that we considered Martin a part 
of our faith community, though he was not offi-
cially a member. I let the funeral home know that 
we would plan a memorial service. We started to 
track down Martin's next-of-kin. 
Martin was seventy-nine years old. He had 
grown up in Mississippi and had lived and worked 
in Chicago before coming to Oshkosh. The friend 
who had left him the groceries thought she knew 
the name of an aunt somewhere in Mississippi. A 
member of my church tried to contact the canning 
factory in Chicago where Martin had worked. I 
phoned the high school he had attended, but all our 
leads were pretty lean. After a week, the coroner's 
office called because Martin's mother had been 
found, living in St. Louis! She, her daughter, her 
grandson and his wife and their daughter would all 
be coming to the memorial service. 
Martin was notorious for several reasons. He 
was often seen fishing at the river. He walked every-
where he went, always with either his fishing gear 
or his guitar. His trademark, though, was the white 
construction helmet he wore. All the time. He just 
felt safer with it. After his death I learned how 
proud he was of his background in construction. 
He came to Oshkosh about fourteen years ago, 
drawn by the Experimental Aircraft Association's 
annual convention. A number of people here 
befriended him. He had a community of people he 
fished with; people who knew him from his 
morning coffee at Hardee's; people whom he had 
lunch with at the Salvation Army; the 
Presbyterians. If everyone who ever bought him a 
cheeseburger at Burger King had attended his 
memorial service our church would have been as 
full as on Christmas Eve. 
Martin liked to travel. Every spring he went to 
southern California and Mexico for about six 
weeks. In 2002, he was gone for longer than six 
weeks. People started to miss him; rumors 
abounded. The Northwestern did an investigation. 
Martin was found in a nursing home in Los 
Angeles, having been beaten and robbed. The 
community worked to bring him back to town. He 
even got his old apartment back. (Martin lived 
above a bar, which embarrassed him. Anyone who 
gave him a ride home had to drop him off a block 
away, and he would not begin walking home until 
the driver had driven off.) 
Planning the memorial service was a lot like 
herding cats. We scheduled the service for a 
Wednesday afternoon so the after-school kids 
could attend. Most had never known someone 
who had died. Since our liturgical dance group 
practices on Wednesdays, they took part in the 
service, as did our octogenarian blues harmonica 
player-every church has one these days-who 
played a medley of Mississippi delta blues tunes. 
One of Martin's friends prepared a ten-page astro-
logical reading for me. While I do not understand 
the significance of zodiacal cusps, I was amazed to 
learn that people with Martin's birthday are 
expected to be wanderers who find it difficult to 
settle any place and often drift from job to job. 
Still, I found myself unable to use these insights in 
my homily. 
Two of Martin's fishing buddies paid for his 
obituary. Employees from a printer who often had 
lunch with Martin contributed the bulletins. 
Someone else brought the flowers. We stretched 
our Lenten Simple Supper Chili Feed and invited 
members to bring salads and dessert for the 
luncheon following the service. It wasn't the 
miracle of loaves and fishes, but there was plenty of 
food for everyone. 
In addition to the front-page coverage of the 
service, several things were especially gratifying to 
me. I am very proud that the congregation I serve 
and this community had been able to care for one 
of our vulnerable people. Throughout the days 
leading up to the service the line "guard each man's 
dignity and save each man's pride" from "We Are 
One in the Spirit" kept echoing in my head. 
I think Martin's family did not realize how 
precious Martin was to Oshkosh. They marveled at 
the kindness that was shown to one his sister knew 
as "a very eccentric young man." 
Finally, memorial money poured in to the 
church. Typically we have a formula which divides 
memorials several ways, but in Martin's case the 
congregation's ruling board decided to have all the 
memorial money go toward purchasing a burial 




A Gentle Giant 
The remaining money is in a fund that aids trav-
elers stranded in Oshkosh. Now we are able to help 
anyone in a situation like Martin's in Los Angeles. 
Martin Lloyd's death and memorial service 
were indeed front-page news in this town of 60,000. 
But everyday, without the headlines, churches 
extend kindness, compassion, respect, and grace to 
eccentric, vulnerable people. And find themselves 
blessed when a Martin Lloyd comes along. f 
The Reverend Thomas C. Willadsen pastors First 
Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. 
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global Christianity still coming 
T.REE YEARS AGO I WROTE A PAPER ON TilE RISE 
of new Christian universities in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America for a conference on "Currents in 
World Christianity" hosted by the University of 
Pretoria. Word of my interest in the subject spread 
rapidly, and virtually every month since then I 
learn of a new institution. Consider two recent visi-
tors to my office. One was the Rev. Dr. Musiande 
Kasali, a Congolese theologian who is a seminary 
president in Nairobi, Kenya. "The Lord is calling 
me to found a Christian university," he told me, 
saying that it would most likely be in Beni, in the 
trinityn Congo. I was astonished. Beni was the 
epicenter of the brutal civil war in the Congo that 
has claimed some 3.3 million lives since 1998. Dr. 
Kasali explained: "We must rebuild our nation. We 
need Christian leaders who will serve God's reign. 
Surely we have seen enough of Satan's hand in our 
land." One can hardly imagine a more impossible 
place to build a Christian university, but Kasali and 
his countrymen have heard God's call. 
The other visitor was Dr. Young-nup Kim, the 
academic dean of Handong Global University in 
South Korea. Handong was founded in 1995 by a 
Korean nuclear engineer who dreams of its 
becoming an evangelical MIT. Handong is assem-
bling a strong Korean faculty on a gleaming new 
campus with about 3000 high-achieving students. 
Handong is not content to stop there; it is busy 
replicating itself in two other Asian sites: 
Uzbekistan and Manchuria. Most American church-
related colleges and universities worry about 
spreading themselves too thin, so we shelve some of 
our more ambitious dreams. That can hardly be 
said of our non-western Christian counterparts. 
This new wave of university building is driven 
by the rising tide of world Christianity. The 
Christian faith, which is in deep decline in Europe, 
is on the ascent elsewhere. In 1900, eighty percent 
of the world's Christians lived in Europe and 
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North America. A century later, sixty percent of the 
world's Christians are living in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. Whereas in Great Britain, for 
example, only about one million of the 26 million 
members of the Church of England attend on 
Sundays, in Nigeria there are 17.5 million Anglicans 
and their churches are packed for worship. Half of 
the world's Anglicans now live in Africa. 
T.E RISE OF NONWESTERN CHRISTIANITY HAS 
come as a huge surprise to the secular west. 
Historian Dana Robert points out that thirty years 
ago, Christianity outside of the west was thought 
to be a product of European imperialism, and it 
was expected to wither and die in the post-colonial 
era. As Robert wryly observes, one of the great 
ironies of our times is that "the process of decolo-
nization. . .freed Christianity to be more at home 
in local situations." Nonwestern Christianity grew 
much more rapidly after the end of the colonial 
empires than during them. In 1900, there were only 
about nine million Christians in all of Africa. A 
half-century later, this number had tripled, to 
about thirty million. Today, roughly a half-century 
into the postcolonial era, the number has multi-
plied more than tenfold, to an estimated 382 
million Christians in Africa. 
Circling back to Drs. Kasali and Kim, we see 
that they represent an intriguing facet of these 
trends: nonwestern Christianity's growing invest-
ment in higher education. Three years ago, my 
Pretoria paper pointed to six new evangelical 
universities in Central America. In a visit to Costa 
Rica last March, I found out that there were a half-
dozen evangelical universities in San Jose alone! 
Every month I learn of more such endeavors, from 
Malawi to Haiti to Irian Papua. I converse regularly 
with Christian leaders who, like Dr. Kasali, have 
heard God's call to found a Christian university. 
This movement marks an important stage in 
the development of nonwestern Christianity. Like 
the Methodist and Pentecostal movements of the 
past, the new Christian groups arising in many 
places are evolving from peace-disturbing, estab-
lishment-upsetting religious upstarts into settled 
denominations and fellowships. With revival fires 
no longer flaring and in need of some tending, 
institutions or "fireplaces" are being built. There is 
a rising generation to equip, and a surrounding 
society in which to minister for the longer term. 
L. NEW CHRISTIANITY IS GROWING MOST 
rapidly among the world's poor who, according to 
sociologist David Martin, often become an 
"aspiring poor." A university education and a good 
job become worthy Christian aspirations, as does a 
rising desire to save and serve troubled societies. 
Early on, evangelical Christians tend to be preoccu-
pied with evangelization and basic discipling of 
new believers. As these movements grow and 
prosper, however, expectations increase for them 
to take on social responsibilities. Hear the mission 
statement of a new Pentecostal school, Central 
University College in Accra, Ghana. It aims to 
advance "the great commission of our Lord Jesus 
Christ in its multifaceted dimensions, ... to exhibit 
His Kingdom ethics and to spread its justice and 
righteousness in the world." 
These new Christian universities give off 
echoes of our own past. Nineteenth-century 
Baptist and Catholic missionaries in the American 
West founded new universities in such wild places 
as the South Bend of the St. Joseph River in 
Indiana, and on the banks of the Brazos in the 
Republic of Texas. These "uncommon schools," 
according to historian Timothy Smith, sought to 
relate the people's religious convictions to the 
emerging political and social structures. The new 
global Christianity is repeating this process. 
So what do all of these developments have to 
do with us Christian scholars in the North? For the 
past millennium, Christianity and Christian 
consciousness have been tied to Europe, and our 
conversation here about Christianity and the life of 
the mind bears the deep stamp of European 
culture. As Christianity takes root in the south and 
east, it is being transformed into a predominantly 
nonwestern religion. Mrican Christian scholars, for 
example, ardently claim Christianity as an Mrican 
religion, not an import. That is the main point of 
Kwame Bediako's stirring and provocative 
Christianity in Africa: The Renewal of a Non-
Western Religion (Orbis, 1995); and the main thrust 
of Lamin Sanneh's eloquent new self-interview, 
Whose Religion Is Christianity? The Gospel beyond 
the West (Eerdmans, 2003). 
If Christianity is becoming predominantly non-
Western, then what happens in Mrica, Asia, and 
Latin America will have a growing influence on 
what Christianity will be like worldwide. 
Conversely, what happens in Europe and North 
America will matter less. Says Tite Tienou, the West 
Mrican theologian who now heads Trinity 
Evangelical Divinity School in Deerfield, Illinois, 
"the future of Christianity no longer depends on 
developments in the North." 
Only a few years ago, such assertions would 
have seemed vastly overblown, but the tragic events 
of September 11 and the subsequent wars have 
begun to awaken us to the global character of 
contemporary life. One of the surprises is the reli-
giosity of our present age. Peter Berger, formerly a 
high priest of secularization theory, writes: "the 
assumption that we live in a secularized world is 
false." The assumption that 'modernization neces-
sarily leads to a decline of religion' has proven to be 
mistaken. Globally interactive modernity has proven 
to be a powerful vehicle for religious interaction and 
competitive expansion, as traditional religious and 
communal boundaries have broken down. The 
rising Christianity of the south and east is no longer 
distant or exotic. It is changing the whole church, 
and we see signs that it will change our thought 
world as well. I hope that the readers of Christian 
thought journals like The Cresset will make new 
efforts to ponder and act on the implications. f 
Joel Carpenter is Provost of Calvin College, Grand 
Rapids, Michigan. 
academic integrity from a faith perspective 
IN EURIPIDES' PLAY, MEDEA, THE FEMALE PRO-
tagonist bemoans the fact that men bear no 
outward, physical sign of the quality of their moral 
character. One translation has it, "Oh, Zeus, why 
have you given men clear marks to help them tell 
the gold from counterfeit, while nature sets no 
stamp upon men's bodies to help us tell the true 
man from the false!" Neither men nor women have 
an easy time discerning the character of those in 
whom we would place our trust and affection. And 
so, too, as a nation weary of scandal, with Medea 
we might well wish for some outward sign by 
which we could reliably recognize a trustworthy 
corporate executive or political leader, one whose 
integrity is without compromise. 
Academic communities are hardly havens of 
the honest. In college classrooms throughout the 
country, academic dishonesty is pervasive. Surveys 
conducted by the national Center for Academic 
Integrity show that on most campuses, over 
seventy-five percent of students admit to some 
cheating, whether it is copying from a fellow 
student's exam, using material from the Internet 
without attribution in a research paper, or falsifying 
research data. A particularly alarming trend is 
evident in a 2001 survey of high school students 
that found that more than half of the 4500 students 
surveyed saw nothing wrong with cheating on tests. 
It is not only students who stand convicted of 
violating academic integrity, professors, them-
selves, have certainly engaged in plagiarism and the 
falsification of data. The legal scholar, Stephen 
Carter, has broadened the understanding of 
academic dishonesty to include even the practices 
associated with grade inflation and the hyperbole 
characteristic of the recommendation letters we 
write for our students. Candace De Russy, in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education, even traces respon-
sibility for corporate scandals and professionals' 
dishonesty back to the declining standards for 
academic integrity in college classrooms. It is the 
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professors of undergraduates, she asserts, who 
introduce students to a set of ethical standards 
associated with a profession. "Do students learn by 
observation," De Russy asks, "how a responsible 
peer collegium conducts itself, both in disciplining 
members who do not meet minimum standards 
and in fostering the highest professional ideals?" 
Without an experience of conducting their 
work in a setting in which the highest ethical stan-
dards are practiced, students are ill-prepared to 
embrace the ethical standards of their profession. 
Indifference to matters of academic integrity, on 
both the parts of students and professors, consti-
tutes a fundamental threat to institutions like 
ours-liberal arts colleges of the church-no less 
that the declining academic preparation of students 
or chronic financial constraints. 
As stated in the academic integrity handbook 
of the college where I teach, "Because academic 
dishonesty in all its forms is so fundamentally 
contrary to the community of study, because it is so 
fundamentally destructive of the moral virtues 
required of those engaged in the academic enter-
prise, we must collectively and individually reaf-
firm the central importance of the virtue of 
academic integrity .... " 
When one takes the fruits of another scholar's 
research and writing without appropriate attribution, 
or when one deliberately falsifies data, then one is 
engaged in theft and has given false witness -viola-
tions of the seventh and eighth commandments. But 
solely to recognize academic dishonesty as sin is 
insufficient and unlikely to diminish the frequency of 
its occurrence in a college community. Are there 
resources that people of faith bring to the project of 
restoring integrity to our college communities? 
In Romans 12:2, the apostle Paul urges people 
of faith not to be conformed to this world-
conformed to a world in which theft and false 
witness have become commonplace-but to be 
transformed by the renewal of our minds, that we 
may discern the will of God. In his exploration of 
the meaning and implications of the command-
ments, Martin Luther explains that the command-
ments address not only that which is prohibited but 
also that which we must do. Luther says that not 
only must we not steal that which belongs to our 
neighbors, we must offer our neighbors assistance 
to improve and protect that which is theirs. We are 
not merely warned against slandering or betraying 
our neighbor, but obligated to safeguard them 
against harm by others. Seen through the lenses of 
Luther's commentaries, we are obligated not only 
to refrain from dishonesty, but also to strengthen 
the learning community by aiding each other in 
"the renewal of our minds, that we may discern the 
will of God." 
Luther's explanations of the seventh and eighth 
commandments cause us to reflect on the broader 
implications of violating academic integrity. A 
teacher who must attend to the possibility that a 
paper has been plagiarized and must search for its 
sources has less opportunity to assist other students 
in the refinement of their thinking. And when a 
teacher awards higher grades than a student's work 
merits, the teacher fails to respect the students' 
pursuit of their Christian vocations and makes of 
their work a smaller, less important thing. The 
integrity of the academy requires not only the prac-
tice of virtues-fair mindedness, courage, persever-
ance, intellectual humility, and empathy-but also 
our commitment to creating a learning community 
in which, as students and teachers, we support each 
others' vocations as scholars. 
If we are not to be conformed to this world, but 
transformed, we must envision the learning 
community and our roles as students and teachers 
in a new way. To conform to this world is to inter-
pret the academy in light of the values and practices 
of the market and think of our learning as a product 
with solely extrinsic value. With a transformed 
vision of the learning community, we understand 
ourselves to be engaged in a spiritual project-we 
understand our intellectual inquiry as a form of 
Christian witness. In contemporary American 
society, we have all but lost the memory that the 
medieval origins of the university were in the cathe-
dral. Michael Peterson, analyzing the thought of the 
Christian philosopher, Jacques Maritain, has 
described the teacher's role as a "ministerial agent 
in the educational process. . .mediators of some-
thing that is higher than themselves, helping others 
to acquire not only facts and skills but also the 
dispositions and qualities suitable for rational 
beings [made] in the image of God." In the trans-
formed vision of the learning community, learning 
is understood to have intrinsic value as a "renewal 
of our minds, that we may discern the will of God." 
A transformed vision of the learning commu-
nity demands a broader set of expectations. Parker 
Palmer, who writes compellingly about the voca-
tions of teaching and learning, has observed 
another sense in which being conformed to this 
world diminishes a learning community. He 
observes that "our culture's fearful obsession with 
results has sometimes, ironically, led us to abandon 
great objectives and settle for trivial and mediocre 
ends. The reason," Palmer states, "is simple. As 
long as 'effectiveness' is the ultimate standard by 
which we judge our actions, we will act only 
toward ends we are sure we can achieve." 
My college transcript states that I majored in 
history, but it would be more accurate to say that I 
majored in Armajani, a professor with whom I 
studied at every opportunity. Professor Armajani 
was born and raised in Iran and educated at univer-
sity and seminary in the United States. At the 
beginning of every course, every semester, in an 
accent thick with his native language of Farsi, 
Armajani would intone the same three questions: 
What is good? What is evil? And what is [hu]man? 
For Armajani, the study of history was sustained 
reflection on the moral dimensions of human expe-
rience. He instilled compassion for the people 
whom we studied and a sense of urgency to do 
justice in the world. Beyond the skills of analysis 
and interpretation, I believed I was learning some-
thing like wisdom. He made me feel that I was a 
member of a continuing community of memory 
and exploration-probing the questions of 
enduring value that constitute the core of our intel-
lectual being. 
As teachers it is our calling to invite students to 
join this community of discernment, for us to make 
it as attractive and worthwhile as we know it in our 
bones to be. Ultimately, the resource people of 
faith bring to this task is the resolve not to be 
conformed to a diminished world but by the 
renewal of our minds to transform our learning to 
the wholeness born of wisdom. f 
Linda Johnson teaches History at Concordia 
College, Moorhead, Minnesota. 
art and law: a Viennese tale 
I Will NEVER FORGET MY CHANCE ENCOUNTER 
with Maria Altmann. It was at a Christmas party. I 
introduced myself to the elderly woman. Talk 
turned to Austria and I learned that she had been 
born in Vienna, but had lived in the U.S. since 1942. 
We spoke of art, of the painter Gustav Klimt, and 
my favorite Klimt-a painting of a woman with 
black hair tied up in a pompadour. Her hair is the 
only darkness in the whole painting. Kind of the 
reverse of Caravaggio or Rembrandt. Lots of 
chiaro, not much oscuro. Everything else-her 
gown, the jewels, the background-is a shim-
mering gold. It's a stunning portrait. 
"That woman is my aunt, Adele Bloch-Bauer. 
That painting belongs to me," Maria Altmann 
replied. "The Nazis stole it from my uncle's home 
in 1939, and the Austrians won't give it back." 
Maria Altmann, I learned, had survived the Shoah 
by fleeing Austria after the Anschluss in March of 
1938. Her uncle Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, a wealthy 
Viennese merchant also had fled, escaping first to 
Czechoslovakia, and then-when Chamberlain let 
"honorable Mr. Hitler" have the Sudetenland-to 
Switzerland, where he died penniless in 1945. 
Soon after we met, Maria hired a very good 
lawyer, Randol Schoenberg, the grandson of two 
world-famous Viennese composers, Arnold 
Schoenberg and Eric Zeisl. For several years 
Schoenberg has ably represented Altmann in her 
legal battle to wrest from the Austrian government 
six Klimts that her uncle Ferdinand left to her in his 
1945 will. The painting of her aunt Adele was 
among these. In 1999 an Austrian journalist notified 
Altmann of his discovery of documents that demon-
strate the falsity of the Austrian Gallery's claim that 
her aunt and uncle had given the paintings to the 
gallery before the Anschluss in March of 1938. 
Altmann then tried to recover the paintings from the 
gallery, but the museum officials would not budge. 
The option of pursuing a legal remedy in 
Austrian courts is not a realistic one for Maria 
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Altmann. Austria demands a bond pegged to the 
current market value of the paintings, now esti-
mated at over $150 million. So, on her behalf, 
Schoenberg filed a lawsuit in the federal trial court 
in Los Angeles. 
The Austrian Gallery, owned and operated by 
the Republic of Austria, raised the defense of sover-
eign immunity to the litigation. Both the trial court 
and the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument and ordered the case to 
proceed to trial on the merits of Altmann's claims. 
Austria sought review in the United States Supreme 
Court, which took the case and heard arguments 
on 25 February of this year. The Court is expected 
to rule in this case by the end of the current term 
in June of 2004. 
In its legal brief, Austria confidently asserts 
that the paintings are "owned by the Republic." 
This misleading statement ignores the very heart of 
this litigation, for Altmann maintains that these six 
paintings are in fact hers, and are "in the wrongful 
possession of the Republic of Austria and the 
Austrian Gallery." Possession may be nine points of 
the law, but it is not the same as clear title or 
rightful ownership. 
I F THE SUPREME COURT ALLOWS THIS CASE TO GO 
to trial, I am confident that Altmann will be able 
to demonstrate that the paintings were not 
"given" to the gallery by a "bequest" in the 1923 
will of Adele Bloch-Bauer and were certainly not 
"given" to Austria in the 1945 will of her husband 
Ferdinand, that the art was in fact stolen by the 
Nazis in 1939 and came into the possession of the 
Austrian Gallery at various times after 1939; that 
the retention of the paintings after the war was 
achieved through shameless extortion by Austrian 
officials to induce a surrender of valuable prop-
erty rights by the lawyer representing the 
Altmann family; and that the Austrian govern-
ment is guilty of an ongoing deception about 
these facts. 
At this point, however, the Court must focus 
on a narrower legal question that has enormous 
significance for Holocaust-era claims lodged 
against an agency of a foreign government: does an 
American federal court have power to hear a 
complaint of theft that occurred before 1952? In 
that year, an official in the State Department 
announced that the United States had abandoned 
the view that sovereign immunity is absolute, and 
in 1976, Congress codified this view in the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act, which confers on federal 
courts power to reject the defense of sovereign 
immunity in cases in which a plaintiff sues a foreign 
government that has expropriated property (or, as 
in this case, has retained property taken in viola-
tion of international law). If the Court answers this 
question in the negative, no suits for recovery of 
stolen property from the 1930s and 1940s will be 
allowed in federal courts. 
I CAN ALMOST UNDERSTAND mE AUDACnY OF 
Austria, which prizes these beautiful paintings so 
much that it claims absolute sovereign immunity, 
even in a case seeking restitution of art stolen by the 
Nazis. But I am shocked that the Bush 
Administration has decided to support Austria in 
this case. The amicus brief filed by the Justice 
Department overlooks the insistence of our govern-
ment-from the London Declaration of 1943 to the 
present moment-that art stolen by the Nazis must 
be restored after the war to its rightful owners. 
Worse yet, its legal argumentation is formalistic and 
ahistorical. Hence, I have filed a brief reframing the 
issues the Court must resolve. On behalf of several 
prominent Holocaust historians and art historians, 
my amicus brief argues that Austria's reliance upon 
absolute sovereign immunity is misplaced. 
First, the theft of the Klimt paintings must be 
viewed within the larger context of the crime of 
genocide perpetrated by German and Austrian 
Nazis. Why do I insist on this connection? Because 
the Nazis themselves made this connection in the 
darkest criminal conspiracy of the past century. 
The dispossession of Jews was linked directly to an 
intentional plan to rob Jews of their liberties and 
their very lives by the millions. 
The very language of homicide had to be rein-
vented to describe the enormity of state-sanctioned 
moral depravity in the twentieth century. In 1944, 
Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish refugee from Poland 
teaching at Yale Law School, invented the term 
"genocide" because, he said, "New Conceptions 
require new terms." He defined genocide as "the 
destruction of a nation or an ethnic group. . .a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves." 
A year later, the Treaty of London addressed 
two distinct crimes-war crimes and crimes against 
hum-anity-that guided the International Military 
Trib-unal at Nuremberg. As Justice Robert Jackson, 
Chief Prosecutor for the United States before this 
tribunal, argued, the theft of Jewish property by the 
Nazis fits within the larger pattern of massive crim-
inality comprehended under the terms, "genocide," 
"war crime," and "crime against humanity." The art 
theft at the heart of the Altmann case can only be 
comprehended in the context of the pattern of 
gross violation of the dignity of Austrian Jews that 
led ultimately to their forced deportation to outside 
countries (as was the case with Maria Altmann and 
her uncle Ferdinand) or to brutal slave labor camps 
such as those at Mauthausen (where over 119,000 
prisoners, including over 38,000 Austrian Jews, 
were tortured and killed by being worked to death) 
and finally to the death camps in Poland, notably 
Auschwitz-Birkenau, the largest Jewish cemetery in 
the world (where victims arrived in cattle cars and 
left this world in chimneys). 
Second, federal courts most emphatically do 
have plenary jurisdiction over the crime of geno-
cide and its fruits. No nation enjoys sovereign 
immunity from this crime, any more than it would 
from acts of piracy, terrorism, or engaging in 
slavery. The Nazi seizure of property owned by 
Jews was, in the language of the United Nations 
Genocide Convention, "deliberately inflicting on 
[a national, ethnical, racial or religious] group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its phys-
ical destruction in whole or in part." It trivializes 
the painful history of the Shoah for Austria to rely 
in this day and age upon the doctrine of interna-
tional law that places its conduct beyond the reach 
of law because it is an "act of a state" or for the 
Justice Department to read the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act in such a wooden, acontextual way. 
Third, the position adopted by Austria and the 
Bush Administration ignores critical developments 
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in international law and in the history of Europe, 
and more particularly in the history of Austria, that 
undermine the claim of sovereign immunity. 
A. Every treaty is a voluntary renunciation of 
sovereignty over the terms of that treaty. Hence, 
when Austria ratified the Hague Convention on the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) , it 
implicitly renounced its claim to sovereign immu-
nity in cases involving the confiscation of private 
property (forbidden by Article 46), pillage 
(forbidden by Article 47), and "all seizure of. 
works of art" (forbidden by Article 56). 
B. Austria abandoned the general theory of 
absolute sovereign immunity in the 1920s. In 1950 
its own Supreme Court ruled that a foreign state 
may not avoid responsibility for violations of inter-
national law by invoking sovereign immunity. 
C. In conformity with the London Declaration of 
1943 (repudiating dispossession of civilians during 
wartime), the post-war government of Austria offi-
cially repudiated all transactions in the property of 
Nazi victims, declaring them null and void in three 
separate statutes passed in 1946 and 1947 that were 
designed to accomplish restitution of Nazi-looted 
property. 
D. When Austria sought to rejoin the family of 
nations as an independent nation in 1955, it 
pledged again in its State Treaty to restore all unre-
turned Nazi-looted property. 
E. After intense negotiations, the Clinton adminis-
tration convened a major international conference 
in Washington in December 1998 about restitution 
of Nazi-looted art. At this conference Austria 
announced that it had just enacted federal legisla-
tion to enforce this duty of restitution, and it 
described to the other forty-three nations at the 
conference its laudable efforts to catalog confis-
cated art in its state museums and to return them to 
their rightful owners. Austria has settled a major 
dispute with the Rothschild family, restoring to 
them more than 250 treasures that the Nazis had 
looted and that Austria had retained as part of its 
"national cultural heritage" for decades. 
A OF THESE C.ONsiDERATIONS LEAD TO THE 
conclusion that Austria may not now be heard to 
claim absolute sovereign immunity in a case seeking 
restoration of Nazi-looted art to Maria Altmann. 
I hope the Court does not exalt legal 
formalism in the manner urged by the Justice 
Department. No country should profit from 
avoiding its responsibility to return Nazi-looted art 
to those from whom it was stolen or to their 
surviving heirs. To accept the view of the current 
administration-a position no previous administra-
tion has ever adopted-severely erodes the duties, 
now widely acknowledged in the art world, both to 
search carefully for the provenance of art in the 
years from 1933 to 1945, and, where it becomes 
clear that the art was stolen by the Nazis, to return 
it promptly to its rightful owners. It sends a double 
message to Austria and other nations about post-
Shoah morality: "Please return stolen art to its 
rightful owners. But if you like this art a lot, or if 
you find it to be 'art of national significance,' or if 
keeping this art will help attract tourists to your 
capital, by all means keep it, and we'll find a way 
of making sure that no one can use our courts to 
establish whether it belongs to you or not." 
Far from interfering with the foreign policy of 
this country, allowing federal courts to serve as fora 
for redress of grievances arising from the 
Holocaust era enables such claims to be resolved 
judiciously and in conformity with the rule of law 
and the freedoms espoused and championed by 
this country when it undertook its titanic struggle 
in World War II against Fascism. 
Finally, this case is about more than priceless 
art treasures. As Elie Wiesel, one of the most vivid 
witnesses to the Shoah, has written: "The duty to 
remember covers not only big accounts, huge 
palaces, and rare art collections but also less 
wealthy families, small merchants, cobblers, 
peddlers, school teachers, water carriers, beggars; 
the enemy deprived them of their pathetically poor 
possessions, such as a prayer book, a shirt, a comb, 
eyeglasses, toys. In other words: the poor victims 
were robbed of their poverty." By allowing the 
Altmann case to proceed on its merits, the Supreme 
Court would fulfill a moral obligation to remember 
all these victims of the greatest crime of the twen-
tieth century. As painful as the burden of this 
memory may be, we dare not forget. f 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., teaches law at 
Valparaiso University. For a full copy of his brief in 




«J will follow him around the Horn, and around the Norway maelstrom, and around 
perdition's flames before I give him up." -Captain Ahab, Moby Dick 
IN THE FILM ThE ROCK, NICHOLAS CAGE PLAYS AN 
FBI agent who commandeers a sports car, zips in 
and out of oncoming traffic, and purposely drives 
the vehicle through the glass windows of a 
building, all in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. I know 
I'm not telling the readers of this journal anything 
they don't already know when I say that such a 
pursuit is purely cinematic and any law enforce-
ment officer in this day and age would get fired 
twenty times over for attempting such stunts. 
(Although there is part of me that has always 
wanted to hold out my badge and commandeer 
something. Anything. Even if just a Big Wheel). 
So what are the actual rules of engagement for 
a vehicle chase? They differ slightly from depart-
ment to department, but here's what I can tell you 
about my neck of the woods. First off, chases aren't 
that common. Even an active officer might only get 
into a few pursuits a year. But when a driver flees, 
it's usually because of one or more of the following 
conditions: (1) The driver of the fleeing vehicle is 
in a stolen car. (2) The driver has multiple arrest 
warrants. (3) The driver is drunk. (4) There are 
items in the car the driver does not want discov-
ered (guns, drugs, plagiarized term papers). 
Chases can be touched off in a number of 
different ways (e.g., a traffic stop, recognizing a 
felony suspect behind the wheel, etc.), but the 
bottom line is, you've turned on your squad's lights 
and siren and the vehicle you are following isn't 
pulling over. Okay. It's game on. This is the 
promise of excitement that lured you onto the 
force. This is why your little brother still thinks 
you're sort of cool. 
The first part of a chase is the radio broadcast. 
The pursuing officer gets on the air and tells the 
dispatcher what's going on. If you are solo, driving 
while broadcasting is a difficult feat. It's like trying 
56157 The Cresset Trinity 12004 
to read two books at once. If you have a partner, 
that person will broadcast and the driver will 
concentrate on driving. The key to broadcasting is 
to remain calm. The tendency is to talk fast on the 
air, because you're excited and traveling at high 
speeds. But the best broadcasts are confident and 
pithy, yet affectless-like you're ordering breakfast 
or inquiring about which films may be showing at 
the multiplex. Basically, you want to sound like 
Tom Brokaw. A solid broadcast might go some-
thing like this: 
Officer: "Squad 80 for the air." 
Dispatcher: "Go ahead, Squad 80." 
Officer: "I'm in vehicle pursuit northbound in the 
1800 block of N. King St. four-door white Ford 
Taurus with plates of William George Tom Four 
One Seven. One white male occupant." 
Dispatcher: "What is the reason for pursuit, 80?" 
Officer: "The car is refusing to pull over for a 
traffic stop. We're still northbound on King St, 
approaching Center. Speeds at about forty mph. 
Traffic is light. Road conditions are good." 
My departmental policy states that only two 
police vehicles may be involved in a chase, in order 
to minimize chaos and accidents. The unit directly 
behind the fleeing vehicle is primary and the other 
unit is secondary. Let me be frank. There are never, 
ever, just two police cars in pursuit. Cops thirty 
blocks away are tossing their double cheeseburgers 
and shakes out the window and roaring out of the 
drive-through to get in on the action. Everybody 
wants a piece of the pie. 
In the initial stages of the chase, an officer will 
run the plate of the fleeing vehicle. We want to 
know where the car lists to, because that may be 
where the fleeing suspect is heading, somewhere 
familiar where he can ditch the car and run. But 
plates often don't list to vehicles. Some folks think 
nothing of stealing a plate and putting it on their 
own car, so the license on that 2003 Cadillac 
Escalade you're after may in fact list to an '81 
Dodge Dart. Rats. Running the plate will also tell 
you if the car is stolen (unless it's a fresh steal that 
hasn't been reported yet). 
So the chase continues, through alleys and 
parking lots and sometimes over front lawns, as 
other cars lurch out of the way like frightened 
cattle. The pursuing officer continues to broadcast 
the direction of travel of the fleeing vehicle and 
also tries to keep an eye on the driver to see if she 
tosses any contraband out the window. In the squad 
car, due to the stress and kinetic charge of the 
chase, colorful language is usually bandied about. 
Here are some techniques criminals use to try 
and shake their pursuers: 
The Stop and Go. At some point during the 
chase, the car will pull over, as if the driver is 
conceding defeat. If the officers then get out and 
approach, the driver will take off again, counting 
on the head-start he now enjoys as the officers run 
back to their squad to give chase. 
The Leap of Faith. The driver will jump out of 
the car and stagger away while the car is still 
moving at low speed, in hopes that the officers will 
have to stop the moving car from causing an acci-
dent instead of giving chase on foot. Incidentally, 
there is a traffic ticket solely designed to handle 
desperados like this. The ticket is called Alighting 
from Moving Vehicle, is quite pricey, and is an 
absolute delight to hand out. 
The Dip and Pray. The driver turns the corner, 
immediately parks, turns the car off, and ducks 
down in hopes that the cops will fly right by. If it 
works, the driver can get away, chortling at her own 
cleverness. If it doesn't work, she's a fly in the web. 
I N A CHASE, THE BAD GUY GENERALLY HAS THE 
upper hand. He probably has some idea where he's 
going and action always beats reaction, so the 
pursuing cops are always playing catch-up. And the 
driver probably doesn't hold the same regard for 
life and property that the pursuing officers do, so 
he'll zip through a red light without a second's 
thought or scream by that scout troop about to 
cross the street. The bad guy also has an advantage 
because in many municipal departments, a 
pursuing officer may not fire a weapon at the 
fleeing vehicle (unless under exigent circum-
stances), ram the vehicle, or use spike strips to 
deflate the tires of the vehicle. Where's the fun in 
that?, you may wonder. Well, it is the city, after all. 
Too much traffic, too many people, too many 
things that could go wrong. Better to chill a little. 
W.nu THE cHASE coNTINUEs, A POLICE 
supervisor, typically a sergeant, is listening in on 
the radio. The supervisor weighs the prospect of 
catching the bad guy against the danger posed to 
the public by all these cars racing through the city. 
The supervisor knows that chases have ended in 
horrific accidents where police officers are killed 
when they smash into each other, or some pedes-
trian is struck so hard by the fleeing vehicle that he 
is literally knocked out of his shoes. If the police 
nab the bad guy but in doing so, two cops have 
ruptured discs in their backs from a crack-up and 
the fleeing driver ends up running his car through 
somebody's living room, maybe the community 
wasn't well served by the chase. 
So if the chase gets too out of hand, and espe-
cially if there's a chance the driver can later be 
identified, a supervisor may cancel the pursuit. 
That means that even if the suspect car is still right 
in your sights, you have to pull over and disengage. 
Despite cancellation of a pursuit often being the 
wise, practical decision, street cops hate it. That's 
when the clicking starts. Clicking is when disgrun-
tled officers, either the pursuing officers or officers 
just listening in, key their radio mike multiple times 
in rapid succession, generating a clicking sound. 
The clicking is a sign of disapproval akin to booing. 
If you, the reader, are thinking that clicking sounds 
a bit childish and unprofessional, well, you're 
right. It's also dangerous, because officers can't 
hear anything when the mike is being keyed, so any 
calls for help on the radio will go unheard until the 
clicking stops. I don't know if clicking is a nation-
wide phenomenon. I don't know when or where it 
started. I don't know how to stop it. 
If the pursuit is not cancelled and the suspect 
vehicle finally comes to rest after the chase, a 
couple of things might happen. The driver and any 
passengers may flee on foot. Or they may stay put 
because there are a hundred cops behind them. If 
they stay, the police are supposed to do what's 
called a felony stop. This is a practiced, tactical 
maneuver involving at least two squad cars parked 
at certain angles, several officers covering down on 
the vehicle with shotguns, and an officer on the PA 
ordering the suspect or suspects out of the vehicle 
step-by-step in a series of rehearsed commands. But 
human nature being what it is, instead of the felony 
stop, typically what you get is the blue swarm; a 
wave of cops with their guns out immediately 
converging on the suspect's car, running up on top 
of the hood, yanking the driver out through the 
door or window, their adrenaline so spiked that 
they can't wait, like a kid who tears open his pres-
ents a week before Christmas. 
The aftermath of a pursuit involves an obscene 
amount of paperwork (the criminal charge is called 
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Fleeing and is a felony), and media coverage (there 
is something blood-stirring and eminently watch-
able about car chases, and the local news gobbles it 
up}. As the pursuing officers decompress from a 
successful chase, a deep sense of satisfaction settles 
in. After all, the quarry has been hunted down 
through the maelstrom and around perdition's 
flames, with minimal damage to people and cars. 
The white whale is in handcuffs now, his head 
bowed, his vehicle on the back of a tow truck. 
Somewhere, Captain Ahab is smiling. f 
A.P. wrote this column mostly as an excuse to use 
the phrase "perdition's flames." 
tthnml g§ cattth0linc 
Martin Luther and Mother Teresa 
I NO WNGER HAVE THE CONCERN FOR 1HING5 
Lutheran I once had, but I read with interest 
Martin Marty's essay "Writing Martin Luther" in 
the Epiphany/Lent issue of this journal. In partic-
ular, I was fascinated by his assertion that Luther's 
message is assumed by many to be no longer rele-
vant to most Christians: "[Luther's] constant 
themes that offer variations on the cantus firmus, 
the foundation, namely justification by grace 
through faith, can sound like solutions that are 
useless because they address problems people of 
today are not expected to have." In other words, 
most people today are no longer 
] ennifer Ferrara 
According to Zaleski, the doubt described by 
Mother Teresa is a modern version of the dark 
night of the soul. In past centuries, mystics went 
through periods during which they believed God 
had reprobated them. In modern times, the dark 
night of the soul has taken "the form of radical 
doubt, doubting not only one's state of grace, but 
God's promises and even God's existence." 
This radical form of doubt is, it seems to me, 
the main spiritual problem of our time. Marty is 
right that most people are not plagued by feelings 
of guilt. (Whether or not they should be is a 
different issue). However, people do 
tormented by feelings of guilt or 
fears of hell. Luther's insecurities, 
which lie behind his theology, are not 
our insecurities. Therefore, his 
message that we are justified by grace 
through faith falls on deaf ears. 
I agree with Marty that the spir-
itual landscape has changed since the 
time of the Reformation. His article 
The idea that our 
doubts, even of 
God's existence, 
can ultimately 
bring us closer to 
Him was nothing 
short of a spiritual 
suffer from feelings of doubt, mean-
inglessness, and loneliness. These 
feelings are the modern form of 
despair. As a pastor, I tried to 
address this problem within the 
Lutheran law/gospel framework. 
Following the Lutheran confessions, 
I viewed despair as a form of sin 
(Luther's Smalcald Articles call it a 
fruit of original sin) to which the reminded me of another-Carol 
Zaleski's "The Dark Night of 
revelation to me. 
Mother Teresa" in First Things. Zaleski argues that 
Mother Teresa is a saint for our times because she 
suffered from the fears and doubts of our age. For 
this reason, she can teach us something about how 
to cope with modern spiritual problems. 
Though we know Mother Teresa primarily 
through her ministry to the poor and dying, she 
was a mystic who suffered from a "true dark night 
of the soul" for most of her adult life. For two 
years when she was in her thirties, she experienced 
a profound union with Christ. But for the rest of 
her whole adult life, she suffered from the loss of 
all spiritual consolations. In her letters, she 
describes "that terrible pain of loss of God not 
wanting me, of God not being God, of God not 
really existing." 
answer was the promise of God's 
forgiveness. However, the solution did not seem to 
fully fit the problem. 
My study of the mystics has led to a different 
understanding and approach to the problem of 
despair, one with a long tradition in the Catholic 
Church, yet one which is perhaps more relevant for 
the modern age. From the mystics, I have learned 
that despair can be an integral part of one's faith. 
Zaleski says, "Mother Teresa learned to deal with 
her trial of faith. . .by converting her feeling of 
abandonment by God into an act of abandonment 
to God. It would be her Gethsemane, she came to 
believe, and her participation in the thirst Jesus 
suffered on the Cross. And it gave her access to the 
deepest poverty of the modern world: the poverty 
of meaninglessness and loneliness." 
The idea that our doubts, even of God's exis-
tence, can ultimately bring us closer to Him was 
nothing short of a spiritual revelation to me. As it 
turns out, I heard this thought articulated for the 
first time during a particularly spiritually arid time 
in my life-the period after which I had left the 
Lutheran Church but had not yet entered the 
Roman Catholic Church. I could no longer pray. 
God seemed distant at best. During this time, I 
went on a retreat at the Sisters of Life Convent in 
the Bronx. There a priest talked about the theology 
of the great mystic and doctor of the Church, St. 
Teresa of Avila. I hadn't wanted to go on the retreat 
(a friend dragged me along), and I certainly wasn't 
in a frame of mind to encounter new ideas. I had 
sunk deep into spiritual darkness and was getting 
rather used to it. 
I remember little of the talk: the ideas were so 
new to me, I couldn't take them all in. But I took 
away the knowledge that God was allowing me to 
undergo a period of purgation-a time of spiritual 
purification. From St. Teresa, I learned that times of 
despair can serve such a purpose. I do not mean to 
compare my life to that of the great mystics, but to 
show how their insights into the meaning of 
suffering and despair can help us make sense of our 
own. The key is how one looks at the problem of 
despair. As a Lutheran, I viewed doubt as the oppo-
site of faith. As a Catholic, I understand it to be an 
occasion for faith. The great nineteenth-century 
mystic, St. Theresa of Lisieux was able to say, "Do 
not believe I am swimming in consolations; oh, no, 
my consolation is to have none on earth." 
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Obviously, for some people who have no faith, 
despair is just that. However, for those who have 
even a glimmer of faith, despair can become a 
source of hope. When turned over to God and 
offered up for his good purposes, despair becomes 
meaningful, and, on some level, ceases to be despair. 
Richard Neuhaus, in his review of Marty's 
book in First Things, says of Martin Luther, "Few 
Christian thinkers have so well understood the 
abyss of despair that is the alternative to the utterly 
gratuitous love of God in Christ." The nature of 
the abyss has changed for many Christians; the 
answer of God's grace has not. Modern mystics 
offer a way of making that grace relevant to the 
problems of today. Feelings of meaninglessness, 
loneliness, and doubt properly understood move 
us toward union with God. There is a dark 
knowing and a dark loving and, as Mother Teresa 
demonstrated, we can carry on in the midst of 
them, hopeful that the darkness will one day give 
way to light. Faith is sometimes a matter of hanging 
on to that light no matter how dim its glow, 
knowing that through our sufferings we are partic-
ipating in Christ's agony on the cross. From 
Mother Teresa, we learn that faith is sometimes 
strongest when it appears the weakest. This is a 
message for our time. f 
Jennifer Ferrara, a formerly ordained minister of the 
ELCA, is a Roman Catholic laywoman. She is co-
editor of The Catholic Mystique: Fourteen Women 
Find Fulfillment in the Catholic Church (Our 
Sunday Visitor, 2004). 
the fate of marriage in America 
I, IT DISCRIMINATION TO REFUSE GAY AND LESBIAN 
couples access to the social institution of marriage? 
Is that refusal unfair and unjust? Those seem to be 
the pressing questions that more and more judges 
are answering in the affirmative. Indeed, it seems 
that many urban centers in America are poised to 
strike down as impermissible discrimination the 
age-old requirement that marriage must be a union 
of a man and a woman. Could the whole of Western 
history and society have been wrong in limiting 
marriage to the union between male and female? 
the history of marriage law 
The answers to those questions depend on 
what is meant by marriage and rights. Take 
marriage; it is abundantly clear that historical 
precedent weighs universally on the side of the 
male-female requirement. (So argues John Witte, 
Jr. in his fine volume From Sacrament to 
Contract-Marriage, Religion, and Law in the 
Western Tradition. Much of what follows is gleaned 
from that book.) Marriage in the West was defined 
by the Early Church over against Roman practice. 
It relied on Jesus' reaffirmation of the Genesis texts 
that Adam and Eve should become one-flesh in an 
exclusive, life-long union. The Catholic Church 
developed a theology of marriage by the third 
century and fully systematized it in the eleventh to 
thirteenth centuries. That theology was embodied 
in canon law, which regulated marriage for all the 
Christian societies of the West. Marriage had 
natural, contractual, social, and religious dimen-
sions that were articulated theologically and 
legally. In the Catholic tradition marriage was an 
indissoluble sacrament. Couples could separate on 
the basis of adultery or desertion but they could 
not divorce. The entrance to marriage was care-
fully guarded by a long list of impediments that 
insured that both the man and the woman were fit 
for marriage. The Catholic tradition also set the 
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classic goals of the holy covenant of marriage that 
have persisted to the present day in most Christian 
traditions-"one-flesh" union of a man and a 
woman, procreation, and protection from sexual 
sin. These rules and goals have been embodied in 
the marriage laws of Catholic countries to the 
present day. 
Protestants-Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, 
and the offshoots thereof-denied that marriage 
was a sacrament that conveyed saving grace on the 
married couple. They also abolished celibate orders 
and elevated marriage to a holy estate pleasing to 
God. And they gave jurisdiction over marriage to 
the state, not the church. However, all maintained 
the natural, social, contractual, and religious 
dimensions of marriage and the classic three 
purposes. (Like the Catholics, Protestants regarded 
homosexual behavior as sin and never could have 
even conceived of homosexuals marrying.) 
Lutherans emphasized the civil, social nature of 
marriage, Calvinists emphasized its covenantal 
character, and Anglicans made marriage the foun-
dation of the commonwealth. 
Each of these Protestant traditions was 
ensconced in the laws of the societies in which they 
were dominant, and the United States was an 
inheritor primarily of the Catholic, Calvinist, and 
Anglican notions. Indeed, the laws regulating 
sexual ethics, marriage, and family life reflected 
these deep-running religious notions up until the 
middle of the twentieth century. It was only then 
that laws against contraception, adultery, fornica-
tion, divorce, homosexuality, abortion, and illegiti-
macy began to fall. 
the contractual view of marriage 
Why were these laws struck down? Because a 
new, stripped-down notion of marriage began to 
replace the richer notions that held sway earlier. 
That new notion began with the Enlightenment of 
the eighteenth century. In that view the contractual 
dimension of marriage is emphasized. Marriage is 
understood as a bargain freely entered into by a 
man and a woman. The two are assumed to be 
rational, equal partners who mutually establish 
rights by their marital agreements. This version 
ignored the other dimensions of marriage as well as 
its three classic purposes. Marriage became what-
ever two free individuals make it out to be. While 
this approach certainly-and in many cases, 
happily-increased the freedom of individuals, it 
eroded the thicker dimensions of marriage. 
It took a long time for this Enlightenment 
notion to predominate in American law because of 
the strong religious substance yet inherent in 
American culture. This view first came to domi-
nance in the law schools of America, whose legal 
philosophies increasingly ignored the moral and 
religious basis of law. The "legal reasoning" taught 
in law schools became purely procedural-focused 
on fair and rational processes-and rejected three 
of the four traditional dimensions of marriage 
while it ignored the three classic goods of marriage. 
As individual rights have been pressed by plaintiffs 
wanting to enter the institution of marriage, 
lawyers and judges have slowly disconnected 
marriage and family law from its foundations in 
centuries of religiously-based moral convictions. As 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently argued: 
there are no "rational" grounds for marriage to be 
reserved for only man/woman unions. 
The last requirement-sexual complemen-
tarity-from the older notion of marriage is now 
under fire. Not much else is legally intact from the 
older notions of marriage that were outlined 
above. If marriage has come to this, then, there are 
few grounds to deny access to homosexuals to this 
diminished institution. This thin, contractual 
notion of marriage seemed to be the dominant one 
in San Francisco recently when thousands of gay 
and lesbian couples perfunctorily married, and 
then were deputized to marry others. Each couple 
made of marriage what they wished to make of it. 
Indeed, this contractual notion cannot justify 
refusing marriage to trios, groups, or family 
members. 
the challenge before us 
But the story does not end here, as it does in 
the more secularized countries in the West. 
Americans as a whole adhere to the "thicker" 
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notions of marriage that are being overlooked by 
the law. They not only believe that marriage ought 
to be between a man and a woman, but they believe 
that it is oriented toward procreation, and should 
be a permanent union characterized by sexual 
fidelity. They hold to more traditional notions. 
THE SPECTACLE OF THOUSANDS OF HOMOSEX-
uals-as well as the many more thousands of 
heterosexuals-"marrying" under this thin 
contractual assumption is making people wonder 
whether we need to bulk up our public notions of 
marriage. Covenant marriage, replete with the 
"thicker" notions mentioned above, has been 
enacted in several states. A Constitutional 
Amendment has been proposed that would guard 
several of the traditional aspects of marriage. 
Perhaps the underlying religious vigor in American 
society can rebuild a network of laws that honor 
these deeper meanings. This stronger version of 
marriage may become the law of the land, with the 
states left to work out whether or not they want to 
legalize "unions" that are more contractual in 
nature, as well as what sorts of legal benefits they 
want to attach to them. 
Americans should take note of Scandinavia, 
where a thinner notion of marriage has been domi-
nant for some time. Scandinavian marriage is not 
sharply distinguished from co-habitation, so even 
contractual marriage has diminished sharply. Gays 
and lesbians have access to this version of marriage, 
but not many enter it. This thin notion of marriage 
has also been de-coupled from procreation so that 
the few babies that are born are born overwhelm-
ingly out of wedlock. Unstable couplings mean that 
the few children born are brought up mostly by the 
child care agencies of the state. Interestingly, by 
contrast, in places where religious culture still 
remains strong, marriage retains much of its tradi-
tional meaning, more children are born to married 
couples, and marriage is more stable. Or so argues 
Stanley Kurtz, in his widely-read report on "The 
Death of Marriage in Scandinavia" (Weekly 
Standard 9/20, 2 February 2004). 
In view of all this, I would argue that the laws 
governing marriage ought to be shored up to the 
more rigorous notions held by the majority of 
Americans. Marriage ought to be governed by 
natural principles-the complementarity of the 
sexes, by social concerns-that stable marriages of 
biological parents are the best place to raise chil-
dren for the sake of society, and by contractual 
rules-that the consent of two competent, adult 
persons be assured and guarded. Moreover, our 
laws should recognize that marriage aims at the 
permanent, faithful union (including sexual 
fidelity) of a man and a woman, at procreation 
(absolutely essential for the future of any society), 
and at the restraint of a sexual disorder that can 
cost so much to persons and the society. These are 
civic meanings. Religious meanings can be added to 
the many marriages that are blessed within various 
religious traditions. Even without the meanings of 
a religious ceremony, however, the civil meaning of 
marriage ought to accord with the principles above. 
Strong, legally mandated benefits ought to accrue 
to the couples who enter this important social insti-
tution, so that marriage is honored and differenti-
ated from co-habitation and other partnerships, 
including homosexual ones. The children begotten 
in these unions ought to bring further benefits to 
the couple. Further, marriage ought to be difficult 
to get into-couples should undergo mandatory 
counseling-and even more difficult to exit-we 
should end "no fault" divorce immediately. 
the question of rights 
If this more robust meaning of marriage 
prevails, it seems clear that homosexuals do not 
have the right to enter this social institution. 
Marriage is defined by certain criteria that they 
simply cannot meet. Homosexual behavior has 
long been held to be an impediment to enter 
marriage. Therefore, it is not unjust discrimination 
to deny homosexuals-and other persons, 
including many heterosexuals, who cannot meet 
the criteria-entry to the social institution of 
marriage that has been so honored in Western 
history. Rather, it is simply applying the principles 
that have been applied until very recently in every 
society in all of Western history since the beginning 
of the Christian era. 
It is proper and important to halt the "defining 
down" of marriage and to bring the legal definition 
of marriage up to the basic moral convictions of the 
majority of our citizens. Covenant marriage and 
the proposed Amendment would help to do that. 
However, all Americans enjoy many "negative" 
rights that assure persons considerable freedom in 
the private realm. Many homosexual and hetero-
sexual pairs already live together in ample condi-
tions of freedom. Homosexual unions can be 
blessed by the churches and synagogues that wish 
to do so without any fear of government interfer-
ence. Further, some states may want to recognize 
gay unions or non-sexually defined partnerships 
and bestow on them certain rights and obligations. 
But for the sake of a stable and wholesome 
society, the laws regulating marriage must be 
strengthened and extended to protect the essential 
features of this venerable and indispensable social 
institution. While properly excluding some, the 
thriving social institution of marriage will be a 
benefit to all. f 
Robert Benne directs the Roanoke College Center 
for Religion and Society. 
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THE PRIVATE 
COLLEGE IN TROUBLE 
BY JOHN STRIETELMEIER 
(first published May 1970) 
Church-related colleges and 
universities all over the country 
are in trouble, and it takes no 
special gift of prophecy to predict 
that many of them will not survive 
the decade of the Seventies. 
To a very large extent, they 
have only themselves to blame. 
Nowhere in the Church is its 
failure of nerve more evident than 
in its colleges and universities. 
Institutions which, in their best 
days, prided themselves on being 
distinctive now rejoice that one 
can be on their campuses for 
weeks at a time without having 
reason to suspect that they are 
affiliated with a Christian denomi-
nation. The spirit of what one of 
my colleagues has aptly called 
"me-too ism" has caught up many 
a church-related institution and 
made it over into a pale copy of 
the secular school. And the tragedy 
is that its administration, faculty, 
and students so often mistake this 
apostasy for maturity. For a 
church-related college or univer-
sity of this kind there is no hope 
and we should rejoice to see it 
depart the scene, for it cumbereth 
the educational ground. 
But there still remain many 
church-related institutions which 
deserve to survive. 
On the lowest level, they 
deserve to survive because they 
offer a respectable alternative to 
the publicly supported institution. 
Unless we are to assume that 
education is the natural monopoly 
of the state, we need institutions 
which will cater for elements of 
wholesome variety in our culture. 
There is a place for the college or 
university which has some over-
arching theme around which all of 
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its teaching and learning are 
organized-some useful ax to 
grind, if you will. In the great days 
of the University of Chicago, 
Hutchins and Adler could tell you 
what Chicago had to offer that no 
other university could offer. And 
so it has been at many another 
private college or university, some 
of them denominational. 
But on a higher level the 
Church needs to "test all things, 
hold fast to that which is good." 
And this has been the historical 
role of the church-related college 
or university at its best. 
Unfortunately, it has played 
this role with little support, either 
financially or in terms of under-
standing, from its constituency. 
Church people have too often 
looked upon their colleges and 
universities as primarily custodial 
institutions for women and degree 
mills for men and have doled out 
just enough support to keep them 
going at a low level of subsistence. 
Now even this support is drying 
up, and most seriously so in the 
case of those denominational insti-
tutions which are trying hardest to 
give their Church constituencies 
something more and better than is 
being asked of them. 
To complicate matters, at this 
very time when the good church-
related institution is having the 
greatest difficulty with its 
constituency it is also having the 
greatest difficulty with its own 
students. The day when the under-
graduate got all misty-eyed during 
the singing of Alma Mater is over, 
at least for the time being. The 
student today sees Alma Mater as 
an agency of the Establishment, 
intent upon repressing him and 
keeping him from doing his own 
thing. So there is restlessness, 
discontent, and occasional turmoil 
on campus-all of them sufficient 
grounds for many constituents to 
conclude that the place has gone to 
the dogs. Caught in the midst of 
the Generation Gap-between 
students who want total freedom 
NOW and constituents who still 
think of the college or university as 
primarily a custodial institution-
administrators and faculty 
members groan inwardly and begin 
to wonder whether it would not be 
best just to lock the place up. 
But, of course; that is not the 
answer. God must not be left 
without witness in the intellectual 
and academic world, however 
great the problems may be of 
maintaining that witness. The 
answer is for church people to take 
a greater interest in their colleges 
and universities, to bring a greater 
measure of sympathetic under-
standing to their problems, and to 
share their affluence with these 
institutions which are trying to do 
a necessary job for them. 
No doubt this sounds like the 
sort of thing one gets from a 
university's PR division. At its best, 
Lutheran theology has always 
maintained that men are capable 
of speaking the truth, even PR 
men, so we need not let that objec-
tion detain us. The fact of the 
matter, though, is that the present 
writer is a faculty member of some 
twenty-three years tenure and with 
a horror of shouting Wolf! If 
anything, I have toned down my 
concern so as not to give the 
impression of over-reacting to the 
problems which beset us in the 
denominational school. My best 
judgment is that the next five years 
will decide whether my university, 
and other church-related universi-
ties like it, will survive. I think 
they should, that they deserve to, 
that both the state and the Church 
would be the poorer if they did 
not. I can only hope that enough 
people share this conviction and 
will act upon it. 
LOT'S WIFE 
Who would not turn around 
one last time, torn back 
by the taste of ash, 
a lingering incandescence, 
unwilling to let go 
before seeing again 
the room where love was consummated, 
the garden where the child plucked grapes, 
the table where meat, bread, and wine 
spread and spilled 
for friends. 
Who would not? 
We root in the familiar, marking 
our borders by the 
carve of a chair, the twist of a road, 
the known edge of a hill. 
Not even grief, so woven 
into the fabric of place 
that we cannot watch trees 
move in the wind without discerning 
the weave of loss, keeps us from 
glancing again. 
Who would not turn? 
A pillar of pain 
whether you face the flame 
or merely shuffle through its shadow. 
He bids us find home 
in him, strange, strong God 
who calls us to leave our dead 
unburied. Did Peter's wife object? 
Did the torn nets and the aged father 
not cry out to James and John? 
Did the magdalene never wish to rest once 
more 
on the soft couch of sin? Surely at Nazareth 
his mother must have yearned 
to see the boy crawling 
again among the shavings. 
Brash, bold trust: 
To shatter every mirror of 
what we've been 




we must become. 
Lot's wife resists. Ardent, 
Robes whirling, she embraces her city. 
The daughters and husband trudge on. 
Anne M. Windholz 
Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts 
The Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and 
the Arts seeks to strengthen the quality and shape 
the character of church-related institutions of 
higher learning for the twenty-first century. First, it 
sustains a postdoctoral teaching fellowship for 
young scholars who wish to renew their sense of 
vocation within a Christian community of learning 
in order to prepare themselves for positions of 
educational leadership within church-related insti-
tutions. Second, it maintains a collaborative 
national network of church-related colleges and 
universities that sponsors a variety of activities and 
publications designed to explore the Christian 
character of the academic vocation and to 
strengthen the religious nature of church-related 
institutions. Together these programs bring focus, 
clarity, and energy to a critical aspect of a much 
larger project: the imaginative reformulation and 
implementation of an agenda for church-related 
higher learning in the twenty-first century. 
The Lilly Fellows Program is based in Christ 
College, the interdisciplinary honors college of 
Valparaiso University. 
LFP National Network of Church-Related 
Colleges and Universities: 
Abilene Christian University 
Augsburg College 
Baylor University 






California Lutheran University 
Calvin College 
College of the Holy Cross 
Columbia College 
Concordia College-Moorhead 






Trinityn Mennonite University 
Fordham University 
Furman University 









Indiana Wesleyan University 
Loyola College in Maryland 




Midland Lutheran College 
Morningside College 







Saint Mary's College 
Saint Mary's University of Minnesota 
St. Olaf College 
Saint Xavier University 
Samford University 
Seattle Pacific University 
Texas Lutheran University 
University of Dallas 
University of the Incarnate Word 
University of Indianapolis 
University of Notre Dame 
University of St. Thomas 
The University of Scranton 
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on cover-
Jeremy Scheuch's TV Guide Jesus is a mixed media collage recently donated to the Christ College art collection 
(managed by the Brauer Museum of Art) by Paul and Judith Strasen (both VU 1978), graduates of Christ College and 
collectors of art. Purchased from the 2004 exhibition Born Again! Modern Madonnas and Contemporary Christs at 
Rockhurst University, the work takes its inspiration from the cover of the May 6-12, 2000 issue of TV Guide which 
advertises a miniseries on the life of Christ. Through his collage, Scheuch is able to explore the interplay between 
sacred and commercial modes of representation. This work will be examined closely in a soon-to-be-published 
article by Professor David Morgan. 
on reviewers-
David Morgan 
is Phyllis and Richard Duesenberg Professor of Christianity and the Arts in Christ College, Valparaiso University. 
Agnes Howard 
is adjunct professor of English and History at Gordon College. 
Bruce Reichenbach 
teaches philosophy at Augsburg College. 
Christoffer H. Grundmann 
is John R. Eckrich University Professor in Religion and the Healing Arts at Valparaiso University. 
Scott Huelin 
teaches in Christ College, Valparaiso University. 
on poets-
Travis Scholl 
writes from Saint Louis, Missouri. 
Linda Mills Woolsey 
teaches English Literature and writing at Houghton College in Houghton, New York. 
Carl Leggo 
has published two books of poems, Growing Up Perpindicular on the Side of a Hill and View from My Mother's 
House (Killick Press). He is associate professor in the Department of Language and Literacy Education 
at the University of British Columbia where he teaches courses in writing and narrative inquiry. 
Anne Turner's 
work has appeared in Wellspring, Weavings, and Commonweal, among others. She has written four books of 
poetry and a published biblical novel, Apes and Peacocks. She writes from Grand Rapids, Minnesota. 
Anne M. Windholz 
is an independent scholar and writer who has published on gender and nineteenth-century literature. She 
taught literature at Roanoke College and Augustana College (South Dakota) before settling down to a life 
of writing in Sycamore, Illinois, where she is at work on her second novel. 
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